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Chapter I.
THE PROBLEM OP LOTZE
Man's inevitable attempt to unify and so explain his 
varied experience has reduced the world of thought to two 
great kingdoms which have offered strenuous resistance to our 
efforts toward further systematisation. On the one hand lies 
the realm of existence usually regarded as forming the proper 
object of the investigations of natural science; on the other, 
the realm of value, which is at least partially revealed in 
the normative sciences, in art, and in religion. That they 
lie in some sense, apart is quite obvious; that they belong 
together and must somehow be brought together both their unity 
in experience and the whole-constructing character of thought 
make equally evident. The natural scientist, as such, may be 
content to ignore questions of value as far as possible, and 
such a conception of natural science has sometimes been elevated 
into a veritable fetish, but this can be at most only a 
principle of method, and anything more than a relative success 
in the maintenance of such an attitude is utterly inconceivable. 
Certainly those whose attention is concentrated more directly 
on the questions of value will not usually be willing to ignore 
questions of existence, even if it were possible so to do; 1 and
1. Sorley, Moral Values, p. 77 ff.
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least of all can a developed religion, the Ritschlians to the 
contrary, withdraw into the realm of value and deny the per- 
tinence of any questions of existence. 1 The result is that 
these two realms are apt to confront each other, each endeavour- 
ing to maintain itself as over against the other; each 
striving somehow - by compromise, by resort to points of view 
that promise to prove more ultimate, sometimes even by flat 
denial - either to absorb the other, or at least to remove the 
apparent contradiction of itself by the other. The problem 
had already emerged by Plato's time, for it appears quite 
explicitly in his attempt to understand all things in the light 
of The Good - indeed it can be traced back as far as to 
Anaxagoras - and ever since it has been fluctuating between the 
foreground and the immediate background of philosophic specu- 
lation. It began to be prominent in modern thinking in the 
eighteenth century, owing largely to the work of Immanuel Kant. 
The problem was widened and deepened by the German Idealists, 
who extended, in philosophy, the domain of value from the 
exclusive moralism of Kant to include also the regions of 
aesthetics and of religion, independently considered; it was 
again made prominent in the nineteenth century owing to the 
active aggression of Naturalism, and the modern tendency to 
give primacy to the conception of value - at least in very 
influential quarters - has brought the question of its relation 
to existence hardly less definitely into the philosophic
1. cf. Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, Gh. III.
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limelight. 1 Because of the fact that, of the disciplines 
that are devoted more explicitly to questions of value, religion 
is the most accessible and yet the most ultimate, it has tended 
to play the role in human thinking of the great protagonist of 
the value disciplines. As a result, the opposition between 
the realms of existence and of value has often betrayed a 
tendency to take the form of a conflict between natural science, 
relying on reason, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 
religion, the medium of which is faith.
This conflict between existence and value, in its various 
forms, was violently agitating the intellectual environment in 
which Lotze grew up and did his life's work; his educational 
contacts were with both sides in the fray, and his writings 
can be appreciated only in its light. On the one hand, natural 
science had been advancing with such spectacular success that 
its spirit and principles were coming increasingly to dominate 
the thinking of the age. Since the stronghold of medieval 
thought, with its theologico-Ptolemaic background, its 
syllogistic ideal of method, its recourse to extra-mundane, 
supernatural agents and externally imposed purposes, had fallen 
one by one before the ever-increasing dominion of the purely 
mechanical conception of Nature, natural science had hastened 
from victory to victory. Philosophy, also, lent its support, 
both positively and negatively, to the increasing encroachment 
of science upon the whole domain of thought. As early at
1. Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, Gh. II.
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least as Descartes we find a fondness for the mathematical 
method that was destined to play a peculiarly important part 
in subsequent speculation, and the Cartesian doctrine of the 
automatism of animals, and the all but automatism of man, shows 
the extent of the dominance of purely physical categories in 
the realm of organic life. Biology, as a science, had not yet 
developed, and when it did there was a long struggle,complicated 
and intensified by the necessity of rejecting the mystical 
doctrine of Vitalism, and lasting almost up to the present time, 
to vindicate for it its own categories different from those of 
mathematics and physics. For Kant, science was just 
ma the mati co-physics; to this field he restricted the ..term 
"knowledge", all else being matter for subjective certainty or 
faith - and if this did not involve, on his part, any superior 
evaluation of the former, his terras soon carried that implication 
for others. When he finally came to the study of living 
organisms, he was forced to regard them as if other categories 
were operative in them; he did suggest, also, that for a higher 
intelligence the reconciliation of the mechanical and the 
teleological categories might be possible, but it remained his 
ideal to "explain all products and occurrences in nature, even 
the most purposive, by mechanism as far as is in our power." 1 
This widespread philosophic attitude was the positive contri- 
bution to which we referred.
During this period also, - and this is her negative
1. Grit, of Judg., sect. 78.
contribution - philosophy was exhausting herself in a series of 
brilliant campaigns, which yet seemed to yield no satisfactory 
result. How the last great philosophic drive had co.iie to a 
decided end, and the proud Hegelian army that had showed promise 
of subduing the whole world of thought in one comprehensive 
movement had lost its sense of unity and its consciousness of 
power. A few faithful adherents of genuine Hegelian! sin still 
strove to commend the method and the doctrine of the master, 
but they were greatly surpassed in importance, on the one hand, 
by such pseudo-Hegelians as Christian Weisse, Lotze's teacher 
in Leipsi,£«, who strove to retain the Hegelian form while 
applying it to more popular materials, 1 and, on the other hand, 
by the still more influential Young Hegelians. The latter - 
Arnold Ruge, Bruno Bauer, Strauss, and Feuerbach - were 
thoroughly materialistic in their sympathies, and were much
more interested in the origin and machinery than in the meaning
p and function of natural existences and events. Such a
weakened and divided force was no match for the a^ressive 
naturalism of contemporary science, whose mechanistic principle 
came easily to be regarded as a universal solvent, and whose 
materialistic philosophy was taken to be the only logical con- 
clusion. As such, materialism was taken up with something of 
a religious fervour, and became the subject of a widespread 
propaganda. Everything claiming superiority to matter v/as 
fiercely denounced; matter was regarded as eternal, and
1. Lotze, T'etaphysic, I-, p. 206.
2. Wallace, Lect. & Essays on i,"at, Theol. & Ethics, p. 49^ i.
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physical and chemical forces were looked on as being the only 
ultimate agents. Carl Vogt, in his bitter "KcShlerglaube und 
Wissenschaft" (1854), declared that "thought stands in about 
the same relation to the brain as gall to the liver or urine to 
the kidneys," and that the world exists "without organic 
substance, without a known Creator, nay, without a leading idea. 1 
Hellwald pronounced it to be the aim of science "to destroy all 
ideals, to manifest their hollowness and nothingness, to show 
that belief in God and Religion is deception." Biichner, in 
his book, "Force and Matter", which went through fourteen 
editions within twenty years, insisted that "Theism, or belief 
in a personal God, leads, as all history clearly shows, to 
Monarchism and the rule of priests; Pantheism, or belief in an 
all-pervading God, leads, where it is in the ascendency, to 
contempt of the,senses, denial of the Ego, to absorption in 
God, and to a state of stagnation; Atheism, or philosophical 
Monism, alone leads to freedom, to intelligence, to progress, 
to due recognition of man - in a word, to Humanism." The 
first edition of this book was published in 1858, while Lotze 
was working on his Microcosmus.
This waxing materialism, however, this passionate affirma- 
tion of existence to the exclusion of value, was only one side - 
the most vocal, perhaps, but still only one side - of the 
development of the times; and there had already come into 
more or less prominence in the circle of philosophical discussion
1. cf. Art. by H.N.Gardiner, "Lotze' s Th. Phil.," Presby. Review.
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at least three elements, all dealing with questions of value, 
which were destined, after a long struggle, to bring t-iis 
militant materialism to a very complete discomforture. These 
were the newly awakened interest in the moral, the aesthetic, 
and the biological aspects of experience. The struggle was 
really only beginning, in its intensity, in Lotze's day, or had 
hardly yet begun, and for this reason his attitude to the 
situation has a quite peculiar interest. It needed the further 
development of biological science to rally the forces of value 
and lead them to the attack, though in this it was very 
materially assisted by an attack delivered in the rear of the 
materialistic stronghold by tnose, among whom Lotze was himself 
prominent, who gradually brought about a more adequate concep- 
tion of the limits of the scientific point of view. It should 
perhaps be borne in mind that the latter attack was developed 
first, and that it is only within the last two or three decades 
that philosophers have had to their hand the full results of 
biological enquiry. The first of these value-disciplines - 
the ethical - was brought into peculiar philosophic prominence 
by Immanuel Kant, who, reinforced in his own tendencies by the 
contrary influences of Hume and Rousseau, gradually abandoned 
his early intellectual!sm in favour of a fundamental moralism. 
It was in moral experience that he found that justification 
which his theoretical enquiries could not furnish of the belief 
in G-od, Freedom and Immortality - a belief which seemed to
1. Pringle-Pattison, Idea of G-od, Oh. IV.
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constitute both an inescapable demand of the human soul and the 
goal of philosophic enquiry. Kant never succeeded in breaking 
away for the belief in a noumenal reality different from, and 
somehow more real than, the phenomenal, and since the latter 
alone was the object of scientific knowledge, and it was 
morality that brought us into touch with the noumenal reality, 
he really made morality the way to ultimate reality. Kant's 
spirit was caught, and his moralism extended, by J. G-. Fichte 
who proceeded to build upon the needs of the moral ego his 
whole philosophic system. Fichte made self-consciousness the 
fundamental principle in his philosophy, and he regarded the 
presence in us of the moral law as the only guarantee of the 
reality of self-consciousness. The non-ego became for him but 
the foil created by the ego as offering the only sphere for the 
possibility of moral development. In short, "the supremacy 
which Kant had accorded to the practical reason was taken . . . 
by Fichte in a much more literal and exclusive sense than it 
had borne to the elder philosopher. The activity of the 
practical Ego became the sole principle by which the existence 
of the intelligible world was to be explained." 1 It is 
unnecessary for us to trace out the history of this tradition 
in Germany. Its natural tendency - a tendency accentuated by 
Fichte's conception of the intelligence as an act - was to give 
primacy to the will, and this tradition has manifested its 
power in G-erman thinking since that time. It may, however, be
1. A. Seth, Devel. f. Kant to Hegel, p. 33.
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of interest to notice that in other lands also at this period 
the tendency to make morality fundamental in the approach to 
reality was manifesting itself. In France, for instance, 
Auguste Gomte was independently arriving at a position very 
similar to that of Kant, and placing moral ends above knowledge. 
He taught that the needs of Humanity, the needs of the heart, 
should set the only problems with which science can legitimately 
deal, and that only so much of the field of any science should 
be explored as is useful as a basis for the next higher science 
in his scale, at the top of which - served by all - he set the 
moral and social sciences. In England, at the same time, James 
Martineau was basing his theistic arguments on the reality of 
the moral ought. Clearly the tendency to fall back for 
ultimate assurance on the facts of moral experience was in the 
philosophic air during this period, as it had not been since 
the time of Plato, and here we have one of the influences which 
exercised an increasingly powerful opposition to the dominant 
materialism.
A second influence, as we have indica.ted, was the renewed 
interest in Aesthetics. Cousin says, "It is the eighteenth 
century which has introduced, or rather has restored, to 
philosophy those researches on the Beautiful and on Art which 
were so familiar to Plato and Aristotle, but which had been 
slighted by the Schoolmen, and had remained almost foreign to 
the great philosophers of the seventeenth century." 1 Professor
1. Quoted from Caldecott & Mackintosh, Select, f. t"ie Lit 
Theism, p. 306 f.
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Bosanquet 1 shows that there were "some traces of the aesthetic 
consciousness throughout the Laddie Ages," and that the movement 
of theory passed through a remarkable circuit, "beginning with 
a special sympathy for nature as opposed to the works of 'P.an in 
the Christian successors of Plotinus . . . . , passing through 
a phase of hostility to the higher and more human arts in the 
destruction of Paganism and the iconoclastic controversy, and 
ending with a complete recognition of a more significant beauty 
as the manifestation of the Divine both through art and nature 
in the age of St. Francis, St. Thomas, Dante, and G-iotto."^" 
In the early scholastics beauty apparently received no 
theoretical consideration. St. Francis attained the intimate 
sympathy with nature which characterises the modern mind, 
while Thomas Aquinas made frequent references to aesthetic 
theory in his writings, his ideas being derived from Plotinus 
through the pseudo-Dionysius, whose writings had been translated 
by Scotus Erigena. What is noteworthy in this long period is 
not the absence of an aesthetic consciousness, for "the actual 
aesthetic consciousness of the middle age was as a historical 
fact the most continuous and creative that the world has ever 
seen"3, but the absence of deliberate aesthetic theorising; 
and this may be attributed both to the "directness of the art- 
impulse" and the pressure of those other needs which gave to 
this period its peculiar character. The first name of 
considerable importance in the modern philosophic consideration
1. History of Aesthetic, Ch. VI.
2. BoBanquet's Hist. etc. p. 131 f. 3. Ibid., p.
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of beauty is that of Kant. Previous thinkers had not entirely 
ignored the subject, but their contribution was rather to t.ie 
setting of the problem which, in Kant, forced the consideration 
of beauty into prominence. It was Baumgarten who first erected 
the philosophy of the beautiful into a separate discipline, and 
gave to it its accepted title, Aesthetics. For him it took 
the form of an enquiry into "confused acts of thought", as the 
Rationalists were unanimous in regarding feeling, and its place 
in the philosophic Encyclopedia was as a preparation for the 
more respectable investigations which have clear ideas for 
their object. In the "Critique of Pure Reason", Kant had 
limited the sphere of knowledge, the work of the Understanding, 
to the mathematico-physical sciences; and in the "Critique of 
Practical Reason", he had made moral experience the sphere of 
the Ideals of Reason. "The separate worlds of Nature and of 
Freedom were thus established on the strength of two dis- 
tinguishable orders of facts - the facts of science and those 
of the moral life - and all proof of their incompatibility was 
supposed to be rendered impossible by the strict negative 
demarcation between them, that is, by a necessity of ignorance'.' 
The question inevitably arose for Kant of a further unification 
of these worlds, and it was in the fields of beauty and of 
organism that Kant found the indications of whicn he was in 
search. Judgment, he taught, was a synthesis of parts - the 
sphere of the Understanding - in subordination to a totality,
1. Bosanquet, Hist, etc., p. 260.
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which is, for Kant, the sphere of Reason, while disinterested 
feeling he regarded as mediating between action and theory. For 
these reasons he regarded the aesthetic judgment "as the guide 
to the required meeting-point of Nature and Freedom, Under- 
standing and Reason, the sensuous and the intelligible." 
Kant, however, was not able to give to the aesthetic judgment 
the objectivity which its central role in his system would seem 
to demand for it. For him it was merely the expression of "a 
felt harmony in the play of our powers on occasion of a certain 
perception." The objectivity of the aesthetic judgment, the 
assurance of an objective harmony of which the subjective 
harmony was a revelation, was the work of Kant's successors. 
How they worked It out we need not pause to enquire; enough 
for our purpose to notice that the entrance of aesthetics into 
the forefront of philosophical speculation started a tradition, 
maintained by Schelling and Hegel and fostered by Schiller and 
Goethe, which exerted its strength against the aggressive 
materialism of the age. It should be mentioned in passing 
that the tendency, which we will have to notice in Lotze, to 
lay stress on feeling as a foundation of knowledge, was also, 
though perhaps less pervasively present in Lotze's environment. 
Like the moralistic tendency it was a revolt against exaggerated 
intellectualism, and the current interest in art, the Romantic 
movement, was one of its expressions. Perhaps its most 
prominent representative before Lotze was Friedrich Schleier- 
macher.
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The third element, the interest in biology, organism, we 
need not pause to trace out, for its real influence was mani- 
fested only much later than the period in which we are now 
interested. It was introduced, as we have already seen, by 
Immanuel Kant in his third Critique, but it was not really 
fruitful until after the time of Darwin. When biology did 
begin to develop, strangely enough, its first result seemed to 
be to reinforce materialism, and it was only later that biology 
proved to be a "liberating influence" "emancipating us from 
the bad dream of Naturalism." 1 Lotze regarded the body as a 
mere machine. Vogt, as we have seen, had as early as this 
descried in organic substance an enemy to be denounced, and the 
conception, when finally taken seriously, was fatal to the 
faith he preached.
With both of these tendencies, the materialistic and the 
idealistic, Lotze came into intimate and sympathetic contact 
during his university training. When he entered the University 
of Leipsig, in 1834, though perhaps mainly interested in studies 
that belonged to the latter field, he was technically enrolled 
as a student of medecine. This fact is probably traceable to 
the influence of his father, an army doctor, who had died in 
1829. To such effect did he pursue these studies that, on 
the completion of his course, he was able to acquire the right 
(habilitieren) to lecture in medecine in the University; he
became a prolific author and original thinker on medical
>
1. Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, p. 66.
14.
subjects, and acquired considerable standing. Helmholtz later 
declared that Lotze had prepared the way for his own researches, 
having thoroughly, methodically, and with distinctive acuteness 
criticised and cleared away rubbish out of the domain of general 
pathology, as it existed before his time. In Lotze's earlier 
years medical science was still much under the influence of the 
theory of Vital Force. It was conceded that inorganic Nature 
must be mechanically explained, but it was generally felt that 
the peculiarities of the life of organisms necessitated some 
other explanation. 2 The theory was obviously inadequate, and 
there were those who argued for a completely mechanistic 
account of physiological processes. Amongst them Lotze's 
anatomy teacher, E. H. Weber, was striving in his famous law of 
the relation of stimulus to conscious 1 change to establish a 
mathematical law and so reduce psychology, at least in part, to 
an exact science. With this crusade against Vitalism Lotze 
actively allied himself, and it was mainly his success in this 
respect that drew forth Helmholtz's enconiums. In his last 
work, the Lletaphysic of 1878, Lotze says, "In an essay on 'Life 
and Vital Energy,' which forms the introduction to Rudolph 
Wagner's Hand-Dictionary of physiology, I defended, six- and- 
thirty years ago, the claim of the mechanical view to a place 
in the science of Physiology."^ This is rather a modest claim. 
In these young days Lotze was so anxious to extend as far as 
possible the realm of mechanism that he was willing to contem-
1. cf. Stahlin, "Kant, Lotze, Albrecht Ritschl," p. 305, n. 2? (Eng.tr.)
2. Netaphysic II, p. 129. 3. Vol. II. D. 12?.
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plate the reduction of Aesthetics to a mechanical science, and, 
though he finally receded from this position, the demonstration 
of the universality of mechanism was one of his abiding aims. 
In his opinion the mechanistic principle is to be applied to all 
matter, organic and inorganic; not only does it explain the 
sentient life of animals, but even the ideas in the human mind 
are in a relation of mechanical interaction with the outside 
world, and, though here Lotze is not at his best, he tends to 
fall into the Herbartic.n error of regarding the soul as a 
background, passive except in one respect, upon which the ides.s 
interact mechanically among themselves. 1 In this revolt against 
Vitalism, therefore, Lotze is in the fullest harmony with that 
glorification of the mechanistic principle which, as we have 
seen, was the foundation of the rampant materialism of the day. 
But with the materialistic deductions from the mechanistic
principle he will have nothing whatever to do. He is perfectly
P clear that mechanism does not involve materialism , and he
speaks with evident scorn of those in his day who thought that 
it did.^ Even more important among his aims than the desire 
to show how universal is the sway of mechanism is the other 
desire to show how subordinate is its significance, and the 
inalienable claims of the soul found ever in him an ardent 
advocate. In short, Lotze sympathised with, and was preeminent 
in the application of, the scientific principle of his day, but 
clearly perceived the illegitimacy of its extension, as
K Thomas, Lotze ' s Theory of Reality,- p. 123f . 2. i:icrocosmus I, p. 433 
> Metaphysics, sects. II - IX. 4. I.Iicrocosinus p. XVI.
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materialism, into the philosophic domain.
And this brings us to the other tendency, the idealistic. 
Lotze tells us that "it was a lively inclination towards poetry 
and art which first made him philosophize", and very ea.'ly in 
his career, in 1840, he published a book of verse. Not only 
did his appreciation of the claims of living feeling protect 
him, as we have just seen, from the snare of materialism; it 
also led him to revolt against what seemed to him to be the 
barren intellectual!sm of the Hegelian Idealism. Any tendency 
he may have had from his early training toward the values of 
human life, was likely to be fostered and cultivated by the 
influence of Christian Weisse, his teacher of philosophy in 
Leipsig. Weisse too was dissatisfied with the content of the 
Hegelian speculation, and, while he retained the form of 
Hegelianism, he recognised the values of life by attemption to 
apr^ly it to more popular materials. Weisse not only lectured 
on Aesthetics, but indulged in independent speculation in this 
field, his most important contribution being in relation to the 
place of the ugly in the beautiful. But perhaps Weisse"s main 
interest was in religious speculation. In his published works 
he deals with the idea of God, Theodicee, Immortality, the 
Resurrection, the philosophy of Christianity and Gospel History 
In the latter field Weisse was one of the forerunners of the 
Tubingen School of Criticism, and his individual contribution 
is of very great importance. 2 In the dogmatic field, Weisse
1. Wallace, Lect. & Essays, p. 495.
2. cf. Pfleiderer, Devel. of Theol. etc.
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endeavoured to round out what was popularly regarded as the 
Hegelian conception of G-od by attributing to Him both feeling 
and will, in addition to reason, and tried to set these 
attributes forth in the form of a doctrine of the Trinity and 
to trace their mutual relations in the work of Creation. He 
had another doctrine of a Trinity constituted by G-od, the 
Son-Man, and the kingdom of Heaven; and in his Christology he 
attempted to show the relation of the man Jesus to an advancing 
incarnation of G-od in human history. Knowing this about 
the teacher, we need feel no surprise to find the pupil 
intensely interested in the realm of faith, and driven by the 
necessity he felt of rejecting the traditional theistic proofs 
to attempt what became the great purpose of his thinking - to 
vindicate the claims of 'faith while yet retaining, and extending 
as far as possible, the principle of mechanism.
Lotze's philosophy, therefore, may rightly be regarded as 
a defence of theism; and, though he considers the chasm 
between existence and value to be unbridgeable, he hopes to 
show, by reasoning from a world of experience to the existence 
of a personal G-od, how great is the necessity of bringing them 
into harmony. "Insight into what ought to be will alone open 
our eyes to discern what is; for there can be no body of facts, 1 
he tells us in an eloquent passage in the Microcosmus, 2 "no 
arrangement of things, no course of destiny, apart from the 
end and meaning of the whole, from which each part has received,
1. Art. on Weisse, in Die Religion etc.
2. Vol. I., p. 392.
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not only existence, but also the active nature in which it 
glories." The promise is alluring, though all previous efforts 
to bring existence and value together, and particularly to 
harmonise science and re11£ion without detriment to the 
legitimate claims of either, have proved in the result to be 
far from satisfactory. For Descartes and his successors, the 
Occasionalists, G-od is merely a Deus ex machina, a convenient 
resting place when the struggle with their difficulties has 
exhaused their strength - an attitude which is correctly, if 
somewhat bitingly, described as "the domestic animal conception 
of G-od." Spinoza's G-od is too much of a greedy Moloch, demand- 
ing the sacrifice of values - freedom, for example - which we 
cannot readily give up. In the Leibnizian monadology God is 
merely the convenient excuse lying patiently and unobtrusively 
by until we human creatures require his services for introducing 
a world of harmony which experience dems,nds and Leibniz's 
theory cannot supply. Kant makes some promising and suggestive 
efforts, in his third Critique, actually pointing out the way 
in which existence and value may be harmonised in our theories 
of Nature and of Art; but his progress is with many a backward 
glance; he does not trust his own discoveries; and his result 
is but a defeat on the very verge of victory, while for him too 
G-od is but a convenient principle, externally introduced, to 
furnish in the practical sphere a moral requisite that Kant's 
theoretical principles cannot afford. It is probable tiir.t 
these previous failures are due in large part to the fact that
19.
the questions of value were not really faced until the various 
tninkers had already committed themselves too far in dealing 
with questions of existence. Lotze's philosophy, with the 
reconciliation of both spheres before him from the first as his 
central problem, bids fare to be more successful in this 
respect .
But before we proceed to state arid discuss it from this 
point of view, a brief consideration of Lotze's treatment of 
the traditional arguments would seem to be called for. we 
wish to bring out the fact that Lotze did not give a fair and 
sympathetic account of these arguments, and in order to do so 
we must has til/ sketch the history of the theistic arguments, 
mainly with a view to showing the various forms in which the 
several arguments have been set forth.
In his Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of G-od, 
Hegel disputes Kant's right to describe the teleological 
argument as the oldest, as he does in the famous phrase "the 
oldest, the clearest, and most in conformity with human reason 1.
a matter of pure history, this argument, it should be noted, 
appears quite clearly in the Old Testament, notably in Psalms 19 
and 104, and in Isaiah 40, and these are perhaps the earliest 
references to it in literature. The dispute between Kegel ane. 
Kant relates, ac far as I can discover, to the interpretation 
which is to be given to the much later worde of Anazagoras, 
''IIous is infinite and absolute, free fro:!, a "mixture with anythin
t. Critique of Pure Reason (Huller), p. 502.
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else, alone by itself; it is omniscient and omnipotent, and
has disposed all things, in order and in beauty, v;itni.; the
encompassing whole, where the stars are, and the sun, am! the
moon, an:"1, ether, and the air." Socretes, it is recorded, was
1 led by this statement to examine the work of Anaxa0onas with
eager expectation, but was disappointed at the failure of its 
author to make of it a real principle in his philosophy. He 
himself was profoundly impressed with the argument from design, 
and referred to it so frequently that he has usually been 
regarded as its author. It seems to have been chiefly the 
particular evidences of an external Designer that drew his 
attention, and here we have perhaps the origin of a tradition 
that long cherished, this argument, and that drew upon it the 
biting satire of Goethe and the more sober strictures of Hegel. 
Socrates, however, did show an appreciation of the deeper con- 
ception of immanent design also. In tne tenth book of the 
Laws, Plato offers as a conclusive ^roof of G-od's existence, a 
line of reasoning that contains features of the teleological 
argument along with elements of the cosmological . He reasons 
that motion which is derived must be thought as originating 
ultimately in spontaneous motion, and the latter, or motion 
which moves itself, is what we mean by soul. Souls are good 
or bad according as they give rise to orderly or disorderly 
motions. The great recurring motions of the universe are all 
orderly, and so must be the product of a supremely good soul,
1 .
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or God. Elsewhere, notably in the Timaeus, Plato refers to 
the design argument, sometiT.es to instances of external design, 
End the whole conception is fundamental to his thinking. The 
same may be said of his successor. In reasoning to the 
existence of God, Aristotle lays more stress on the cosmological 
argument, but his whole system falls into a dualism of efficient 
and final causes of which the former are regarded as but a means 
to the realisation of the latter, and he does expressly employ 
the design argument also. Cicero professed to be copying from 
Aristotle when, in his de Nature. Deorum, he advanced the argu- 
ment from the beauty and grandeur of the creation, and his 
analogy of the house came probably from the same source. The 
argument was thus fully elaborated before the modern period 
began, and that, too, in a pagan setting. It was a favourite 
argument with many of the Church Fathers, and received the 
sanction of the Schoolmen when Aquinas made use of it in his 
great Summa. Aquinas's form of the argument is as follows: 
"Some things that have no power of knowing, such as natural 
bodies, work for ends, as is manifest from their constantly, or 
at least frequently, working in the same way for the attainment 
of that which is best; which shows that they arrive at their 
end not by chance but from intention. Now such things as have 
no power of knowing do not tend towards an end unless they are 
directed by some being which has knowledge and intelligence, as 
an arrow is directed by an archer. There is, therefore, some 
intelligent Being by which all natural things are directed
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towards ends. And this we call God." By tnia argument, 
coming as the completion of various forms of the cosmological 
argument, Aquinas regarded the existence of G-od as conclusively 
demonstrated. Amongst the reformers, Melanchthon and Zwingli 
make use of the design argument; it was, as Wendland expresses 
it, the darling proof of the eighteenth century tneology, and 
was accepted as valid by such a deist as Relmarus. The latter 
regarded "Natural Religion" as quite sufficient for our needs, 
writing very acutely against revelation, and he based his 
natural knowledge upon the teleological argument. The nature 
of his data may be gathered from the titles of some of his 
publications, viz. "The Instinct of Animals as a Proof for the 
Existence and the Y/isdom of G-od," "General Considerations 
concerning the Instinct of Animals," etc. Leibniz has a form 
of this argument in his theory of Pre-established Harmony. 
Having enunciated a doctrine of extreme pluralism he felt 
constrained, in order to account for the world-plan to which 
experience bears at least a partial testimony, to hold that tne 
individual monads were originally determined in their nature by 
G-od in harmony with a comprehensive plan. This doctrine is 
therefore an argument to G-od from the ordered harmony of the   
world. The argument plays the same fundamental part in Paley's 
system as it does in that of Relmarus. For Paley's "I[oral 
and Political Philosophy" presupposes a system of future rewards 
and punishments as the only adequate source of ethical motive,
1. Art. on G-ottesbeweise, in Die Religion etc.
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and this, he thinks, depends on the credibility of the Christian 
Religion. His defence of the latter presupposes the existence 
of a benevolent Creator desirous of communicating with His 
creatures for their good; and it is the latter which he bases 
on the argument from design. He very skilfully brings his 
evidence together, all of it however characterised by that 
mechanical conception of the relation of God to the world which 
now makes all these arguments seem so unsatisfying, and the 
foundation of his whole argument rests on "the necessity, in 
each particular case" - taken from hunu-.n anatomy - 'of an 
intelligent designing mind for the contriving and determining 
of the forms which organised bodies bear." Kant did good 
service to the design argument by his development of the 
conception of immanent design. Previously, though this idea 
was more or less present, as we have seen, as early as Socrates, 
there had been much too great a tendency to interpret all the 
cases where man found natural objects suitable to his needs - 
a classical example is the bark of a certain tree for making 
stoppers for bottles - as evidence that G-od created these 
objects precisely to meet these human needs, and to found the 
design argument largely, or even exclusively, on such instances. 
However this "collier faith" may appear to one who already 
possesses a we11-developed theism, it can hardly be regarded 
as evidence conclusive enough to serve as the foundation of 
such a faith. What is more, the earlier tendency was to 
regard the source of design in nature, after the deistic fashion.
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as a Being standing outside of nature, in the same way as 
Aquinas's archer stands outside of his arrow; to regard Him, 
in short, as a contractor rather than as an architect or 
creator. While the transcendence of God is vital to a full 
religious consciousness and must not be given up, this view 
scarcely does justice to His immanence. Plant's indication of 
a design wnich is immanent in nature - purpose and materials, 
end and means, being united there in the closest harmony - is, 
though made by him with excessive caution, from every point of 
view a deepening of the de,3ign conception. In quite modern 
times the application of the conception of evolution to the 
explanation of organic forms has rendered many of the instances 
of design on which such writers as Paley confidently rested no 
longer available, and it ha.s even threatened to banish the very 
conception of design from nature. It was therefore strenuously 
resisted by popular theologians, and even by such -or.Ilosophers
as J. Hutchison Stirling. The later result has been, however,
p rather to deepen and widen the argument, and the modern
Idealist movement, for example, is founded on the idea that all 
things must be interpreted in terms of a purposeful whole.^
Aristotle is traditionally named as the originator of the 
cosmological argument, although, as we have seen, Plato's 
argument in the Laws contains cosmological elements. Indeed 
Aristotle's cosmological argument is just Plato's with the
1. Phil. & Theol.
2. cf. Sim 73son, Iran & the Attain, 3. C£ Pringle-Pattison. Idea
of Import., Gh. I. of God, Jh. XVII 
Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, Ch. IV. Bosanquet etc.
teleological ending omitted, and stated in terr.s of an astron- 
omical theory - that of Eudoxus - which Plato had deliberately 
rejected. 1 Aristotle argues that everything that moves has 
had a mover, except that the necessary ultimate member of t:ie 
causal chain must be a self-mover, which must be infinite and 
eternal. This is G-od. G-od he conceives as an exalted mind 
the only worthy object of whose thinking is his own nature. 
G-od, therefore, is quite unaware of the existence of the 
universe, moving it by being the end of its striving - the 
teleological element that permeates the Aristotelian philosophy 
being here introduced. G-od, for Aristotle, cannot be said to 
have moral qualities, and the conception in general is that 
which has come to be termed deistic. The cosmological argument 
therefore, like the teleological, was first elaborated in a 
pagan setting, and only later taken over into the stream of 
Christian thought. Its clear expression of the divine 
sovereignty has made it very welcome, however, in the home of 
its adoption. Thomas Aquinas teaches that, while "human 
intelligence cannot by its natural strength achieve the 
apprehension of [G-od'sj substance," still we are "led from 
things of sense into Divine knowledge, to the extent of knowing 
that G-od is;" 2 and of this fact we may attain a demonstrative 
certainty on the level of natural reason. The first of these 
demonstrative proofs is the Aristotelian argument from the fact 
of motion, which we have outlined above. Along with this
1. Taylor - Art. on Theism,in Hasting's Encycl. of Relig. & Ethics.
2. Summa c. Gentiles Bk. L, ch. Ill, quoted in Caldercott~& T 'aci'into?' 
Selections fro:n the Lit. of Theism.
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Aquinas advances an argument from causal agency to a "first 
efficient Cause; and all men call this G-od." This second 
argument is ultimately of the same nature as the first, and 
shares its limitations. The third is more like that form of 
the cosmological argument which came to be regarded as typical. 
It starts from the idea of contingency, in the sense tnat 
certain actually existing things, being generated and corrupted, 
can either exist or not exist. But, Aquinas reasons, at some 
time or other that which is thus contingent does not exist, and 
if there were not something necessary nothing would now exist. 
But if there be anything necessary something must be necessary 
in itself, and "this all men call Q-od. " Aquinas' s fourth 
argument, taken from Aristotle and Augustine, and found also in 
Anselm's Monologium, is based on the premise that the relative 
presupposes the Absolute. For instance, what is good pre- 
supposes The G-ood, what is true The Truth, and so forth. But 
all things participate in being, and so there must be a highest 
being, which is, as such, the cause of the existence of all 
other things and perfections; and this highest being we call 
G-od. The fundamental assumption of this fourth argument has 
acquired increasing prominence in modern thinking. It appears 
as a mere suggestion in Descartes. The most famous of the 
Cartesian theistic proofs is of the cosmological type. Descartes 
argues from the contingency in us of the idea of perfection to 
the existence of God as its cause, the suggestion that this idea 
is generated by us through our negating of the limits of the
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finite being rejected by him on the two grounds, first that 
simplicity is included in the idea itself, and, second, that 
the finite comes through our limitation of the infinite and not 
the infinite through aggregation of the finite. The same idea, 
prominent in Spinoza, is the goal towards which tne development 
of the Kantian thinking tended, but it was never deliberately 
worked out by him. It has since become, however, one of the 
fundamental generative principles of modern Idealism. The 
arduous struggle of the mind to transcend its finitude and 
overcome the dissociation of the Absolute is regarded, for 
instance by Bosanquet, as of the very nature of thought, and is 
expressly called by him the argument a contingentia mundi.
r\
Locke presents the argument from causality, "badly stated." 
He says, "If we know there is some real being, and that 
nonentity cannot produce any real being, it is evident demon- 
stration that from eternity there has been something, since 
what was not from eternity had a beginning, and what had a 
beginning must be produced by something else." Leibniz argues 
tuat, since time, space, and matter might easily have assumed 
other forms, movements, and order, all finite things are 
contingent, and therefore demand for their explanation an 
eternal, necessary, self-caused substance which makes their 
existence necessary. The twenty-fourth section of the first 
part of Wolff's Natural Theology reads as follows: "An ens 
riecessarium exists. The human mind exists, or we exist. Since
1. Princ. of Ind.& Value, Lect. VII. 2. Taylor, Art. on Theism etc. 
cf. also Pringle-Pattison, Idea 
of God, p. 251.
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there is nothing without a sufficient reason why it should be 
rather than not be, it is necessary that a sufficient reason be 
given why our mind exists, or why we ourselves exist. This 
reason is contained either in ourselves or in some other being 
diverse from us. But if you affirm that we have the reason 
for our existence in a being which again has the reason for its 
own existence in another, you have not reached a sufficient 
reason, unless at length you rest in some being which has the 
sufficient reason for its own existence in itself. Either 
therefore we ourselves are entia necessaria, or there is 
postulated another ens necessarium; consequently an ens 
necessarium exists." Wolff then proceeds to develop this 
conception of an ens necessarium into the full idea of G-od. 
The same indication of the point of departure as perhaps best 
centering in the self, and the same clear recognition of the 
fact that this argument properly contains two stages, is seen 
in K&nt's formulation of it in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
V/hat is essentially another form of this cosmolo^ical argument, 
somewhat akin to that of Descartes, is to be found in the 
philosophy of Berkeley, according to which the world of Nature 
is but a system of signs through which G-od speaks to finite 
souls. Nature is therefore a contingent existence which 
requires the existence of God for its explanation, of which, 
therefore, it is a constant evidence. It is because, in his 
philosophy, Nature is thus a constant witness of experience to 
the existence and nearness of G-od that Berkeley claired for his
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speculations such a high religious value. The same point of 
view finds an eminent, living champion in Canon Rashdall, and 
appeared also in the earlier,Scottish thinker, Professor Ferrier. 2
The last of the three great traditional arguments, the 
ontological, is the only one that has originated within Christen- 
dom. It may be described as the attempt to prove the existence 
of God from what is involved in our conception of Him. Anselm, 
its originator-5 argued that G-od, being that than which nothing 
greater can be conceived, must necessarily exist. For, if He 
did not exist, by adding to this conception the fact of exis- 
tence we could form a conception greater than the greatest that 
is possible for us. But this is a manifest absurdity, Anselm 
claims. Thus the mere ability to formulate the conception of 
God - an ability which falls within the capacity even of the 
fool who says there is no God - proves God's existence. Atheism 
is merely a verbal misuse. The latter idea commended itself 
even to such an empirical thinker as Francis Bacon. He says, 
"The Scripture saith: The Fool hath said in his Heart, tnere 
is no God: It is not said, The Fool hath thought in his Heart: 
So as, he hath said it by rote to himself, as that he would 
have, than that he can thoroughly believe it, or be persuaded 
of it." Anselm's argument was attacked by his contemporary, 
Gaunilo, who denied that atheism is merely the use of an 
expression without the corresponding conviction, and insisted 
that either we may fail to prove God's existence or else there
1. cf.,eg. Contentio Veritatis. 2. Institutes of TJetaphysic. 
3. Proslogium Ghs. II. & III. 4. Liber pro Insipiente etc.
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is no necessary ^roof at all. Against Anselm's prooi1 he 
brought forward his celebrated analogy of a perfect island, and 
drove home his attack by his claim, later urged by Hume and Kant, 
that we can think as non-existent anything that can be thought 
of as existing. Anselm's argument made little impression in 
the twelfth century, perhaps owing to the slowness with which 
books were then disseminated, but it was widely known in tne 
thirteenth. Of fifteen scholars examined by Daniels, three - 
including Albertus Magnus - express no opinion on its validity, 
ten - including Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, and Scotus - 
regard it as sound, and only two - Richard of KicMleton and 
Thomas Aquinas - definitely reject it. 1 It was Duns Scotus 
who first suggested that this argument should be regarded as 
supplementary to tne cosmolo^ical and teleolo^ical arguments - 
Anselm elaborated it rather because of his dissatisfaction v/ith 
these - anil the idea has proved attractive in modern tip.es. 
Kant, who rejects it, recognises that this is its true place; 
He~el, v.Tho accepts it, tries to present the three arguments in 
this relation, and Flint strenuously -lefends the same conception. 
The great authority of Aquinas, however, who decided against it 
chiefly because his Aristotelian doctrine of the origin of all 
knowledge in sense-perception prevents him fro.n ascribing to it 
anything more than a subjective validity, put tnis line of 
reasoning out of favour until the time of Descartes. The 
latter was prevented by his well marked dualism of mind ancl
1. Taylor, Art. on Theism, etc.
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matter and his subjective starting point, fron elaborating a 
teleological argument. Since he needed t.ie certainty of the 
existence of G-od as the only assurance of the validity of our 
knowledge of the objective world, he had to stc,rt his proofs 
from our own innate ideas. We have already der.lt with his 
cosmological, causal argument from our idea of perfection. At 
the same time his strong leaning toward a falsely conceived 
mathematical method lead 1 him to work out an ontologies! proof 
also. He reasoned that Grocl, being the ens perfect!ssimuin, 
must exist, because existence is a perfection. To the rather 
obvious objection, already offered by G-aunilo and later insisted 
on by Hume and Kant, that a necessity of thought does not 
establish a fact of existence, Descartes made the profound 
suggestion that the real existence of our ideals is a pre- 
supposition of our whole life, particularly on its practical 
side. This assumption, of course, underlies the Kantian 
moral argument, though Kant was too timid to grant it its due. 
It has been explicitly accepted and built upon by thinkers of 
the Idealist type. 2 Leibniz felt that Descartes's formulation 
of the ontological argument was weak because it did not clearly 
prove that its definition of G-od contained no contradiction 
within itself. He therefore defined G-od as the ens realissimuv. 
which contains all possible positive predicates but which 
cannot contain any negative predicates, since negation is the 
same as limitation. The same necessity of excluding contra-
1. cf. Pringle-Pattison, Idea of G-od, Oh. XIII.
2. Ibid, Ch. XII.
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diction is seen in the arguments of Vfolff and Baumgarten. Thei
former regards the conception of ens perfect!ssiraum as a 
confused notion which, though it may be valid, should not be 
employed when a clearer notion is available. He indicates 
however that the Cartesian term is still the popular one.
Baumgarten retains the term ens perfectissimum but makes it a
2 point to show that it excludes all negative attributes, but
Kant again prefers the Leibnizian expression.
In the eighteenth century it was generally accepted that 
the existence of G-od could be conclusively proved by one or 
more of these three great proofs. There were other proofs, 
such as the proof from general consent, first employed by the 
Stoics, and later by Cicero, and certain early Christian 
writers; Descartes's proof from the duration of our life,-^ and 
so forth. But these three, the metaphysical arguments, are 
the most important and were recognised to be such. True, 
objections had been raised either against one or other of these 
proofs, or against the possibility of any kind of theistic 
proof, at least since the time of the Greek Sceptics. These 
thinkers did not usually single out religion as in any way the 
special object of their sceptical attention, but in this respect 
Carneades was a notable exception. He not only rejected the 
teleological argument and that from general consent, but also 
strove to prove that the very idea of G-od is self-contradictory 
because, while He must be thought of as moral, it is impossible
1. Theolog!a Natural!s II., sec. 21.
2. Kemp Smith, Commentary to Kant, etc., p. 522 f.
3. liorman Smith, Cartesian Studies, p. 73 n.
to think of Him as overcoming imperfection which is what we 
mean by morality - an argument which has been made familiar to 
modern readers in the works of Bradley and William Wallace. 
The Epicureans also banished the conception of design from their 
view of nature, adopting instead the purely materialistic 
atomism of Democritus, and their whole temper was e.theistic. 
In the Middle Ages, those who drew a sharp destruction between 
the spheres of reason and of faith, notably such Nominalists as 
Occam and D'Ailly, considered it impossible for the human mind 
to find reasons for belief in the existence of G-od, and they 
had recourse to legitimate authority as the only assurance for 
their faith. Similarly Pascal held that, so far as reason is 
concerned, there are equal grounds for believing arid for dis- 
believing in the existence of G-od, and Peter Boyle declared 
that faith was free to accept even such doctrines as had been 
proved to be irrational because faith and reason were mutually 
contradictory. In s^ite of this line of contrary opinion,
however, the eighteenth century slumbered on in the security of 
a dogmatic self-satisfaction, resting on the supposedly solid 
foundation of the metaphysical proofs, and sometimes stilling 
an uneasy stir by means of a doctrine of learned iterance 
inherited from Neo-Platonism through the medium of Augustine 
and other Fathers of the early church.
The eighteenth century pride, however, was destined for a 
sudden and disastrous fall. Even more by the atmosphere which
1. For this history see Flint, Agnosticism, pp. 89 to 115.
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they created than by the arguments v.hich they brought forth 
the terrible David and Kant, the ? 11-destrcr. er, completely 
confounded the orthodox champions. To Berkeley his owij. 
philosophy brought G-od near to men and sunnlied the firmest 
foundation for Christian faith; Hume, with the same Lockian 
presuppositions, discovered the synthetic nature of the causal 
principle and therein set a problem for all who would use it 
in their thinking. Kant was led thereby to the discovery that 
all principles are synthetic, and to the consequent rejection 
of all previous types of proof as dogmatic. His own attempt 
to work out a transcendental proof lead to the consequence that 
sense-experience is an essential element in all knowledge, and 
that God's existence, while it may be a legitimate object of 
faith and a necessary practical postulate, is not capable of 
metaphysical demonstration. Had t.iese two thinkers made no 
direct references to the theistic arguments the effect of their 
general conclusions on these arguments must have been profound, 
but both of them passed the orthodox "proofs" under review. 
Some of their particular objections will have to be considered 
by us in the next chapter, so that here only a general notice 
is called for. In the Dialogues, Hume pays scant attention to 
the Ontolo ;ical Argument, and where it is introduced it is 
already prejudiced by being put into the mouth of Demea, the 
man of "rigid, inflexible orthodoxy." Gleanthes inrmtie,itly 
objects to it, first, that it is absurd to pretend to demon- 
strate a matter of fact, anc1 , second, t lat, si:.ce we can
conceive anything as non-existent which we can conceive as , 
existent, there is no being whose non-existence implies a 
contradiction. Philo aviroves this answer, reinforces it with 
further observations, and ends by insisting that the argument, 
even if it were vail'-"1 , is purely academic. Elsewhere Hurne 
had already anticipated the objection wh'ich Kant later made 
famous, namely, that, since existence is not an element in the 
content of any concept, it is impossible by analysis of any 
concept to prove the existence of its object. Huine would 
agree with the later emphatic statement of Ilutciiison Stirling 
that "the very existence of Natural Theology is bound up with 
the existence of final causes, 1 and to the teleological 
argument he devotes most of his attention. His conclusion is, 
in brief, that, though the presence of design in nature will be 
acknowledged by any man of common sense, yet it cannot be proved 
conclusively that the design is not linmanent in nature itself 
so that nature is the source of its own adaptations, and that, 
even if this point were conceded to the orthodox, the design 
is not sufficient to support an inference to the personal, 
moral G-od of traditional orthodoxy. Kant admits the great 
influence of the teleological argument, but, in distinction 
from Hume, he regards the ontological argument as the crucial 
one. His conclusion is that the teleological argument can at 
best only reach an architect who is very great, and that in 
attempting to go beyond this to the infinite it is resting on
1. Philosophy & Theology, Ch. III.
the ontolo^ical argument. Similarly the cosmolooical argument, 
in attempting, as a second step, to determine whst properties 
ought to be possessed by the absolutely necessary Being v;hich 
the first step is supposed to have supported, also rests on the 
ontological argument. The latter, however, fails because, 
since existence is not part of the content of any concept, it 
is illegitimate to base a question of fact on a necessity of 
thought.
Hegel ascribes to the influence of Kant the situation with
>
regard to trie theistic arguments in his own day, which he 
describes as follows; "The proofs of the existence of G-od are 
to such an extent fallen into discredit that they pass for 
something antequated, belonging to trie metaphysics of days gone 
by; a barren desert, out of which we have escaped and brought 
ourselves back to a living faith; the region, of an Understand- 
ing out of which we have once more raised ourselves to the warm 
feeling of religion.' He further informs us that "it is not 
t.'iis or that proof, or this or that form or way of putting it, 
that has lost its weight, but the very proving of reli ;.ious 
truth has so much lost credit with the mode of thought neculler 
to our time that the impossibility of such proof is already a 
generally accepted opinion. Nay more, it has come to be
i
regarded as irreligious to place confidence in such reasoned 
knowledge." 1 So prevalent is this spirit, indeed, that, he 
says, "the proofs themselves are barely even historically known
1. Lectures on the Proofs etc. (Summer, 1831), Lect. I.
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here and there - even to theologians." 1 This situation Hegel 
set himself to remedy by showing that the three traditional 
proofs, though usually wrongly stated in terms of a separating 
Understanding, really represent stages in the elevation of 
the mind to G-od by means of the dialectical process of Reason. 
How he v.orks this out in detail we need not stop to make clear, 
but his vagueness and hesitation of statement seem to suggest 
that he experiences some uneasiness about the success of this 
effort, and he abandons it entirely when he complains that 
the Ontological Argument has been developed since Anselm's day 
"always along with the other proofs, though it alone is the true
r)
one." Lotze's treatment of these arguments shows quite 
clearly that Hegel had failed to rescue them from the neglect 
about which he so eloquently complained.
1. Lectures on the Proofs etc. (Summer, 1831), Lect. I.
2. Lectures on the Proofs etc. (Summer, 1831).
Chapter II. 
LOTZE and the TRADITIONAL PROOFS.
In no section of his published work, so far as I can find, 
does Lotze set himself the task of a detailed and systematic, 
far less historical, discussion of the traditional "proofs". 
His general treatment of them in the Microcosmus (English 
translation) occupies only seven pages, claims to be only a 
"brief retrospective view" of a region of thought already 
sufficiently disposed of in other connections, and is intro- 
duced when he is confessedly "hastening to a conclusion." 
They are already prejudiced by the results arrived at in the 
preceding section. The reasoning here is that knowledge is 
a product of certain given elements and of general,hypothetical 
propositions which are "nothing but the expressions of the 
forms of activity, in which our reason according to our own 
nature must be exercised." In scientific knowledge the given 
elements come to us in sense-perception; in religious knowledge 
Lotze is willing to regard them, after the manner of 
Schleiermacher, as due to "a divine or supersensible influence 
upon our interior being"; and, until they are worked up into 
knowledge, they exist, Lotze declares, only as certain modes of 
our feeling - fear, dependence, aesthetic admiration, ethical
1. Microcosraus II, pp. 664 - 671.
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feelings of obligation being their more developed forms. The 
full development of these data by means of reflection is not 
possible for us, and so much of our religious experience must 
remain in this purely subjective form. Indeed Lotze goes so 
far as to say that the very best content of religion remains 
thus in the emotional sphere, where it is both superior to and 
remote from anything that can be established by formal, logical 
demonstration. The arguments themselves are Introduced as an 
example of an out-grown attitude, and, though he does endeavour 
to reveal them as manifestations - however inadequate - of an 
inner, emotional urge which they almost entirely fail to express, 
but which is to be clearly revealed in his own argument, still 
his treatment is predominantly toned by his intention of 
rejecting them. One gets the impression that instead of 
sympathetically studying these proofs, as the important part 
they have played in human thinking would seem to demand, in 
order to find out what of truth is in them, Lotze is more 
anxious to reveal their inadequacies as a preliminary for his 
own more satisfactory arguments. Perhaps, however, this 
prominently negative attitude should be traced to the practical 
necessities under which Lotze worked, rather than to any 
narrowness in his remarkably catholic spirit. In other parts 
of the Microcosmus, indeed, various aspects of the several 
"proofs" have come up for discussion, but there again their 
treatment is rather Incidental in order to throw light on, or
1. of. also Phil, of Relig., sects. 2-4.
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assist in the development of, the other arguments that are, in 
these passages, in course of construction.
Lotze faces the theistic proofs again in his Outlines of 
the Philosophy of Religion. This work consists of the sentences 
dictated in lectures to his students, and published, after his 
death, from their notes. Here the treatment is fuller, but 
it is still, as one would expect, sketchy and dogmatic, omitting 
everything that does not serve the practical purposes of the 
class-room. In these lectures, too, one feels, Lotze betrays 
the largely negative attitude to which we have already referred, 
being more interested in showing the fallacies and shortcomings 
of the "proofs" than in defending any elements of value they 
might contain. As is very natural in lectures, the;treatment 
was changed from time to time. They are before me in two 
forms, first as they were delivered in 1875 having been 
translated, with the addition of two final chapters that were 
not delivered until later, under the direction of Professor 
G. T. Ladd, and second as they were delivered in l8?8 and 1879 
(not translated). The following discussion, therefore, is 
based on three different treatments, that of the Microcosmus 
belonging to the year 1868, that of the lectures of 1875, and 
the somewhat different treatment in the lectures of 1879.
I. Lotze seems to have experienced some difficulty in 
finding satisfactory short statements of the traditional "proofs" 
In the case of each proof his formulae vary considerably,
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sometimes essentially, and he confesses, in; his final attempt 
to state the cosmological argument, that "a real formula can 
hardly be advanced." The reasons for his changes of statement, 
as far as I can find, are nowhere indicated, and we are left 
for explanation to our own conjectures. In 1868 he states 
the teleological argument thus: "The Teleological Proof seeks 
to attain certainty of the reality of G-od from the purposiveness 
in the world." With this form, however, he became dissatisfied, 
evidently because it would seem to imply an admission on his 
part that the purposiveness in the world is a fact of indubitable 
certainty, and because it does not sufficiently indicate the 
nature of the reasoning as a causal argument to G-od as creator 
and designer. And so, in 1875, he tries to remedy these 
defects. The teleological argument, he now says, "proposes to 
make that empirical conformity to an end, which appears in the 
world, the point of departure for an inference concerning a 
single designing and-creative reason as the supreme cause of 
the world." Lotze now has a formula which expresses the 
uncertainty which, he thinks, belongs to the datum from which 
the teleological argument starts, and is thus more in harmony 
with the views that are put forward in his criticisms; but it 
does not tell us clearly whether those who advance this 
argument consider purposiveness to be a certain, or only a 
probable, fact. Prom this point of view the earlier formula 
is more definite, though the later one makes more definite the 
fact, which Lotze intends to deny, that this argument, as
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conceived by its believers, is able to prove the designer's 
unity. The earlier formula, also, is more definite in its 
expression of the degree of compulsion which is claimed for the 
argument. It makes quite clear that the argument "seeks to 
attain certainty"; in the second form it might claim to 
establish only a probable conclusion. The same remarks are 
applicable to the final formula, but here an additional 
criticism must be made. In the lectures of 1879 Lotze states 
that the teleological argument reasons "from the world's 
empirically given conformity to an end to the wisdom of a 
supreme, personal founder." Here, apparently, the main 
question at issue is the wisdom, not the existence, of God. 
All this uncertainty, however, belongs only to the formulae, 
not to Lotze's discussions. In his criticism he assumes that 
the datum of the argument is regarded by those who advance it 
as indubitable, that the point at issue is, not the wisdom of 
a God whose existence is conceded, but the existence of a God 
of infinite wisdom, and that the process of reasoning is 
considered to be demonstrative. We find, in his treatment of 
the teleological argument, no historical reference to any 
other form, neither to the Platonic, nor to that of Aquinas, 
nor to the Leibnizian. What is more, though - and perhaps, 
because - his own attitude to the essentials of this argument 
is that it has an extreme probability, he does not here indicate 
that the possibility of its being advanced in this form had 
ever occurred to him, nor does he, except on one occasion that
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I have noticed, consider its validity when put forward, not as 
a proof, but as a confirmation. This attitude is quite in 
harmony with that of the negative tradition which began, as a 
modern phenomenon, with Hume, but it is somewhat strange if, as 
Sorley argues, 1 the traditional proofs, in the time of their 
special prominence, were really only confirmations, even though 
they were not clearly recognised to be such. Lotze's procedure 
is clearly dictated by the practical desire to formulate only 
that conception of the argument that was current in his day, 
and by the negative results which he wishes to establish in 
respect to that whole conception of theistic proof of which 
the current forms are, he thinks, sufficiently typical.
Against the teleological argument, so conceived, Lotze 
brings five main objections. He objects, in the first place, 
that it is impossible to prove the necessity of employing the 
concept of design in the explanation of the world, and that 
the starting-point of the argument is, therefore, incapable of 
the type of justification which such an argument demands. It 
is not the presence of a unitary design in Nature that Lotze 
calls in question; he is not, with Spinoza, regarding the 
concept of design as a mere fruit of our ignorance. On the
contrary he would regard the detailed exhibition of such a
p unitary plan as the completion of philosophy; but such a
completion, he urges, is still far in the future. In a very 
striking passage,-' Lotze remarks how extremely strange it is
1. Moral Values etc., p. 305. 2. Metaphysics,sect. X. 
3. Microcosmus I, p. 375.
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that "our scientific illuminati" refuse to start*from a single 
governing power that works intelligently, preferring to commence 
with the postulates of an original store of matter and force, 
and the unshaken authority of a group of universal and immutable 
laws of Nature. For, he says, apart from the fact that these 
are no trifling postulates, the comprehensive spirit of human 
reason would seem to favour the rejected procedure. Elsewhere 
he Justifies this attitude, but in this passage he scornfully 
suggests that, in adopting it, the scientists in question are 
actuated by an easily understood, though unworthy, desire to 
draw within the limits of finitude, and so make agreeably 
intelligible to themselves, what, to the unprejudiced mind, is 
conceivable only as the product of infinite wisdom - a sugges- 
tion which clearly manifests Lotze's belief in teleology. The 
objection to the teleological argument which now concerns us 
is not, therefore, a denial of teleology, but a denial that it 
can be proved in the manner, and with the stringency, which are 
demanded by that form of the argument with which he is dealing. 
Perhaps the shortest and clearest expression of his position 
is the following: "Speculatively it is by no means to be 
demonstrated: it continues to be perfectly possible to think 
of the course of the world as an entirely purposeless, although 
more or less living development of an Absolute. But religious 
feeling has an immediate evidence that the case is not so, and 
that all the phenomena of inspiration, of adoration, and of the 
feeling of obligation to an ideal, are not explicable as causal
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effects in the development of a purposeless Principle."
It may be questioned whether this view of Lotze's is not 
based on that impossible separation of various aspects or 
fields of mental activity which characterised the work of 
Immanuel Kant, and which his successors laboured to overcome. 
If religious feeling has any such immediate evidence, how is 
it possible for speculation to conceive of the course of the 
world as entirely purposeless without stultifying, in principle, 
that very experience from which it itself takes its rise? But 
we must return to the objection we are examining. The concept 
of design, Lotze argues, is borrowed from our experience of our 
own activity, and cannot be clearly understood unless first 
we study it in that reference. In order to achieve our 
purposes we bring together elements, each of which has, quite 
independently of human designs, a mode of operation peculiar 
to itself, but which, as a result of the massing of these 
peculiar modes of operation, will bring our purposes to 
fruition. Our only contribution to the result has been to 
bring the necessary elements together, and this change in their 
spatial relations has itself been produced by us by means of a 
blind force. How the purpose in our minds is able to influence 
these blind forces to alter the spatial relations of the 
elements must remain ultimately inexplicable. -Elsewhere he 
teaches that the adoption of certain purposes, in which alone 
we are free, gives rise to the ideas of the corresponding
1. Phil, of Relig., sect. 65.
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things or conditions as actually existing. These ideas, 
further, in a purely mechanical way, give rise to the necessary 
intermediate ideas, and presently the latter, by means of an 
inexplicable mechanical interaction with the external world, 
set going the objective movements which, in due course,bring 
our purposes to realisation. In order, therefore, to justify 
our application of the conception of design to natural phenomena 
we would have to prove that the spatial relations of the 
efficient elements, in cases of adaptation, are due to an 
operation of blind forces which themselves demand for their 
full explanation this inexplicable leap which would lead finally 
to the purposes of an intelligent designer. To do this we 
would have to prove that disorder is more original in the world 
than order, - Hume's great point - , and that the world would 
be a vast Chaos if it were not for the ordering efficiency of 
an external power. But this can never be done. However 
probable the design explanation might be in any particular case, 
the exclusion of the possibility of a purely mechanical ex- 
planation could never be made absolute. That this objection, 
in general, is valid is betrayed, Lotze urges, by the further 
fact that even the most ardent adherents of teleology, when 
they leave generalities and proceed to the consideration of 
details, are forced to employ the very method which they try 
to reject, that is, to find the efficient means through whose 
necessary and blind causal connection the required effect must 
be brought about.
1. Microcosmus I, p. 376.
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We may, for the present, admit the incomprehensibility of 
the relation between human purposes and their objective execution 
since that is the main point here, without pausing to discuss 
Lotze's account of it. It must also be admitted that, if we 
are to think, in the teleological argument, of elements of the 
world each possessing an independent efficiency, and then, over 
against these, a wise and efficient Being who somehow arranges 
these world-elements so that the combination of their indepen- 
dent actions will produce the results He desires, then a study 
of these world-elements and their combinations can never reveal 
the necessity for such a Being. This is clearly Lotze's 
contention, and, if the teleological argument rests essentially
pon such a view, it must be rejected. Nor will it help 
matters to regard the world-elements as entirely passive, for 
this would add to, rather than subtracting from, the difficulties. 
But, just as clearly, no objection to the teleological argument, 
so conceived, should be left resting on such a decisively 
dualistic conception. It may be sufficient for a limited 
purpose, but it can never be really satisfactory, to oppose the 
dualism of this form of the argument merely by accepting the 
dualism, without any indicated qualification, and showing that, 
on such a basis, no conclusive argument is possible. The 
objection should proceed to challenge the dualism directly, and 
to exhibit the superiority of a view which does more justice 
to the immanence of God - that is, of course, if it is being
1. cf. Microcosmus II, r>. 131.
2. cf. Pringle-Pattison~, Idea of God, p. 324 rf.
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advanced by one who holds such a view. And Lotze does hold 
such a view, although, as we must see later, he finds some 
difficulty in working it out. His failure to make any hint off 
such a conception in the present connection is an evidence of 
the negative attitude to which we have referred.
So far the objection has been that the necessity of 
applying the concept of design to the world in general cannot 
be clearly established as the teleological argument in this 
form would demand. But now Lotze advances a step, and denies 
that that immanent adaptation which makes organisms appear to 
be self-sufficient, absolute ends is really in any better 
position. This conception, hesitatingly introduced by Kant, 
is usually regarded as a great advance on the external, 
anthropomorphic conception of design which is typical of 
eighteenth century thought, and which is the only one that Hume 
clearly faces. Lotze indicates that it was generally accepted 
as valid in his own day, but that it can be proved to be such 
he will not admit. Rather does this kind of adaptation, he 
urges, more than any other, admit of the reduction of its so- 
called design to an unpremeditating mechanism. For these 
instances of immanent adaptation, he thinks, may quite easily 
be explained by means of the law of survival. It is perfectly 
possible, that is to say, that an unpremeditating course of 
Nature has produced a large variety of forms all of which have 
become extinct except those which, either within themselves or 
in their relation to outer conditions, happened to possess a
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superior equilibrium and fixity. The existence of evil in the 
world seems to show that nature produces the faulty and the 
well-adapted indifferently, and that the former pass again out 
of existence by reason of their inner contradictions. It 
follows that instances of immanent adaptation are not conclusive 
evidence of the operation of a designing intelligence in 
Nature. All this, of course, is not new in Lotze. Hume had 
made the same point against the teleological argument in 
general. But one cannot admit that this is a valid criticism 
against the teleological argument, as such. In the first 
place, it does not seem possible for any theory of survival to 
explain the lavish munificence with which beauty is manifested 
in Nature, and it is coming to be recognised that there is in 
organisms something peculiar which necessitates for their 
explanation categories different from those that apply in the 
inorganic sphere. Progress in the study of organisms is 
leading more and more strongly to such a conclusion; and among 
these categories purposiveness is prominent. However that 
might be, Lotze f s contention has a second and fundamental 
weakness; for, in assuming that the ill-adapted pass out of 
existence while the well-balanced tend to be preserved, he is 
presupposing in the operation of Nature as a whole the very 
rational system which, in particular instances, he is calling 
in question. True, the various objects in Nature are produced, 
according to his argument, in a haphazard, fortuitous manner,
1. of. further, Sorley, Moral Values etc., p. 325 ff.
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but the selection which they then undergo is a manifestation, 
surely, of the teleological principle. Finally, we must admit 
that it is impossible to prove, with mathematical stringency 
and in a syllogistic manner, that adaptation of any kind in 
Nature is an evidence of designing intelligence. Instead this 
is an assumption that is in process of proof in the only way in 
which such as assumption could possibly be justified, that is, 
by its harmony with the general body of received truth. The 
inference from adaptation to design is only an application of 
the causal law of a kind that is repeatedly involved in the 
interpretation, or rather the formation, of experience. It 
involves the same assumption by which one person recognises the 
presence of other persons in the world from the actions which 
they perform. It cannot be formally demonstrated, but a 
systematic doubt of its truth would entail disastrous con- 
sequences. This will not necessarily establish an external 
Designer, but it will render necessary the belief in designing 
intelligence as operative in the world process.
Lotze's second main objection to the teleological argument 
is that it is impossible to prove the unity of the design in 
Nature, from which to argue to a unitary Designer. We could 
prove the unity of design, he urges, only if we could show 
that adaptation reigns without exception throughout the universe; 
but this we are unable to do, not only in view of the limita- 
tions of our knowledge, but also because, within the limits of 
our experience, there is much that is inexplicable, purposeless,
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even obstructive to ends of which we had assumed the validity. 
The few examples of harmony that we can clearly recognise might 
be sufficient, he suggests with Hume, to confirm an existing 
faith in G-od, but they could never enable one who lacks that 
faith logically to attain it with certainty. Experience would 
lead more naturally, he adds, either to the scientific view of 
an unconditioned reality of given elements, forces, and laws, 
or else to the polytheistic conception of a plurality of divine 
beings, each of which rules, as its genius, over a special 
department of Nature, and the varying governments of which 
agree so far as to attain a certain general compatibility, but 
not a harmony that is altogether without exceptions. This 
criticism, also, is familiar to readers of Hume and Kant, and, 
when the design argument is offered as a demonstrative proof, 
we must, I think, grant its cogency. If, from our ability 
actually to trace* design in Nature, we are to attain a certain 
demonstration of the unity of that design, and thence to deduce 
the unity of the Designer, then the task is, at least for the 
present, manifestly impossible. Elsewhere 1 Lotze points out 
that our faith in the unity of design rests, just as little as 
our belief in the most general points of view of the mechanistic 
system, on any such ability to trace it out through all the 
details of the course of things. The most that might be 
claimed is that unity, system is a presupposition of human 




1. Microcosmus I, p. 412. J'\ /--,
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tracing, with ever increasing precision, the ramifications of 
what looks like a single system in Nature, and that, if it did 
not do~so, it would stultify human reason and render it unreason- 
able. If there is design at all in Nature it must be a unity, 
if the possibility of knowledge is not ultimately to be denied. 
At the same time we gain nothing by underestimating our 
difficulties, and we cannot claim that the unity of a world 
design is more than a hypothesis in process of proving itself. 
If, for instance, sin has been rightly defined as that which 
absolutely ought not to be, a definition which seems to accord 
with the experiences of the greatest saints, then we must either 
maintain, with the Idealists, that the point of view here is 
not ultimate, or else there is in human experience a refractory 
element that must resist all our systematising efforts. It is 
the weight of this consideration which makes Cleanthes, in 
Hume's Dialogues, willing to justify the divine benevolence at 
the expense of His omnipotence, and the same hard problem 
inclined John Stuart Mill to hold a Manichaean dualism, evil 
being regarded as the result of the opposition of a chaotic 
power to a God whose power and love is limited. In the con- 
ceptions of a finite God to be found in the writings of 
Rashdall and H. G. Wells the same difficulty is clearly directive. 
But even though this conception of sin be granted, the assump- 
tion of a plurality of coordinate principles may, I think, be 
shown to raise more, and more fundamental, problems than it
1. cf. Jones, A Faith that Enquires, pp. 230, 304.
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solves. Lotze himself regards sin as presenting a problem 
which is at present insoluble, but he is sure that there is a 
solution, and he is not, therefore, constrained by the fact of 
evil to any pluralistic conclusions.
Thirdly, to be valid the teleological argument, Lotze 
contends, would need to prove the unconditional worth and 
sacredness of the designs which we plainly see pursued in the 
world. If the designs which, as far as we can see, are 
actually being pursued in the world are not worth while, or 
cannot be shown to be worth while, they will offer no evidence 
of the activity of the kind of designer whose existence we 
wish to prove. But this, he thinks, is precisely our position. 
In many of the ends which philosophy points out as cosmically 
supreme and sacred, living feeling can find no worth at all, and 
it is impossible to prove the worth of many of the instances 
of immanent adaptation. Lotze insists that a world-aim, to 
be acceptable as such, must be of such a nature as to render 
absurd the question why it, and not something else, is the aim. 
In his opinion - and here his general overemphasis on feeling 
expresses itself in the hedonistic conviction that the only 
real and substantial Good is the pleasure of some sensitive 
spirit - such an end is blessedness, existing in a kingdom of 
spirits. But this is a certainty, he says, only in the "common, 
unphilosophic view," and its nature and necessity are based only 
on ethical requirements. From such a supreme purpose, however,
1. Microcosmus II, p. 716 ff.
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it is not possible to deduce the necessity of the present inani- 
mate world. The necessity of some kind of inanimate world may, 
indeed, be inferred from the need of some content for this 
blessedness, but we cannot be more explicit and prove the need 
of "just these substances, forces, organisms, and kinds of 
occurrence, which we discover empirically in the world." The 
obvious objection to all this is that, Lotze to the contrary, 
"living feeling" is not the ultimate test of values. Even if 
it be granted, as it must be, I think, that feeling is, sub- 
jectively, a necessary element in all that is valuable, surely 
there are intellectual and volitional elements in value also; 
and it should be clear that feeling can be a criterion of value 
only in so far as it has wrapped itself round standards of 
judgment, intellectual criteria, which have been previously 
established and made habitual. Value must reside, not in any 
emotional condition called blessedness, but in an objectively 
real system, and feeling is only a ready, but not always reliable 
indication to us of this value, and a test of our progress in 
moulding our character into harmony with the values which we 
have come to recognise. A good example is the moral emotion 
which is usually a very good, because readily available, guide 
to moral value, but that it is not always reliable as such is 
indicated by those instances when we feel pain at actions which 
we no longer judge to be wrong. If our contention be justified, 
the fact that certain of the ends which philosophy offers as
1. Phil, of Relig., sects. 66 - 69.
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valuable do not awaken pleasurable feelings is no evidence that 
they do not possess value, but only that we are not yet so 
inwardly identified with them that they have become for us 
centres of feeling. It may be granted that Lotze's objection 
is to this extent valid that we cannot conclusively prove the 
unconditioned worth of the ends which our experience reveals to 
us in the world, - it certainly is true that the best we can do 
will not render doubt formally illogical - , but of this feeling 
cannot be the judge. The only test of the value of the ends 
which we seem to discover working in nature is their place in 
an objective system of ends, as revealed and approved, not by 
feeling alone, but by the whole self expressing itself in 
judgment. "Judgments of value, in other words, are not to be 
taken, like the intuitions of an older philosophy, as so many 
detached and mutually independent pronouncements of one faculty
or another upon particular features or aspects of the world. 
They represent rather so many parts of one fundamental judgment 
in which the nature of reality, as exhibited in the system, may 
be said to affirm itself. Every particular judgment depends 
for its ultimate sanction on the recognition of its object as a 
contributory element to this inclusive whole." A teleological 
argument that claims to be demonstrative is obviously exceeding 
the limits of human capacity, - and this, it must be borne in 
mind, is really all that Lotze means to contend - , but when 
this argument is rightly regarded, that is, as a partial con-
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firmation of one part of our experience (the religious) by 
another (the teleological), then the legitimacy of basing an 
argument on the values with which we are acquainted will hardly 
be called in question; or, at least, it will not be questioned 
on the score of the imperfection of our knowledge of values.
Lotze brings against the teleological "proof", in the 
fourth place, the objection that it is quite incapable of giving 
us the right which it claims to characterise G-od in superlative 
terms. In order to prove that God is omnipotent wisdom it 
would be necessary to show that His designs are executed without 
opposition, and that He is never forced to produce even that 
which, in relation to His purposes, is indifferent. But this 
is quite Impossible. On the contrary, not only does experience 
show much that seems to be the result of a resistance to the 
designing power on the part of a refractory material, but even 
the very concept of design seems to involve such opposition. 
"That will alone can have ends, whose volition is not tantamount 
to execution, whose purpose, on the contrary, hindered by the 
resistance of an independent nature of things, becomes converted 
into an aim to be reached in: a particular way. Action adapted 
to an end is to be found not where an absolute moulding power 
produces everything directly out of itself, but where a limited 
efficacy needs means for the achievement of its results, means 
which it can make serviceable to its ends only on the condition 
of its accommodating the character of its own designs to the
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nature of this foreign material." 1 It is for this reason that, 
in his discussion of Creation, Lotze refuses to think of God's 
will after the analogy of the finite will. The conclusion is 
that, if the concept of design can be legitimately attributed to 
the divine mode of activity, then G-od must be a limited Being. 
The consideration is of great weight, and has led modern thinkers 
to modify the conception of design, in one way or another, in 
its application to the Absolute. But still it seems to them 
that the idea of design may be purged without being completely 
volatilized, and that it may be usefully applied in its purged 
form to the Infinite. Lotze has another reason for denying 
that the teleological argument gives us any right to character- 
ise G-od in superlative terms, namely, that we cannot so describe 
this world, which is the starting-point of the argument. For, 
he urges, while we know the world that is, we do not know those 
that might have been, and the latter might include a much better 
world than this. Until that possibility is excluded we cannot 
reason to the supreme wisdom of G-od. The objection, as stated, 
is that we must be able to prove that this is the best possible 
world in order to be able to prove from it the existence of a 
supremely wise God. It does not seem to me that any attempt to 
prove that this is the best possible world, such as that made by 
Leibniz, can be very impressive. It may be shown, as Professor 
Jones does most nobly in his recent Clifford Lectures, that this
1.Microcosmus I, p. 412 f; cf. Mill, Three Essays in Relig., p. 176 f.
2.Phil, of Relig., p. 73-
3.Bosanquet, Indiv, & Value, Gh. IV.: Pringle-Pattison, Idea of 
God, Ch. XVII.
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world, regarded as a school for the development of moral charac- 
ter, is a much better place than we might be inclined to think 
when we concentrate our attention (religiously) on the problem 
of sin as such, or (hedonistically) puzzle over the fact of 
pain. This, I think, is all that Professor Jones is able to 
accomplish, but Lotze would readily admit all this, and still 
press his objection. There are, however, three things that 
should be pointed out in reply. In the first place, the 
objection is an appeal to the limitation of human knowledge, 
and, as such, is equally valid, or invalid, against all our 
reasoning which stays within that limit. When the teleological 
argument is regarded as a demonstratively certain proof - and 
this, we repeat, is what Lotze is anxious to refute - the 
objection is fatal to it, but when it is reduced in its claims 
to a degree that will harmonise with the coherence theory the 
objection will lose its weight. For the principle of perfec- 
tion can be shown to be operative within our experience, and 
thus any knowledge may be made to lead to the Perfect. This 
leads us to remark, secondly, that the objection is just that 
one, in essence, which appears in Kant but is by no means con- 
fined to him, and which is based on the principle that a 
conclusion cannot contain more than is already contained in its 
premises. The latter is undoubtedly true in formal logic, but 
Idealism has challenged its validity in the processes of living 
logic, and has very impressively argued that adherence to it is
1. of. Sorley, Moral Values, p. 342 ff.
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fatal to true metaphysics. 1 Idealists insist that, so far 
from it being true in philosophy that the stream cannot rise 
any higher than its source, that instead it is its very nature 
so to do. This is because, as we said above, the principle 
of perfection is operative in experience, and it is the very 
nature of the finite to transcend itself. These considerations 
suggest, what Professor Jones somewhere remarks in reference to 
Lotze, that the conception of the nature of reasoning that was 
current among earlier thinkers was defective, because still too 
much dominated by the syllogistic ideal. Finally, in reply to 
Lotze's objection, it is encumbent on us to enquire what can be 
meant by such an expression as "the best possible world." 
Lotze does not employ this exact wording, but this is what he 
has in mind. It comes at once to mind that possibility is 
based on actuality of some kind, and this Lotze admits. He 
speaks scornfully of the "strange power" whereby our minds, 
though dependent on actual conditions for their existence, can 
yet think away all those conditions and arrive at a situation 
from which they presume to criticise their own conditions. Do 
we, then, mean by the expression, "the best possible world", the 
best under the circumstances? But what circumstances? Lotze 
has himself contended that the original condition of the uni- 
verse could not have been a chaos of infinite possibilities, but 
some definite condition; and, within the world, the only power 
that could introduce an element of possibility into the
1. cf. Bosanquet, Indiv. & Value, p. 262 ff.
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mechanically determined development from that primitive state 
is, on his principles, the free choice of finite persons. But 
even the movements which they initiate are compensated by the 
Absolute, so as to restore the equation M = M. It seems to me 
that the expression, "the best possible world", can be given an 
intelligible meaning, only on the assumption of a theistic G-od, 
who is free to bring various kinds of world into being, but 
whose freedom is also limited either by an eternally existing 
material, or by His own character and purposes. If this be so, 
then, in the strictly negative attitude which he is adopting in 
these sections, Lotze has really debarred himself from employing 
this objection.
The fifth, and final, objection to the teleological 
argument is that it involves a petitio principii. We begin 
with a few instances of adaptation in Nature, he urges, and, 
assuming that adaptation proves design, regard them as evidences 
of design. Then we arbitrarily infer from our few instances 
a universal design in Nature, and proceed to argue from this to 
a unitary Designer. Finally, on the strength of our belief in 
a supreme Designer, we infer that design must be discoverable 
also in those all too numerous instances where we have not yet 
been able to discover it. That is, we believe in the absolute 
universality of design because of our faith in the Designer, and 
we Justify our faith in the Designer by means of our belief in 
the universality of the design. But surely Lotze's account of 
the teleological argument is here grotesque and unfair. In
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the case of those who regard this argument merely as a confir- 
mation, the generalisation of the instances of design discover- 
able in the world may, as a matter of psychological fact, be 
unduly hastened in some cases by the pre-existing faith; but 
even so, as also when the argument is regarded as an independent 
and stringent proof, the discovery of instances of design must 
ultimately be universalised in harmony with the demand of our 
thinking for unity. In so doing we are not acting arbitrarily, 
as Lotze contends, unless reason itself be arbitrary. The 
same necessity which impels the philosopher to seek a unitary 
principle underlying the manifold of experience would lead to 
the conception of a universal design, if design is applicable to 
the world at all. Since, therefore, the universalising of the 
concept of design does not rest logically on the belief in God, 
this argument is not a petitio principii.
II. Lotze's statements of the cosmological argument show 
some interesting variations. In 1868 he worded it thus: "The 
Cosmological Proof concludes from the contingent and conditioned 
character of everything in the world to the existence of a 
Necessary and Unconditioned Being, and it seems to it that no- 
thing but an absolutely perfect being can be thus unconditioned." 
This formula, in harmony with the treatment of the argument in 
Wolff and Kant, indicates two distinct steps; first, that from 
the contingent to the necessary, and, second, the identification 
of the necessary with the ens perfectissimum. In the statement
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of 1875, only one step is indicated - though the discussion 
involves a recognition of the second step - for, as he then 
states it, the argument "begins in an apprehension of frequent 
occurence, yet withal wholly incorrect, namely, that the exis- 
tence of each individual thing and of the world in general is 
contingent, and therefore presupposes not a contingent but a 
necessary Being." In this form, more striking even than the 
elimination of the second step, is his characterisation of the 
starting-point and the conclusion of the argument. The earlier 
statement represents the starting-point as being "everything in 
the world" regarded as contingent and conditioned, and the 
conclusion as being a Necessary and Unconditioned Being. So to 
characterise the argument is historically accurate, but it 
evidently was not acceptable to Lotze because it fails to 
indicate what he regards as the proper attitude toward it. His 
investigation of the subject had convinced him that the world of 
things is rightly described as conditioned, but not as contingent 
and that G-od might be referred to as the Unconditioned, but 
never as the Necessary Being. In the second form of statement, 
therefore, he employs only the terms which he regards as 
illegitimate, at the same time indicating very emphatically his 
opposition thereto. However this formula also proves unsatis- 
factory - and naturally so. When an argument is being stated 
for purposes of discussion, and especially for purposes of 
criticism, the argument itself, and not one's own attitude to it, 
should first be set forth in a perfectly fair and unbiassed.
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manner. In the lectures of 1879, he is still dissatisfied 
with his formula, but offers as sufficiently accurate the follow- 
ing : "The Cosmological Proof, of which a real formula can 
hardly be advanced, argues from the existence in the world of 
conditioned things and events, which do not have within them- 
selves the ground of their existence, to an Unconditioned and 
Necessary Principle, and believes that it is possible to set 
in the place of such a principle only an ens realissimum, which 
has the ground of its existence in itself." The points to 
notice here are the restoration of the second step, stated this 
time, however, in terms of the Leibnizian ens realissimum 
instead of the Cartesian ens perfectissimum; the elimination 
of the term 'contingent* in favour of the term 'conditioned', 
which he is also careful to define; and the characterisation 
of God, once more, as both Unconditioned and Necessary. None 
of these formulae is very clear as to the degree of constraint 
which the argument claims for itself, though the discussion 
presupposes that the claim is for demonstrative certainty. In 
this case, too, as in that of the teleological argument, Lotze 
has indicated only the form current in his day, without troubling 
to notice other forms that would have had,he probably considered, 
only a historical interest. Here again is his negative attitude, 
and we have seen it also struggling with his sense of fairness 
in determining the formulae. Such an exclusive attention to 
one type of the argument may be practically Justifiable, but it 
can never be satisfactory, particularly when the one type is
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examined only to be rejected. For it will often be possible 
that some other type of the argument would be found to be cogent. 
It is, therefore, disappointing that Lotze entirely overlooks 
the Aristotelian form, ignores Aquinas's distinction between 
the argument to a First Cause and that to a necessary Ground, 
fails to notice the famous cosmological argument of Descartes, 
and gives no Indication that he was acquainted with the system 
of Berkeley.
Lotze's criticism of the cosmological argument, as thus 
formulated, is, in short, that the terms employed are in- 
appropriate, and that, when this error is rectified, the result 
will be seen to fall short of what the argument claims fbr 
itself, in that it can be only an Unconditioned, not a God, 
and of this unconditioned the unity cannot be established.
In the treatment of 1868, which, as we have seen, is 
formulated by Lotze in terms of an ens perfect!ssimum, there is 
included a discussion of the term "perfection", which is 
naturally omitted from later treatments, though its results are 
involved in the treatment of 1875. When this term, in its 
strictly speculative sense, is applied to an object, Lotze 
declares, we mean only that the nature of the object is what it, 
as such, ought to be; that is, we mean that the object includes 
all that it, as such, ought to include, and nothing that does 
not belong to its nature. Imperfection, in this sense, might 
reasonably be taken to indicate the interference of, and so the 
object ! s dependence on, some foreign power. This however,
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Lotze contends, is not the sense in which the term is employed 
in the cosmological argument. Instead imperfection is taken 
to be the absence of some merely conceivable excellence, and 
perfection signifies the possession of every conceivable 
excellence. When thus employed, he urges, the terms are not 
equivalent to conditioned and unconditioned, for "unconditioned 
existence may belong to that which is indifferent and petty 
as well as to that which is significant and great, and is not 
the exclusive priviledge of that which is most excellent. 11 
His reasoning seems to be that the unconditioned is, as such, 
dependent on no reasons of any kind; it merely is; and so 
there can be.no reason why it should be most excellent rather 
than indifferent and petty. It is not surprising that Lotze 
omitted this section from his later treatments of the argument. 
For, in the first place, the ens perfectissimum, if that is a 
legitimate concept, surely satisfies both senses of the term 
perfect, and not merely the latter. Its peculiar nature is 
that, if it did not satisfy both, it would not satisfy either. 
Lotze seems to think that by pointing out the uniqueness of 
this concept he is condemning it, but that is precisely what 
it deliberately claims for itself. Nor is his second point of 
any greater value. It is perfectly true that an unconditioned 
can have nothing outside it determining it to be perfect rather 
than petty, but this is not the reason why it is identified 
with the ens perfectissimum. As he himself later recognises,
1. Microcosmus II, p. 666; cf. Phil, of Relig., p. 14.
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this identification is based on the belief that the unconditioned 
must be perfect enough to be the cause of the perfections in 
everything else. That, in order for this, the unconditioned 
must be perfectissimum certainly is a contention that ^oes 
beyond our experience, as he pointed out in dealing with the 
teleological argument. It was doubtless due to the desire to 
equate the Unconditioned with the God of Christianity, but it 
claimed as its basis the conception of causation which Neo- 
Platonism supplied. Lotze should, at least, have considered 
these facts - a modern objector might be expected to consider 
others besides - and in failing to do so he has, we believe, 
overlooked the essential point.
With regard to the term "necessary IT , we are told, it is 
valid to reason from a conditioned to'an unconditioned, but not 
to describe this unconditioned as necessary; for the necessary, 
in the only sense that is clear to us, coincides exactly with 
the conditioned. We describe as necessary only that the 
existence or validity of which is grounded, in accordance with 
a general law, in the existence or validity of something else. 
We cannot, therefore, call the unconditioned necessary. "It 
must rather be called the absolute matter of fact, which exists 
for the reason merely that it does exist; which does not need 
for its existence any extraneous condition; but which, for 
precisely this reason, can only be an actual and never a 
necessary existence." Our recognition of it may be necessary,
1. Phil, of Relig., p. 13-
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but it itself cannot be so described. Lotze's discussion of 
this term was clearly suggested by, and is, the Kantian conten- 
tion that the removal of the conditions is also the removal of 
the necessity, and that the expression ens necessarium is 
therefore meaningless. The same idea is suggested by Hume, 
from whom, perhaps, Kant derived it. The point is now generally 
conceded, and when we speak of G-od as necessarily existing we 
mean only that we are constrained by the facts of experience to 
believe in His existence. The earlier characterisation of 
G-od in this way was intended to differentiate G-od from all those 
existences which were dependent for their existence on some 
external power, and it depended on the belief that God could be 
reached by means of a causal regress. It was seen, or perhaps 
felt, that the causal series was at least potentially infinite, 
though the argument involved the belief that in fact it could 
not be so - , and that, when, as they thought, the regress was 
actually terminated, the causal query could still be raised with 
respect to the ultimate member. The only possible answer to 
such a question, if their reasoning so far were valid, would be 
that G-od is causa sui; and that meant that, having the 
conditions of His existence in Himself alone,He must be a 
necessary Being. That is to say, His essence, they thought, 
renders His existence necessary. With the modern agreement 
that a causal regress will not prove the existence of God, and 
that the term "necessity" should be employed to mean only 
"conditioned necessity", such reasoning has been abandoned.
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Lotze distinguishes five different senses of the .term 
"contingent." First, in the philosophic usage, it is applied 
"to everything whose non-existence in general would be thinkable 
without contradiction, and whose conception or whose nature 
accordingly offers no resistance to the cessation of its own 
existence." Secondly, the more common usage merely contrasts 
"the contingent with the designed, and understands by it all 
those secondary effects which, without being themselves designed, 
originate from action of ours that is designed." Thirdly, 
when in the application of a law of nature to a particular case 
processes occur which do not follow from the law, we call these 
contingent. Fourthly, rightly or wrongly, we often consider 
the world to have a predestined course, and then facts or events 
which find no direct place in this course, as we conceive it, are 
said to be contingent. Finally, the term signifies "that whose 
nature and content seem to deserve existence neither on account 
of its own value nor by connection with other values, although 
it, nevertheless, is in possession of such existence. In this 
sense, the 'contingent* is simply the matter of fact, whose 
being does not permit .... of justification by its own value!! 
It is because we use the term in this last sense that we deny
contingency, and affirm necessity, of the ultimate ground of
p the universe. The proper meaning of the term is, however,
somewhat different. Everything in the world follows from 
some general law, and is therefore necessary, not contingent.
1. Phil, of Relig.,p. 10 ff. 2. Microcosmus II, p. 665.
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If anything can be properly called contingent, then, it can be, 
Lotze concludes, only from some limited point of view. The 
general sense of the term is that the contingent is not entitled, 
according to its peculiar nature, to be met with in the unfolding 
of a design, in the working out of a law, or in the development 
of an existing thin^, but that the grounds of its actual 
occurrence lie in some circumstances not included in the assigned 
causes of a given event.
When the necessary corrections are thus made in the 
terminology of the cosmological argument, it becomes clear, 
Lotze thinks, that it falls far short of being a proof of the 
existence of God. At best it can only reason "from the con- 
ditionalness and conditioned necessity of all individual real 
things in the universe, to an ultimate real being which, without 
being conditioned by anything else, simply is, and simply is 
what it is, and finally may be regarded as the sufficient reason 
through which all individual reality is, and is what it is." 
This, however, is the metaphysical conception of an unconditioned, 
not the religious conception of G-od. It should be borne in 
mind that Lotze is criticising this argument only as it claims 
to be in itself a satisfactory proof of the existence of God. 
Against it, properly stated, and intended merely as a pre- 
liminary step in such a proof, he has advanced no objection, and 
he employs cosmological reasoning himself in this way. It is 
open to Lotze, of course, to go further; to identify the
1. Microcosmus II, p. 666.
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unconditioned with the world-unity, and to deny, as Ritschl 
later did, that such a world unity has anything to do with any 
religion; in which case, if this extension of his reasoning 
were valid, the whole criticism would bear against the cosmol- 
ogical argument, as such. But this he did not do, and with 
good reason, for it would have rendered his own reasoning 
impossible.
Lotze, then, is correct in his contention that the cosmol- 
ogical argument cannot alone establish the existence of the G-od 
of religion. We must, however, go further and ask if he is 
correct in his opinion that it can lead to an unconditioned. He 
seems, in the present discussion, to take this for granted, but 
how can we pass from the conditioned to the unconditioned? It 
may be that the conception of the unconditioned is a necessary 
principle of thought, but can we prove, from noticing that all 
the objects 'of experience are conditioned, that an unconditioned 
exists? We can pass from a conditioned object to its conditions, 
but, as far as natural science can see, these are also con- 
ditioned in every case. It must be granted that the causal 
series contains within itself no principle for its own termi- 
nation; or, at least, if the conception of an infinite causal 
chain be conceded, for any reason, to be inadmissible, this fact 
in itself cannot indicate the First Cause. The scientist, who 
is already possessed of a certain concept or ideal of totality, 
may assume that this is the unconditioned; the theologian,
1. Justification & Reconciliation (Ens. tr.), p. 17.
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already in possession of a remarkably rich idea of God, may 
claim that He alone can be the ultimate member of the series. 
The question is,in either case, as to their right to do so, 
and the justification, if justification there be, cannot come 
from the cosmological argument considered as a causal regress. 
Only practical, considerations, considerations of value, can 
interrupt the infinite regress, and the break can never be made 
so decisive as to banish the possibility of a further causal 
query. It may be, however, that a valid argument from the 
conditioned to the unconditioned may be elaborated without 
employing the causal regressus. In his own cosmological 
reasoning Lotze has himself employed such a different method, 
which will lead, if valid, not to an unconditioned which^gave 
to the world-process its initial push, but to one on which the 
world is eternally dependent. Our examination of this 
reasoning must wait until we can devote ourselves exclusively 
to it. In the present discussion he makes no reference to it, 
and, since he is examining an argument of the former type, his 
approval of the passage from the conditioned to the unconditioned 
would naturally suggest that he is supporting the argument 
which proceeds by means of a causal regress.
There is, as we have indicated, another respect in which, 
according to our author, the cosmological argument falls short, 
when it is stated in appropriate terms. So far we have noticed 
his objection against the second step only; that is, the 
identification of the unconditioned with the ens perfectissimum
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(1868), or with the ens realissimum (1879). We have now to 
notice his contention that the first step also is defective, in 
that it is unable to prove the unity of the unconditioned. "It 
is indeed possible that at a further stage of development the 
demand for unconditionalness may be found to have connected with 
it a demand for unity too; but this connection has not been 
discovered by the proof which we are considering, and hence it 
does not refute the assumption of an indefinite plurality of 
cosmic beginnings, cf a plurality of unconditioned Real beings, 
in which, on the other hand, students of Nature may hope to find 
an explanation of the multiplicity of phenomena more easily than 
in the unity of the Supreme Principle." In a later publication 
Lotze states more dogmatically that scientific pluralism lies 
much nearer to the cosmological argument than he here indicates. 
Here his statement merely is that the argument "does not refute" 
scientific pluralism; in the Lectures (l8?9) he contends that 
this pluralism is an assumption that lies nearer at hand to the 
argument, for the purpose of conceiving of the unconditioned, 
than does the religious conception. His later position is 
that the traditional cosmological argument is so framed that, 
though it cannot definitely locate its highest principle, it 
points toward scientific pluralism, which is epistemologically 
unsatisfactory, rather than to the religious conception of God.
For this conclusion he indicates three reasons. In the 
first place, the unconditioned to which it can legitimately lead
1. Microcosmus II, p. 666.
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is, he repeats, only a real, not a necessary existence; and it 
is, as such, on the same plane as other reals, not above them. 
The scientific conception of a pluralistic unconditioned is of 
this nature, while religion wishes to maintain the transcendence 
of God; the scientific unconditioned is a totality of the 
reals, the religious unconditioned is somehow apart from, and 
above, the reals, and the cosmological argument points to the 
former rather than the latter. In the second place, the 
cosmological argument, Lotze maintains, does not force us to the 
conclusion that the unconditioned is a unity. Rather would 
this be for it a difficulty, since we can "get no insight as to 
how a single unconditioned being, even though it were in 
existence, would be able to condition anything else, and there- 
fore serve as the desired initial member in the conditioned 
series of the world's events." Finally, religion insists on 
regarding the unconditioned as a real Being, while science does 
not go so far. Such a contention on the part of religion lies 
quite outside the scope of the cosmological argument, as such, 
and, in this respect too, the scientific conception lies much 
nearer to what the cosmological argument can perform than does 
that of religion.
As long as theistic argumentation was dominated by the 
conception, drawn from theological sources, of the unity of God, 
the need of proving the unity of God was not easily appreciated. 
After Hume had drawn the distinction between the historical
1. Phil, of Relig., p. 15; ct. Microcosmus I, p. 375.
causes of religion and its theoretical justification, and had 
further declared that polytheism was historically antecedent to 
theism, this need, however, was bound to be insisted on. The 
only way in which such an objection as this of Lotze's, entirely 
justified as it is in reference to that form of the argument 
against which it is advanced, may be obviated is by abandoning 
the unnatural separation of the various aspects of the theistic 
argument into proofs that found on over-restricted fields of 
experience - such as is characteristic of earlier attitudes - , 
and by building all the various, relevant aspects of our 
unitary experience into one comprehensive movement of thought,
*
which does not claim for itself a demonstrative certainty such 
as our limited capacity can never attain to.
III. The most noticeable features of Lotze's three state- 
ments of the ontological argument are, firstly, that, whereas 
in the earliest arid latest he notices both the Anselmic and the 
Cartesian forms, in the Lectures of 1875 there is no hint of 
the former; and, secondly, that he ignores, in this connection, 
the Leibnizian substitution of realissimum for the Cartesian 
perfectissimum. In the Microcosmus the Cartesian argument is 
represented as stating that, "because the notion of a most 
perfect Being includes reality as one of its perfections, there- 
fore a most perfect Being necessarily exists." The form of 
1875 gives more emphasis to the fact that the argument is based 
on a claim of absolute uniqueness for the conception of God,
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and makes as prominent as possible its analytic nature. It 
argues, so he now expresses it, that, "while the conception of 
other beings does not include their existence, the conception of 
the most perfect Being of all does include it, and that this 
being would in fact contradict its own conception if the one 
perfection - to wit, existence itself - did not belong to it." 
This form is repeated with only verbal changes in the later 
lectures. The Anselmic form is thus expressed: "the greatest 
which we can think, if we think it as only thought, is less 
than the same greatest if we think it as existent."
To advance the Cartesian form of this argument is, Lotze 
considers, "so obviously to-conclude falsely, that after Kant's 
incisive refutation any attempt to defend such reasoning would 
be useless." With this bare notice, in the Microcosmus, he 
turns away from it to discuss the Anselmic form, but in the 
Lectures he adds an explanation, brief in those of 1878, but 
fuller in 1879. We may outline his thought as follows. In 
no case, he holds, neither in that of finite beings nor in that 
of the Supreme Being, can we escape self-contradiction, if we 
try to think of the predicates of a subject without also think- 
ing of the subject which alone unites them; but the proof of 
the actual existence of this subject is a further problem which 
can be solved only in terms of its relation to some other 
reality. That is to say, as Kant pointed out, when we think of 
the subject along with the attributes our result is only a self-
1. Microcosmus II, p. 670; cf. Phil, of Relig., p. 9.
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consistent concept, and the actual existence of a corresponding 
reality is a further question, which can be answered, not 
analytically, but only synthetically, not in terms of the content 
of the concept, but only in terms of its outer relations. More 
concretely, if one wishes to prove the existence of G-od, it is 
not enough to endeavour to show that the assumption of God's 
non-existence would introduce self-contradiction into the 
concept of G-od. Instead one must show that such an assumption 
would form an "outer contradiction" with some other acknowledged 
reality. Instead, however, of admitting that this is an 
"incisive refutation" of the Cartesian argument, it may be 
contended that the main point of Descartes ! s reasoning has been 
overlooked. To class the idea of G-od unqualifiedly with other 
ideas, assuming that what is true of the.m must be true also of 
it, is to assume the very question at issue. The ontological 
argument is based on a claim that the idea of G-od is absolutely 
unique - as, we have seen, Lotze recognises - in its implication 
of the existence of its object. This claim may or may not be 
justifiable. It may also be true that neither Anselm nor 
Descartes has adequately vindicated the uniqueness of this idea 
- and, of course, the burden of proof is on their shoulders - ; 
but, it may be urged, Kant has not refuted the argument because 
he has only assumed, he has not proved, that the idea of God is
 
not thus unique.
Toward the Anselmic form of the argument Lotze shows much
1. Sorley, Moral Values, p. 308 ff.
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more sympathy, for he regards it as having only very narrowly 
missed the truth, or even as having here and there actually 
touched it. The truth is that there exists in our heart 
((jemut) a "dark compulsion" in the direction of belief in the 
reality of the supersensible. That this is so is an immediate 
fact to be accepted as such. Any attempt to express it as a 
logical process is bound to fail, because it is immediate, not 
discursive, in nature. "We do not from the perfection of that 
which is perfect immediately deduce its reality as a logical 
consequence; but without the circumlocution of a deduction we 
directly feel the impossibility of its non-existence," and, as 
other examples of such direct feeling, he quotes the perceptions 
of beauty and of moral quality. Just as we immediately perceive 
what is beautiful or good, he teaches, through the pleasurable 
feeling which it awakens in us, due to its stimulating us in 
harmony with the direction of our own development; just as 
what is ugly or bad, by its opposition to this life-process, 
awakens in us feelings of pain whereby we immediately perceive 
it to be ugly or bad; eo the belief that our ideal is only "an 
idea produced by the action of thought but having no existence, 
no power, and no validity in the world of reality'.1 is im- 
mediately perceived, because it is intolerable, to be false, and 
its opposite is an immediate certainty. The basis of this 
immediate certainty is feeling, and it thus has, for Lotze, a 
higher authority than the products of thought; for feeling is
1. Microcosmus II, p. 670.
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not only - along with faith, presentiment, inspiration, and 
cognition - one of the elements in intellectual experience; 
feeling is of all these elements the superior and most funda- 
mental. Feeling, he holds, is the only source of our impulse 
to know; being the source of our consciousness of harmony, it 
furnishes knowledge with the ideal of systematic wholeness - as, 
indeed, it is the source of all our ideals, intellectual, 
aesthetic, moral, and religious; it is, therefore, the 
ultimate criterion of truth; and, finally, it is the basis of 
the distinction between the self and the not-self upon which 
all human thought is hinged.
The true proof of the existence of God will, therefore, be 
merely an uncovering of this "dark compulsion." The traditional 
proofs, Lotze affirms, are all more or less clumsy attempts to 
express it, or at least this it is which, vaguely sensed, in- 
spires them and leads them to run far ahead of their evidence. 
It underlies the teleological argument and carries it "far 
beyond the inferences which could be reached by means of its own 
impractical assumptions. For when once the dominion of 
significant moral forces that operate purposively has been 
confirmed by experience, though over but a small portion of the 
world, the silent enlargement of this experience into an 
assertion that there is a wisdom, a beauty, a goodness, and a 
perfection that pervade the whole world without exception, rests 
in this case not merely on the common logical mistake of a
1. of. Jones, The Phil, of Hermann Lotze, Ch. II.
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generalisation of some truth proved to be valid in a particular 
case, but is supported by the living feeling that to this, 
which is greatest and most perfect, there belongs a perfect and 
all-embracing reality. 1 ' 1 In the Lectures of 1879, Lotze 
indicates that what we have thus seen to lie, in his opinion, 
beneath the teleological argument also underlies the cosmologicaL 
The latter is based, he says, on the three legitimate claims, 
first, that a highest principle must not be self-contradictory; 
second, that it must be necessary for explaining reality; and 
third, that, of all the thinkable principles which satisfy these 
formal postulates, that alone should be recognised as the 
highest principle of all which proves itself, at once through 
the greatness and exaltedness of its sense, to be entitled to 
occupy this highest place. The third claim is based directly 
on the dark compulsion of feeling. However, the ontological 
argument expresses it more adequately, and of its two forms the 
Anselmic is very nearly satisfactory. For this form "shares
the formal indefiniteness which attaches to all the inner
P 
experiences of faith." The formal indefiniteness is shown,
firstly, in the fact that "it leaves us in doubt as to what the
reality is which that which is highest and most worthy must
P 
possess." For though, in the course of the argument, Anselm
uses the term Deus, addresses a prayer to Deus in the second 
person, and employs Psalm 13 in such a way as to show clearly 
that he identifies Deus with the God of the Old Testament, still
1. Microcosmus II, p. 671. 2. Ibid., p. 671.
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in the definition upon which the whole argument depends God 
appears as an "id" which, Lotze contends, need not be a Bein^, 
but may be of the nature of an event, or a world-order. What- 
ever we may think of the conclusion which Lotze draws from it, 
the fact which he here indicates is undeniable, and it is 
probably due, as Professor Taylor claims, 1 to the influence of 
Neo-Platonic conceptions in Scholastic thinking. This 
indeterminateness appears, further, we are told, along with a
recognition that the argument is based on a value-judgment, in
2 the predicate "majus." Anselm had himself said, "I do not
mean greatness in space, like a body, but greatness in goodness 
and worth, like wisdom." Lotze is, therefore, justified in 
saying that the predicate majus expresses the sum of all 
predicates of worth, of the beautiful, the good, the exalted 
and the holy, in a quite indefinite way. This indefiniteness, 
then, and the recognition of the argument as based on a 
value-judgment, seem to indicate, Lotze thinks, that Anselm was 
struggling on the very verge of expressing the truth which yet 
eluded him. Anselm was also right, Lotze contends, in that he 
was thinking, not in terms of an inner contradiction within 
the conception of G-od, but in terms of a contradiction of our 
whole immediate certitude which, he thought, the denial of God's 
existence would create. The ontological argument, therefore, 
comes nearest to being an adequate expression of an immediate 
intuition of value; "to wit, the conviction that the totality
1. Art. on Theism, Easting's Encycl. etc.
2. Monologium, Gh. II.
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of all that has value - all that is perfect, fair, and good - 
cannot possibly be homeless in the world or in the realm of 
actuality, but has the very best claim to be regarded by us as 
imperishable reality. 1 It falls short of a precise de- 
termination of that which has supreme value, but it "believes 
that it knows that this highest and best must be one with the 
Infinite which speculative philosophy found itself bound to
Qrecognise as the true reality.' This blending of the 
Existent and the Worthy is really a further step, Lotze con- 
siders, but it is one for which he hopes, in his own reasoning, 
to bring forward weighty considerations.
We must take exception to the role which Lotze assigns to 
feeling in this discussion, as we have already done in a 
different but essentially relevant connection. As Professor 
Jones complains, Lotze has handed over to feeling what is the 
essential function of thought; and it is unnecessary, if not 
fundamentally impossible, to assume, as Lotze does, that a 
process which is immediate must therefore be based on feeling. 
In striving to eliminate this element, however, we must be 
careful to recognise that his support of the fundamental 
assumption which the ontological argument strives to express -
namely, the objectivity of our value-judgments - is of great
3 value and validity. Sorley finds that there are two motives
underlying the ontological argument; namely, an intellectual 
desire for completeness in our conceptions, and the demand -
I.Phil, of Relig., p. 10. 2. Microcosmus II, p. 671 
3.cf. Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, Ch. XII.
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which Lotze recognises - "that our highest ideal, the best and 
most perfect being which we can conceive, shall not be severed 
from reality." He agrees also with Lotze that "it is clearly 
a mistake to clothe such a demand in the dress of an apodictic 
proof which can be demonstrated from the mere content of the 
idea." He is careful, however, not to err with Lotze in 
overemphasizing feeling. In his Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, 
McTaggart has an examination of this contention of Lotze's. 
He holds that, if Lotze's language be strictly interpreted, it 
merely records the fact that Lotze has this immediate certainty 
of the real existence of the Best - a fact that is merely of 
biographical interest, since his possession of this certainty 
cannot be the logical basis of an argument. Indeed the fact 
that it is a widespread possession, if that be a fact, could 
not have any logical significance, especially since there are 
some who do not have it. Lotze would probably admit the truth 
of most of McTaggart's contention, but he would deny its 
relevance. He would draw an analogy between the immediate 
certainty of the existence of the Best and the facts of sense- 
perception. In both cases, he would say, we cannot logically 
prove that those who lack them are wrong or deficient, because 
they are the necessary data from which all proof starts, and to 
which proof must ultimately return. But, for the same reason, 
it is important to have them, and to recognise them for what 
they are. Such a defence, however, could be granted to Lotze
1. Moral Values, p. 313.
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only by those who agree with him that the data of sense are 
beyond the jurisdiction of reason. By those who hold the 
coherence view of truth - and Lotze was one of these - the data 
of sense must be regarded as subject to the test of harmony 
within a system, and the same will be true of this so-called 
immediate certainty of the existence of the Best. McTaggart, 
therefore, goes on to ask what could be said of this contention 
if it "presented itself as a proposition which reason directed 
us to believe," and his reply is, in brief, that, while it 
could not be accepted as a foundation on which to rest a 
metaphysical system, it might perhaps be acceptable "if we 
regard an idealist system of metaphysics as being already 
demonstrated." Even of this, however, he is very doubtful.
IV. In the Lectures of 1879, Lotze included a brief 
paragraph on the moral argument. Previously he had confined 
his critical attention to the traditional metaphysical argu- 
ments, but apparently he felt that the importance assumed by the 
moral: argument since the time of Kant merited some reference to 
it on his part. His treatment of .it irresistibly suggests that 
he mentions it only to avoid the charge of failing to do so, 
rather than for any contribution it might yield to the develop- 
ment of his discussion. The argument proceeds, he says, from 
the lack of a due proportion between merit and reward in this 
world to a supreme ethical principle which is both willing and
1. Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, sects. 73 - 78.
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able to produce this proportion. Against this reasoning he 
brings only one, but that a perfectly fatal, objection - fatal, 
that is to say, if it is sustained; namely, that it involves a 
petitio principii. For without a prior faith in God, he urges, 
man has no ground for that belief in an ultimate proportion 
between merit and reward from which this argument endeavours to 
deduce the existence of God.
But surely this is a misrepresentation of the argument 1. 
Whatever may be the ethical status of the idea of merit and the 
demand that it shall meet its reward, it is not in its origin 
a religious deduction. If a belief in God be not its ultimate 
ground then clearly from it we cannot deduce the existence of 
God, but surely it does not arise out of a prior faith in God. 
The moral argument, in this form, may be properly expressed as 
follows. I find in myself and others an insistent and apparent- 
ly innate, ethical demand for justice; for a due proportion, 
that is to say, between reward and merit. I find further that 
only my belief in God gives me a right to believe that such 
justice will finally obtain. Therefore my demand for justice 
reinforces my belief in God. It may be granted, as Wendland 
puts it, that this argument is bristling with vulnerable points, 
but to characterise it as a circulus in demonstrando is to 
misunderstand its true nature. Instead, it simply is, what 
all factual proof is, a case where one element of our experience 
is confirmed by being shown to be in harmony with another
1. Gottesbeweise, in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gesenwart, 
Vol. II.
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element that arises in our experience independently of it.
It should also be noticed that Lotze considers, in this 
passage, only that form of the moral argument which - though it 
is hinted at in the closing section of Hume's Dialogues - was 
made famous by Immanuel Kant. The argument is that complete 
good must be a union of virtue and felicity. But the present 
world, where that unconditioned obedience to the categorical 
imperative, in which virtue consists, often leads directly away 
from felicity, is not so constituted as to produce, or render 
possible, this complete good. There must exist, therefore, a 
G-od who brings it to pass in an eternal life in a higher world. 
But Lotze does not indicate the history of Kant's relation to 
this argument; that is to say, that Kant realised its un- 
satisfactory nature and worked toward another that should be 
more adequate; nor does he hint at other forms of moral 
reasoning that, because they have satisfied eminent thinkers, 
would seem to demand notice in any consideration of the moral 
argument. A statement and criticism of what is claimed to be 
the moral argument, but which is really only one form of it - a 
form that was recognised by its author to be insupportable - is 
highly misleading and insufficient. And here we have another 
instance of Lotze's undue negativity in this whole discussion. 
He was quite well acquainted, as we shall see, with a form of 
the moral argument which he, probably with justice, regarded 
as valid. In order to be fair to the moral argument, in its
1. Jones, A Faith that Enquires, p. 23.
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essence, he should have indicated that fact in the present 
connection. This criticism, of course, applies only to the 
published lectures. That these correctly reproduce the dictata 
I am assuming without investigation; what Lotze may have said 
in addition to his students I have no means of knowing.
Chapter III. 
INTERACTION - LOTZE'S STARTING POINT.
We are now in a position to understand the problem as it 
presented itself to Lotze. On the one hand, as we have shown 
was a victorious natural science,-with a purely empirical 
outlook, a completely mechanical method, and, as an explicitly 
deduced and enthusiastically advocated philosophical conclusion, 
a thorough-going materialism. As a competent scientist, we 
have seen, he was thoroughly in sympathy with the mechanistic 
method of his day, yet he protested against the philosophical 
assumptions of contemporary science, and insisted, firstly, 
that its pure empiricism involved it logically in a denial of
the possibility of scientific prediction, a conclusion which it
2 escaped only by a happy inconsistency; secondly, that its
mechanical method, while universally applicable, was everywhere 
subordinate in significance;-^ and, thirdly, that its materialism
was a quite unnecessary, and indeed mistaken deduction from
4. 
its mechanistic method; and unwarranted limitation of in-
*
telligent consciousness, and an insufficient explanation of the 
facts of experience. On the other hand were the value-dis- 
ciplines, strong in every respect in which contemporary natural 
science was weak, and yet the religion at their head was unable
I.Metaphysic Bk. I, sect. II. 2. Ibid, sect. IV. 
3.Microcosmus p. XVI. 4. Ibid. p. 433- 5-Phil.of Relig.,p.3o.
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to offer as proofs of the existence of God, Lotze felt, any 
arguments which were not either fallacious or inconclusive, and 
was therefore quite incapable of a scientific vindication of 
her right of existence. Nor could the religious apologist 
retort, according to Lotze, that in this respect science and 
religion are in the same situation; for, though it is true 
that science cannot, any more than religion, prove the existence 
of that with which it deals, still science is not under the 
same obligation to do so. Its laws do not claim to be more 
than hypothetical. Religion, on the contrary, claims, and 
must claim, to be true of real existence, and a failure on its 
part to justify this claim must ultimately prove fatal to its 
very existence.
In attempting to formulate such a justification, Lotze 
will avoid, as far as possible, the sources of previous failures 
The teleological argument had proved unsatisfactory, as we saw 
in our previous chapter, because of its inability to find an 
empirical vindication for its starting point; Lotze will bring 
forward a cosmological argument, with a starting point that is 
simpler and more easily established. But the traditional form 
of the cosmological argument had also met with failure, the 
reason being that it had attempted too much. Instead of es- 
tablishing the existence of God it was able to argue only to a 
philosophical unconditioned. Lotze's argument will not be so 
ambitious. He will not try to deduce the existence of God in 
one step from his simpler starting point, but will rather
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endeavour to establish "a more modest conclusion, which shall 
serve us as a preliminary condition for that other conclusion." 
His argument, that is to say, has two main steps, in the former 
of which he endeavours cosmologically to prove the existence of 
an Absolute, and in the latter of which he endeavours to build 
into the conception of an Absolute such other conceptions, based 
on.various considerations, as will transform it into the 
religious conception of God. It is with the former step that 
we are now concerned.
The starting point whic^ he selects is the fact of inter- 
action, "the assumption that all the elements of the world, 
without exception, act upon each other, no matter whether 
adapted to an end or the reverse; and therefore that each
exerts influences upon the rest, or, in turn, receives influences
2 from them." Such an assumption, unlike that which forms the
starting point of the traditional teleological argument, is 
completely confirmed, so Lotze is convinced, by our experience, 
so far as it goes, and even where we have not experienced its 
validity - in the remote past, the future, and in present in- 
stances of apparently indifferent elements - its direct or 
indirect presence must be assumed, unless the very possibility
-x.
of science is not to be denied.
There are certain systems of thought, however, which 
advocate such a mutual independence on the part of the world- 
elements that they find it necessary to deny the fact, though
I.Phil, of Relig., p. 25. 2. Phil, of Relig., p. 25 f. 
3.Ibid., p. 26 f.
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they admit the appearance, of interaction; and these must be 
shown to be invalid if Lotze is to rest his argument securely 
upon interaction. The first of these to be noticed, is the 
doctrine of Occasionalism. Lotze himself taught a doctrine 
that either had been, or he feared might be, confused with 
Occasionalism, but he taught it, he claimed, only as a prece-ot 
of Methodology, necessary in order to permit science to proceed 
with her proper investigations without waiting on the solution 
of the more ultimate problems involved. He points out that 
physics must be content at first to describe the connections 
between things without awaiting the solution of the metaphysical 
problem as to how these connections are brought about; psychology 
can study the factual interrelation of mental and bodily 
processes without knowing how it is produced; and, in short, 
all our knowledge of Nature is but a "study of the occasions on 
which - by means of a mechanism whose inner moving springs we 
do not understand - phenomena are manifested, each attached by 
universal laws to an occasion belonging exclusively to itself,
and each with an equally constant regularity changing with a
P change in that occasion." Occasionalism, as a metaphysical
doctrine, is very different from this. It does not, like the 
above, pass by the question of the "inner moving springs;" it 
concerns itself directly therewith, and is indeed a doctrine of 
these inner moving springs. It is a denial of causality. It 
teaches that if, when A and B enter into the relation C, A changes
1. cf. Microcosmus I,p.280 f; Ketaphysic I, p. 14? f.
2. Microcosmus I, p. 280.
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to a and B to b, the most that we can say is, not that there is 
a mutual influence between A and B, but only that G is the 
occasion of these changes. But, as Lotze is content in this 
section to point out, this is not to banish an active process 
from the effectuation of these changes. It is rather to pre- 
suppose an active process as having already occurred between 
A and B, on the one hand, and some other element, on the other. 
With such a contention, Malebranche , for instance, would readily 
agree. God, he would say, is the other element; it is G-od 
who recognises the occasion C, and causes the change of A to a 
to be followed by the change of B to b. Elsewhere, however, 
Lotze refers, though not by name, to the doctrine of Occasion- 
alism, and there contends that such a source of the necessary 
active process serves to magnify, rather than to solve, the 
problem. He is criticising the Leibnizian doctrine of Pre- 
established Harmony, and one of his objections to it is the
-z
fact of contingency.-' Now, he argues, a doctrine of Occasion- 
alism cannot be brought in to meet this need so long as it 
illegitimately separates G-od from things; for this would result 
only in a multiplication of the problem. His words are; "And 
the most desperate efforts to find in the continual mediating 
activity of God the bond to which it is due that the states of 
one thing become the efficient causes of change in another, 
cannot obviate our speculative scruples, as long as they 
separate God and things from one another in the same way as
' y ° ' P> 147> 2 - "IwoooBmufl II, p. 597 f .3. of
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individual things used to be separated from one another. For 
these views, too, only double the unsolved problem - they 
suppose an action of things upon G-od, and a reaction of G-od 
upon them, and explain neither the action nor the reaction."
Lotze has correctly indicated an essential weakness of 
this form of the doctrine of Occasionalism; namely, its deistic 
presuppositions. And yet I cannot avoid a suspicion that he 
has himself left an opening for a very shrewd counter-thrust. 
As we shall see more fully in our next chapter, he is induced 
by the difficulties involved in the conception of transeunt 
action to reduce everything to immanent action; but he recognises 
that the latter conception is really full of difficulties too, 
and he justifies his reduction of the one to the other merely 
by claiming that the difficulties in the latter conception are 
not so obtrusive, because we think we know that immanent action 
can take place even.if we have to confess our ignorance of the 
how. Now, may not this doctrine of Occasionalism retort that 
the interaction of material particles is inconceivable to us; 
whereas we know the fact, even if we do not know its explanation, 
that material particles can impress a mind in order to be known 
thereby, and that a mind can produce movements in these material 
particles? Lotze, who was not entirely free from the 
epistemological subjectivism which gives to this retort its 
plausibility, would be hard put to it for a reply, unless he 
called in question the conception of matter which underlies 
Occasionalism. For Occasionalism is based upon the Cartesian
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conception of matter as essentially passive and inert, and 
motion as something that comes to matter and changes its spatial 
relations from an outside source. Lotze's doctrine of matter 
is essentially different, for he converts atoms into souls. 
Until it is successfully challenged, it gives him the right to 
assert that the relation between any of the so-called material 
atoms in interaction does not differ essentially from the 
relation of knowledge and will presupposed by Occasionalism, 
and to deny that the latter is any better known to us than the 
former. If this claim be allowed him, Occasionalism loses its 
raison d'etre. I suppose his doctrine of matter is presupposed 
in all his discussions of Occasionalism, but in those with 
which I am acquainted he does not explicitly refer to it, nor 
does he definitely challenge the conception of matter which 
underlies the doctrine he is criticising.
In the T^etaphysic, Lotze notices a more refined form of 
Occasionalism to which, it may be claimed, the criticisms which 
he has brought against the grosser form do not apply. It would 
regard the relation C, between A and B, as the complete reason 
of the consequent F, and deny that we need look any further for 
an active process of any kind; and it would appeal against 
Lotze to his own repeated assertion that an ection cannot be
delayed when the sum of its conditions is complete. Such an 
  
argument is fallacious, Lotze contends, because it regards law,
which is only a mental connection of truths and so purely 
1. Section 62.
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hypothetical, as containing in itself the actuating power which 
really resides only in things. Such a view of the nature of 
law, as Lotze is ever insisting, is quite false; but even if it 
were true, this view would be merely substituting, for the 
conception of G-od in the other form of the doctrine, its own 
conception of law, and would presuppose an action exercised by 
the elements on the law itself, "in order, by help of the power 
of the law, to dispense with the action of things upon each 
other." 1
It will be remembered that Lotze himself denies interaction 
in the usual acceptation of that term in his attempt to explain 
its possibility; but his is not intended to be a doctrine of 
Occasionalism, and he strives to save himself from the error 
which he regards as invalidating such a doctrine. In the first 
place, he endeavours - how successfully we will have to enquire 
in the following chapter - to bridge the gap between G-od and 
things; and in consequence of this endeavour, secondly, a 
change in one thing is not usually regarded by .11 :i as tne 
occasion on which G-od produces a change in another. Sometimes 
lis does seem to be teaching that, on the occasion of a change 
in itself produced by, or at least manifesting itself in, one 
thing, the Absolute makes such changes in other things as are 
necessary to preserve its own identity - and this surely is
i
Occasionalism. But his explicit repudiation of the charge 
of Occasionalism shows that this is not his real meaning.
1. Section 62.
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Rather does he intend so to unify the worli elements in and with 
the Absolute that a change in one element does not merely produce 
but actually is. a change in the Absolute itself, and this does 
not merely produce, but actually is, a change in certain world 
elements which may be different from the former. The passages 
that seem to teach Occasionalism occur when Lotze is thinking 
of the fact that not every world element is manifestly changed 
when any one element changes; for his explanation of this fact 
is that, on the occurrence of any disturbance in an element, and 
so in itself, the Absolute changes only so much as is necessary 
in order to restore its own identity; but he clearly intends 
such an explanation to be understood, somehow, in the light 
of his closer identification of the changes involved. All this 
may be admitted, and yet it may be contended that it is true 
of Lotze only while his discussion moves on physical levels. 
When he has shown that by the finite individuals he means souls 
and spirits, and that by the Absolute he means God, and when 
further he has insisted on the independence of souls, and still 
more of spirits, this vindication of Lotze, it may be urged, 
will no' longer apply. It must be admitted that there is much 
in his writings that would seem to justify such a criticism, 
and whether he has succeeded in avoiding a form of Occasionalism 
is at least open to question. We can claim, however, that he 
did not intend to enunciate such a doctrine, and that, at his 
best, he avoids it. This difficulty is but one aspect of a
1. Ward, Realm of Ends, Ch. XII.
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fundamental problem which underlies the whole Lotzian system, 
and the.failure to solve which infected his writings with a 
confusing vacillation; namely, the harmonising of the apparent- 
ly conflicting claims of pluralism and absolutism.
A second theory which must be disposed of before Lotze 
can start from interaction as a datum is Leibnitz's theory of 
Pre-established Harmony. It is described as an attempt to put 
in the place of reciprocal action "a predetermined harmony of 
cosmic order, according to which the states of the different 
things accompany and correspond to one another, without having
to be produced by reciprocal action.' The theory is more
p 
fully characterised in the Metaphysic. Leibnitz starts, we
are there informed, from "the supposition of a relation of 
complete mutual exclusion between the simple essences on which 
he builds his universe," a supposition which renders necessary 
that '.'the de facto correspondence which takes place between the 
states of things" should be attributed "to the deity which-had 
designed their developments." Before the mind of God, according 
to Leibnitz as Lotze Interprets him, there hover innumerable 
images of possible worlds, each image being unalterably ordered 
in the minutest detail in accordance with certain eternal laws 
which are binding on God Himself. Each image is exclusive of 
all the others, and must be accepted or rejected entire, just 
as it is. G-od, that is to say, cannot assemble the excellences 
of the several worlds, rejecting their peculiar drawbacks, and
1, Microcosmus II, p. 597. 2. I, pp. 150 - 162.
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so forming a new, and vastly superior, world-image. All He can 
do is to grant to "the one which is relatively most perfect, 
just as it is, admission to reality." In the further develop- 
ment of his theory, Leibnitz might have been content, Lotze 
suggests, to regard only the general laws governing the world, 
and not the particular cases of their application, as originally 
determined, but this, he says, would have led ultimately to 
Occasionalism. Instead, Leibnitz unhesitatingly decided that 
the cases of their application were also once for all, irrevocably 
determined; that is to say, that the internal development of 
each of the mutually exclusive essences was predetermined by 
G-od in all its details in such a way that there would be the   
correspondence which we experience between the various stages 
of their independent developments. In reading what Lotze has 
to say of Leibnitz, whether in exposition or in criticism, it 
is necessary to bear in mind that, as Professor Taylor warns 
us, the latter's principal works had not been published in 
Lotze's day, and considerable caution must therefore be employed. 
Our interest, however is in Lotze's argument at present, and we 
do not think it necessary to investigate the adequacy of his 
conception of the Leibnitzian system.
In criticism of Leibnitz's theory, Lotze states, in the 
first place, but does not develop, an opposition to the pre- 
supposition that "the monads are without windows." He cannot 
see that this stringency is either justified empirically or
1. Art. Theism, Hasting's Encycl.
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required by the theory. 1 In very properly excluding the 
Dossibility of a transference of "ready-made states" from monad 
to monad, he thinks, Leibnitz has gone further than was necessary, 
and has gratuitously rejected the possibility, w:j_ch the facts 
would seem to warrant, of a communication, on the part of the 
monads, of their inner states one to another. Leibnitz could 
have claimed all the advantages he sought, in other words, 
without rejecting the view of interaction to which, as we shall 
presently see, Lotze adheres, and his opposition to the Lotzian
argument is not called for by the necessities of his system.
p In the Microcosmus Lotze is more aggressive, and stoutly
denies that any theory of Pre-established Harmony can be an 
explanation of the facts of the world. If the course of even 
the most trivial event were fixed by immutable predestination, 
then the theory in question might, he admits, be an accurate 
description, but obviously never an explanation, of the facts. 
To say that the universe consists of a number of independent 
monads developing in correspondence with one another because 
each, with absolute necessity, pursues a course irrevocably 
fixed for it in harmony with that of all the others - this is 
clearly to offer no explanation of the inner working of the 
universe. Lotze elsewhere points out that, regarded as a 
description, the theory leaves some vital questions undecided; 
here however his attitude is more positive. He insists, in the 
present discussion, that the fact of contingency must both cause
1. Metaphysic I, p. 150. 2. II, p. 597.
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the theory of Pre-established Harmony to fall short even of 
being a correct description of the facts, and also render 
necessary some form of that very interaction with wiiich it is 
intended to do away. "But it is impossible," he says, "that 
there could be such a harmony which as a general law should pre- 
determine the necessary consequences of contingent events; for 
if a change of some constituent of the universe (and it is of 
such that all these consequences must finally consist) has to 
follow and correspond to any event that may or may not happen 
whenever it does happen, then that constituent must be able to 
distinguish the occurrence from the non-occurrence of the event 
by some passion which the event produces in it, and the action 
and reaction which it was desired to banish would thus be 
necessary for the comprehension of that harmony which is inten- 
ded to replace it."
The force of this objection, of course, depends on its 
assumption of contingency - an assumption which Leibnitz would 
strenuously resist. Accordingly something must be said here 
concerning the place of contingency in Lotze's teaching, and 
the reasons which he brings in support of his view. It is the 
fact of spiritual life, according to him, which renders the 
assumption of contingency unavoidable. Within the realms of 
natural science the principle of causality would, at first 
glance, appear to banish the possibility of accident or freedom, 
and yet, even here, it is not regarded in such a way as to
1. Microcosmus II, p. 597.
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render freedom entirely impossible. For the necessity belongs 
only to universal law, which is essentially hypothetical. wo 
natural law "indicates by itself the cases in which it comes to 
be applied. It waits for the requisite points of application 
to be supplied from some other quarter.' Arid here, to say the 
least, room is left for contingency. But Lotze is not willing 
to say only the least. He regards interaction as a mutual 
stimulation of atoms, which he regards after the analogy of 
souls, whereby these atoms are led to develop within themselves 
certain states which belong to their several natures, and which, 
apparently, they are unable to develop unaided only because of 
a certain weakness, or lack of initiative, which makes them 
dependent on an external push to start the movement. G-enerally 
he teaches, or allows to be assumed, that the response of a 
stimulated atom is but an effort to maintain or restore its own 
threatened self-identity; but at times he suggests the possib- 
ility that the atoms may actually develop under the stimulus of 
these external shocks. This would leave room for the appearance 
of the new, which Lotze identifies with the contingent, even 
apart from the agency of those souls which are of a sufficiently 
high grade to be called spirits. But, however this may be, 
spirits must be regarded, Lotze insists, as capable of the free 
production of the new. "A deep and irresistible demand of our 
spirit, under the influence of which we all act in life," impels 
us to the conviction that history must be "something more than
1. Metaphysic I, p. 155*
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a translation into time of the eternally complete content of an 
ordered world." 1 This conviction manifests itself most clearly
in our ethical judgments, notably in our feelings of remorse
2 
and in our censure of wrong-doing in others. Spirits,there-
fore, must be regarded as capable of the production of the new, 
though, once introduced into the world, the new series must 
themselves be mechanically determined. Lotze does not leave us 
without more light on his view as to how the new is produced.-5 
The series of sensations and feelings in our minds are all part 
of the mechanical order. The soul is free, not in respect of 
these, but only in its power of freely adopting its purposes. 
Somehow or other, how is not clear, an adopted purpose gives 
rise to the idea of its object as existing, and this, in a purely 
mechanical way, sets going a series of other ideas which escape, 
by some unknown connection, from the mental to the material, 
where they set going the operations necessary for the realisation 
of the freely-adopted purpose. This theory, to which we re- 
ferred without further comment in our second chapter, we must 
now proceed briefly to examine.
In the first place, we must ask, is this explanation 
psychologically accurate? Is it the adoption of a Durpose 
which originates the idea of its object as existing,or is it 
the latter which conditions the former? Obviously the second is 
the correct alternative, and, if so, Lotze will be hard put to 
it to explain how the idea of something new originates, on nis
1. Metaphysic I, p. 156.
2. cf. Phil, of Relig., sects. 59, 60.
3. Metaphysic, Bk. III., Gh. V.
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assumption of the widened scope of mechanical action. This 
mechanical conception of the nature and relations of ideas, it 
may further be pointed out, does not represent Lotze's best 
thought on the subject. One suspects that he is unduly influ- 
enced in it by the views of his predecessor, Herbart. According 
to the latter, the soul - a simple, indestructible real - , on 
being brought together with other reals, reserves its identity 
under the form,of an idea or object of consciousness. This is 
its one act. Subsequently, the soul is a purely passive back- 
ground in which the ideas react on one another in a mechanical 
manner, building up, in this fashion, the complete mental struc- 
ture. In the present connection, Lotze has altered the Her- 
bartian view of the nature of the soul's creative act, but other- 
wise has been too much influenced by that view. He also has, 
however, - and it is much more characteristic of him - a more 
adequate view of thought in which its active nature is fully 
recognised, and he even criticises, as maintained by Herbart,the
very mechanistic view of thinking which we have seen him, in the
p present section, himself advocating." It is a cause for
great regret that Lotze died before he had had an opportunity to 
develop that part of his system in which the subject of freedom 
would naturally have received a more detailed treatment; namely, 
his ethical doctrines. Here he speaks of the soul freely 
adopting its purposes, and an atterr.pt to discover what he regards 
the soul as free from in this activity would seem to reveal a 
doctrine of extreme indeterminism which we believe to be quite
1. cf. Mlcrocosmus II, p. 611 f.
2. Microcosmus I, p. 133; Metaphysics, sects. 24, 269, 270.
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indefensible. Indeed Lotze gives explicit expression to just
this conception of freedom. 1 Thomas has drawn attention to
2 another difficulty in this general view of Lotze's. He points
out that, according to Lotze, since the sense-content in the 
mechanical-whole is inextricably involved in the chain of 
mechanical necessity, the new element introduced must be, not a 
new movement among these sense-contents, but new sense-content, 
which at once becomes a part of the mechanical chain. But this 
would seem to conflict with Lotze's doctrine of substance, 
Thomas objects. He has insisted, Thomas urges, that a thing 
is real only if it is a substance; that is to say, it must con- 
sist of a unitary group of sense-qualities changing according to 
law under varying conditions. It follows from this that a 
spirit could introduce into the being of a thing only such 
beginnings as the thing itself, under favourable conditions, 
could mechanically produce, and these would not be really new. 
To sum up, Lotze needs contingency in his system, and yet it 
conflicts with his view of necessity. In the absence of a more 
adequate vindication of his doctrine of contingency we must 
question his right to use it as an argument against the doctrine 
of Pre-established Harmony.
A third feature of this doctrine to which Lotze objects is 
its substituting the connection of a system of consistent ideas 
for a connection in the way of active causation. Both the 
presuppositions and the results of such an attitude are, he
1. Phil, of Relio., sect. 61.
2. Lotze f s Theory of Reality, pp. 115 - 121.
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thinks, thoroughly unsatisfactory. Its chief presupposition is 
that there can be an order separated from the things in the 
changes of which alone it could have any reality - an order 
existing prior to tne things, and exercising some constraint, oil 
tneir realisation. Lotze's oft-repeated view on this subject 
is characterised by the intensest realism. Laws can exist, he 
is convinced., either as the activity of the elements which seem 
to obey them and at the instant when they are apparently obeyed, 
or "in the observing spirits which compare the events, as con- 
scious rules for the combination of the ideas, by which we (the 
observing spirits) are enabled, in accordance with the reality, 
to determine beforehand from given states those which succeed 
them"; but "laws never exist outside, between, beside, or above 
the Things that are to obey them." There can be no order 
apart from the things that are in order. "This,ceaselessly 
advancing melody of events - it and nothing else - is the 
metaphysical place in which the connectedness of the world of 
Ideas, the multiplicity of its harmonious relations, not only 
is found by us but alone has its reality."^ When, therefore, 
Leibnitz pictured the mind of G-od as confronted with an infinite 
number of possible worlds, one of which he could translate, 
otherwise without change, from an ideal to a real existence, he 
was imagining something wholly illusory. Such an error is 
easily understandable, Lotze concedes; indeed, it is almost 
unavoidable; for, in relation to the movement of our cognition
1. Phil, of Relig., p. 83.
2. Metaphysic, sect. 43.
3. Metanhysic, sects. 35, 36.
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in predicting the future, the ideas which we have obtained by a 
previous comparison of phenomena do constitute a prius. That 
they can function in this way, however, is due solely to the 
fact that in them, sinc6 they have originated in reality, 
reality expresses itself to guide our expectations; but to 
regard an ideal world as an absolute prius is certainly, so 
Lotze contends, as erroneous as it has been conceded to be 
understandable.
It is but another form of this objection when Lotze urges 
that the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony involves a wrong 
view of the relation of possibility to God. We cannot think 
of Him as limited by any prior necessity external to Himself, 
nor even by a necessity of His own nature, if that nature be 
conceived of as in some way imposed on Him or as one among many 
possible natures. His nature has no prius - such would be a 
"strange and utterly unthinkable idea" - ; but this does not 
mean, on the other hand, that His is a merely indeterminate 
nature. Rather has it an actual form, in harmony with which 
G-od's energising proceeds, and this is the only meaning of 
possibility in relation to Him. 1
Certain other objections are advanced by Lotze against the 
doctrine under review, but their discussion would not contribute 
so much to an understanding of Lotze T s own views as has been 
the case above, and we must therefore pass them by with a 
briefer mention. Even if the possibility of the existence of
1. of. Phil, of Relig., sects. 48 - 54.
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a prior ideal world were conceded, he charges, the theory would 
still be by no means free from serious difficulty, especially 
in respect of time. Into the relation of the elements of the 
ideal world time of course does not enter, so that the motion 
of a ship may be said to be as much the condition of the wind 
and waves as the latter are the conditions of the former. When,
now, this ideal world has become real, it is impossible to dis-
? 
cover from Leibnitz, Lotze complains, what has actually happened
in it; for its development in time clearly cannot add anything 
to its eternally predetermined order. This, in turn, gives 
rise to the question of value. What good was the realisation 
of the ideal world? The only conceivable answer to this 
question, as far as Lotze can see, is that, by the realisation 
of the world which previously was ideal, finite spirits were 
created who could be independent centres of its enjoyment; and 
this answer, he thinks, is at least not alien to the Leibnitzian 
system. But such an answer, he hastens to point out, consti- 
tutes spiritual life the import of the monads, and this intro- 
duces into the system, he considers, as we have seen above, that 
contingency which must render the doctrine of Pre-established 
Harmony quite insupportable.
But further; from at least one point of view, it may be 
shown, he adds, that the granting of reality to the best of all 
possible worlds, as conceived by Leibnitz, actually would 
produce a negative result as far as value is concerned. 1 That
1. Metaphysic, sect. 79-
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which, on this theory, rendered certain of the worlds which 
confronted the divine intelligence possible, as opposed to others^ 
which were impossible, was the rationality of the former; and 
that in which one of them was the best of all was its superior 
rationality. This can only mean, so Lotze interprets it, that 
the presentation to the divine consciousness of one idea a in 
this complex image was the efficient cause of the presentation 
of another of its constituent ideas b, or at the very least, 
of its retention in the divine consciousness when once presented; 
and that the best of all possible worlds excelled the others 
through the superiority within it of this relation of efficient 
causation amongst its members. When, now, the image becomes a 
reality it loses this inherent rationality. While everything 
goes on within the real world as if causation were in operation 
between its members, such is not actually the case; and, "in 
one word, its reality consists in a hollow and delusive imitation 
of that inner consistency which was pronounced to be, as such, 
the ultimate reason why its realisation was possible." Thus, 
so far from its realisation being a gain, it was a loss; and 
we are mystified by the fact that God did not prefer the image 
to the reality.
The doctrine of Pre-established Harmony is based, further- 
more, on what Lotze regards as an illusory view of the relation 
between our minds and their actions in the external world. It 
falsely assumes, so he thinks, that our act of will produces the 
willed result in the world. Instead, all that we can say is
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that there is an unknown mechanism whereby results are connected 
with our purposes, if the latter are really accepted as such by 
the mind. As a result we may be sure that all our purposes 
have the reality of which they are capable, and any that are ca- 
pable of realisation in the external world come thus to fruition. 
Similarly, it must not be thought, according to Lotze, that the 
present world alone was actually realised because God picked it 
out as the best possible, and willed its realisation; but we 
must believe that God saw that it alone was capable of that 
realisation which has come to it alone. This would be the truth 
of the matter, he corrects himself, if the conception of any 
truth as externally confronting the mind of God were a possible 
one.
Lotze complains, once more, that Leibnitz has not made it 
clear how the correspondence of all the changes that occur to- 
gether in the world is provided for; how, for instance, in the 
monads A and B, states a and b correspond, and then later states 
a' and b 1 . This result might obtain if A and B develop at an 
equal velocity, a 1 being separated from a by the same number of 
states as b 1 is from b, so that there is throughout a state to 
state correspondence between A and B; or it might happen if the 
gaps a - a 1 and b - b' are of different sizes the difference 
being neutralised by different rates of development in the res- 
pective monads. His analogy of the clocks, borrowed from 
Geulinx, probably favours the former, but it itself, so Lotze
1. cf. Microcosmus II, p. 704 f.
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contends, was not a very happy illustration for Leibnitz to em- 
ploy. Finally, L0 tze complains that Leibnitz has not satis- 
factorily solved the difficulties involved in the fact of 
general laws in the universe. Leibnitz assumes, he says, that 
genera,! laws were necessary to the perfection of that world 
which should receive the divine approval, but this is by no 
means self-evident. A world is perfectly conceivable which 
would be a consistent whole, and in which every detail might be 
the inevitable result of a preconceived plan, but in which those 
repetitions never occurred which are the basis of our general 
laws. And it is quite possible to regard general laws as 
"vexatious hindrances, cutting short a multitude of beautiful 
developments which but for their troublesome intervention might 
have made the system of the most perfect world still more per- 
fect." Leibnitz should either have shown that general laws are 
necessary to the perfection of the best possible world, and this 
Lotze thinks, he would probably have attempted had he ever faced 
the question, or "he should have given up the attempt to sub- 
stitute for the unintelligible action of one thing on another
O
an even more unintelligible pre-establishment of all things."
We have seen, thus far, that Lotze proposes to make the 
fact of interaction the starting point of his theistic argument, 
and that, in vindication of his right to do so, he has appealed 
to the uncontradicted testimony of experience and the necessary 
presuppositions of knowledge. We have also followed the dis-
1. Metaphysic, sect. 66. 2. Ibid., sect. 6?.
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cussion, and criticised those elements in it which are most 
important for our purpose, whereby he seeks to contravert those 
theories which strive to explain the appearance of interaction 
while denying its reality. It remains for us to bring together 
certain considerations, from different parts of the Metaphysic, 
which, if valid, will constitute a positive proof of interaction, 
The argument, briefly, is this; it is impossible to say what we 
mean by the Being of a Thing without involving the conception of 
relatedness, and relations can have reality in the world only in 
the form of interaction. But we must develop this reasoning 
more fully.
The human race, so he begins, early became possessed of the 
distinction between true and untrue Being, through detecting the 
deceptions of sense-illusions; and this distinction has been 
sharpened and rendered more enduring through the contrast be- 
tween the conditioned and the unconditioned, and through that 
between Being and Becoming. To pursue the latter contrast a
little further with Lotze; we naturally think of a Thing, he
<
continues, as essentially a simple, immoveable whole, a some- 
thing that remains identical with itself even though certain of 
its aspects undergo change. But closer investigation reveals 
the fact, he points out, that change penetrates more deeply into 
the Being of Things than we had originally supposed., and, indeed, 
our study of a Thing is confronted on every hand only with that 
which changes, and fails entirely to locate the permanent. When 
this fact is noticed an attempt may be made, of which the history
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of philosophy since the time of Heraclitus affords several 
examples, to do away completely with the permanent in Things, 
and to explain the world entirely in terms of Becoming. Such 
an attempt, Lotze is convinced, is quite impossible. Even 
Heraclitus had to introduce the permanent in the shape of in- 
exorable laws, and some such concession would seem to be 
inevitable. Whatever may be the difficulties in so doing, we 
find it necessary to regard Things as participant in immutable,
independent Being, a.nd as presenting the fixed points to which
p 
is somehow attached the varying course of events. Two questions,
therefore, present themselves for solution; first, what is that 
Being that we require in Things in order that our theory of the 
world may find in them a firn foundation?; and, second, how 
and what must Things be in order to participate in such Being? 
The latter question does not here concern us, though we will 
have to outline with some fullness, in our next chapter, the 
answer which Lotze gives to it. We may merely remark, in 
passing, that he finds it necessary to regard Things after the 
analogy of souls in order that they may satisfy the conditions 
which his answer to the former question reveals. It is, however, 
with the former question that we have now to deal.-'
The first and most natural answer is that there is in real 
Being something that is essentially opposed to all merely in- 
telligible existence, something which renders it quite impossible 
that we should ever by mere thinking penetrate and exhaust the
1. Metaphysic, sect. 40. 2. Nicrocosmus II, p. 579. 
3. Metaphysic Ch. I; Microcosmus Bk. I, Gh. I. & II.
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essential property of real Being; that it is only in sensation 
that we experience real Being, and here we do so immediately; and 
that this alone, therefore, is our warrant for regarding real 
Being as present to us. Such a view may perhaps point for vindi- 
cation of its claim to our practical custom of resolving doubts 
by referring from proofs and testimony to the confirmation of
*
actual sense-experience; and it may also point to the fact, 
Lotze concedes, that the material, as distinct from the formal, 
validity of the premises of a syllogism is ultimately assured 
only through the test of sense-experience. Lotze admits the 
truth of these claims, merely suggesting that care must be taken 
to guard against the deceptions of sense. It seems to me, as 
I pointed out in our second chapter, that Lotze here betrays a 
faulty theory of knowledge, 1 and that, had he sufficiently con- 
sidered what is involved in that guarding against sense-decep- 
tions which he recommends, he would not have allowed these 
claims to pass without challenge in the present connection, nor 
would he have advanced them himself in other passages. For, 
the data of sense are subject to the test of consistency within 
a system; and, this being so, it is at least as true to say 
that they are tested by thinking as that thinking is tested by 
them. But if this be once admitted the view under consideration 
must dissipate. Lotze's criticism of this view, however, 
follows a different line. The question he raises is as to 
whether sensation is able to afford insight into the real as it
1 . p. 83.
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is. It Is quite impossible, he contends, to isolate the content 
of sense from the act of sensing, in such a way that either the 
sense-content could be imagined as it would be apart from the 
act of sensing, or the act of sensing apart from the qualities 
sensed. If, therefore, we are wholly dependent on sensation 
for our knowledge of the real, as this theory claims we are, the 
latter must be private to each sensuous being, and the act of 
sensing must be creative of the real, which, however, ceases 
again to be real with a change in our attention. But this, 
Lotze objects, is not what we mean by the real. We think of it, 
he urges, as objective to us, the same for all, and as persis- 
ting whether we are sensing it or not. Those who claim that 
Things exist only in their being perceived are misled by the 
variety and distinctness of sense-qualities into first making, 
in thought, this separation which, in reality, is quite imposs- 
ible, and then illegitimately transferring the separation to 
reality, affirming self-existence of the sense-qualities, in 
spite of the fact that they are recognised and discovered only 
by an act of feeling. When, however, they are asked to state 
wher -in the real Bein^ of these sense-qualities consists, they 
cannot do othe.^v/ise than find it in the simple fact of being 
felt, thus reuniting the aspects of sensation that should never 
have been separatee! at all.
Accordingly, Lotze concludes, it is impossible to find in 
sensation that real Beiro of which we are in seatch, for its 
very nature is independence and permanence. Xor :;itv this theory
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satisfy these claims of real Being by appealing to the sense- 
experience of others; by claiming, that is to say, that on the 
disappearance of our own sensation that of others maintains 
Things in Being.' For real Being claims independence of all 
consciousness; and that very natural thinking which would 
equate" Being with sensing would also inconsistently claim that, 
even were all consciousness banished from the universe, Things 
would continue in Being, and would stand to one another in the 
same relations as when they are objects of perception.
Ordinary thought is thus led to conceive of the Being of 
Things, Lotze continues, as consisting in relatedness. "It 
was these relations that formerly gave to them a firm hold on 
reality; and these constituted their existence up to the moment 
of their being again perceived by us. But this being perceived 
is itself nothing but a new relation which is added to, or 
dissolves, the old ones; while of greater importance for us, 
because it is only through it that we come to have cognisance of 
existence, it is to the existent thing itself not more indis- 
pensable for its existence than those relations which subsist 
or subsisted between it and other things." This is the view 
which, subject to certain qualifications which he will later 
bring to our attention, Lotze wishes to maintain. In order to 
do so, however, he must meet certain objections.
 If the reality of Things is to consist in their relatedness, 
these relations must themselves be real. This is a contention
1. Microcosmus II, p. 580.
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on which Lotze himself strenuously insists, and tne implications 
of which form a later stage in the course of reasoning which we 
are now pursuing. When it is advanced as an objection to the 
view that real Being exists only as related, it really takes the 
form, Lotze holds, of a desire to know how there is anything 
real at all. His reply is that this is an impossible and 
improper question. The task of thinking is to define, not to 
construct, reality; and our present problem' is, accepting 
reality as given, to distinguish within it the Being of Things 
from other instances of reality.
A second objection, admitting the truth of Lotze's 
characterisation of the task of philosophy, denies that the view 
he wishes to maintain in the present instance is successful. 
Philosophy has been very unanimous, Lotze admits, in attempting 
"to reach beyond this and in a reality devoid of relations, in 
a wholly self-sufficing self-dependence, to find the true and 
pure existence which belongs to things in themselves, and first 
makes them capable of serving as points from which relations may 
start.' For, it is insisted, the relations in which such men 
as Lotze wish to find the Being of Things must needs be relations 
between the Things themselves, discoverable but not created by 
our thought. That they should be created by our thought is 
quite impossible. If Things ordered themselves according to 
such intellectual relations we would be wholly unable to find 
the independent Being for which we are in search, and if they
1. Microcosmus II, p. 580.
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failed to do so it would be thereby made clear that the Being of 
Things involved something which our definition had omitted. But 
if the relations are to be, on the other hand, real relations 
between Things, then surely, it is argued, the centres of these 
relations must first be established in independent reality. 
Clearly, that is to say, Things must be before they can enter 
into relations, even though it be only through their relations 
that they can become perceptible to us. Now, as the. argument 
proceeds, this Being that they have prior to their entering into 
relations, and which alone makes it possible for them ever to 
enter into relations at all, is the pure Being for which Phil- 
osophy has so often sought. "It is opposed by Philosophy, as 
being of the same significance for all things, to the empirical 
Being which, originating in the various relations that have come 
into play between things, is different for every second thing 
from what it is for the third, and which Philosophy hopes somehow 
to deduce as a supervening result from the pure Being." Here, 
then, we have a doctrine the direct opposite of that which Lotze 
wishes to maintain. What can he bring forward by way of reply?
It should be noted that, even,if Lotze were unable to refute 
this theory, the proof of interaction which we are considering 
would not thereby be completely invalidated. For this theory 
admits that all the Being of experience is, as a matter of fact, 
related Being, and that, indeed, everything has stood in relations 
from eternity. 2 If, therefore, Lotze can show, as he claims to
1. Metaphysic, sect. 6. 2. Ibid., sect. 14.
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do, that the only possible relations between Things are relations 
of interaction, then, even on this theory, he has advanced a 
valid proof of interaction, and demonstrated his right to start 
from it as a basis in his theistic argument. But if, in 
opposition to this theory, he can show that pure Being, apart 
from relations, is an abstraction, valid for thought but in- 
applicable to reality, then the starting-point of his theistic 
argument will be even more secure. His criticism of this 
theory is therefore very much in place in our discussion.
Lotze's first objection to the theory in question is that 
its definition does not enable us to distinguish between Being 
and non-Being. "For not to be at any place, not to have any 
position in the complex of other things, not to undergo any 
operation from anything nor to display itself by the exercise 
of any activity upon anything; to be thus void of relation is 
just that in which we should find the nonentity of a thing if it 
was our purpose to define it." This objection, so he hastens 
to defend himself, is not a foolish expression of the desire to 
know the process or the inner structure whereby Being is endowed 
with the reality which distinguishes it from non-Bfcing; it is 
merely the entirely legitimate demand that our definition of 
Being should enable us to distinguish it from its opposite; a 
demand which the definition of pure Being in terms of the absence 
of relations is quite unable to fulfil. An attempt fcay be made 
to meet this objection, he anticipates, by denying that this
1. Metaphysic, sect. 7: Microcosmus II, p. 581.
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theory defines pure Being as mere unrelatedness. "It will be 
urged that if, starting from the comparison of the multiform 
Being of experience, we omit all the relations on which its 
distinction rests, that which remains as pure Being is not the 
mere privation of relations but that of which this very unre- 
latedness serves only as a predicate, and which, resting on 
itself and independent, is distinguished by this hardly to be 
indicated but still positive trait from that which is not." 
Lotze's reply is that, though in practice we apply such pre- 
dicates as independence and self-existence only to that which 
is, and not to that which is not, still they get their meaning 
only from the thought of relatedness, and that, once the impli- 
cation of relatedness is dropped, they are quite as applicable 
to Nothing as they are to Being. This contention of Lotze's, 
I think, must be sustained.
In bringing forward this' objection, Lotze repeats, he is 
not contradicting his own previous assertion that the business 
of Philosophy is to define a-given reality, not to construct 
rec.lity de novo, though he fears that this may be charged against 
him. It may be said, he suggests, that reality is indefinable, 
only to be learned by living experience, and that within this 
reality so experience^ we rightly isolate pure Being as the 
positive element in all experienced Being. Consequently, his 
opponents may continue, Lotze's objection is based on the ques- 
tion which he himself has previously disallowed, and an answer
1. Metaphysic, sect. 7*
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to it is not called for, since the problem of distinguishing 
between Being arid non-Being is not before us. But this, Lotze 
replies, would be to mistake his meaning. It is not logical 
Being, but real Being, with which he is concerned: and his 
point is that a pure Being defined as unrelitedness would be, in 
reality, indistinguishable from Nothing. It is perfectly 
possible and legitimate for purposes of thought, he readily 
concedes, to form the conception of a pure, unrelated Being 
underlying the related. Being of experience, just as it is 
allowable and necessary to abstract out of actual movement its 
various aspects, velocity, direction, and motion. But, in the 
real world., it is to be clearly understood, there can be no 
motion without direction and velocity, no velocity without 
motion in a definite direction, and so forth. Similarly there 
can be in reality no such thing as Being apart from all rela- 
tions. Pure Being is an abstraction that does not admit of 
application to anything real. "Just as an abstract motion can- 
not take place, just as it never occurs but in the form of 
velocity in a definite direction, so pure Being cannot in reality 
be an antecedent or substance of such a kind, as that empirical 
existence with its manifold determinations should be in any sort 
a secondary emanation from it, either as its consequence or as 
its modification. It has no reality except as latent in these 
particular cases of it, in each of these definite forms of 
existence. It is merely in the system of our conceptions that 
these supervene upon it as subsequent and subordinate kinds." 1
1. Metaphysics, sect. 9.
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In both the Metaphysic and the Microcosmus, Lotze proceeds to 
enforce this conclusion by examining the other terms, namely, 
position and affirmation, which have been applied to pure Beins, 
but the point is already sufficiently clear for our purposes, 
and we may pass on.
So far, then, Lotze has shown that it would be impossible, 
in the real world, to distinguish between a pure Being, the 
essence of which was the absence of relations, and non-Being. 
His second objection is that any communication between such a 
pure Being and the related Being of experience would be wholly 
impossible. The priority of pure Being to empirical Being is 
only a logical, not a metaphysical, priority. If it were not 
so, it would be quite impossible to understand how, in reality, 
empirical Being could either issue forth from pure Being or 
sink back into it again. There would, of course, be no logical 
contradiction involved in such conceptions, but the real process 
would be thoroughly incomprehensible. For an element cannot 
pass from the unrelated stage merely into relations in general. 
It could enter only into certain definite relations, to definite 
other Things, at a definite time and place. But how could it 
be determined to enter into these relations rather than into 
others? There could certainly be nothing in its own nature 
thus to determine it, and only some other relation could be 
decisive. Without such other relation it could never issue 
from its "ontological seclusion", and be "wrought into the web 
of this universe"; and once having become part of this related
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whole it could never escape. More generally it may be said 
that a transition from unrelatedness to relatedness is unin- 
telligible to us, all that is intelligible being a transition 
from one form of relation to another. Lotze, therefore, feels 
justified in asserting that relatedness is the only kind of real 
existence, and that pure Being does not exist in reality.
Such a conclusion inevitably calls to mind T. H. Green's 
contention that things are constituted by their relations, and 
also the criticism of it by William James. Neither Green nor 
Lotze, however, it seems clear, intended to reduce reality to a 
"train of couplings", though unguarded expressions at times 
might seem to lay them open to such a charge. But any such 
doctrine, and this is a much more serious problem, will now have 
to maintain itself against the rejection of relations on the
part of J. H. Bradley. 1 The latter agrees that there can be
p 
no qualities without relations. He also accepts what we have
stated to be the real view of Lotze and of G-reen, namely, that 
qualities cannot be wholly resolved into relations. It follows, 
he argues, that each quality "has a double character, as both 
supporting and as being made by the relation"; and this, he 
continues, involves us in the dilemma that the quality cannot 
have this double character without a relation between its two 
aspects, and yet, if a relation is admitted into it, the quality 
loses its unity. Or, looking at the problem from the side of 
relations; how there can be relations without terms Bradley
1. Appearance & Reality, Ch. III.
2. Ibid., p. 26. 3. Ibid., p. 30.
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cannot see, so that the terms appear to be something beyond 
their relations; but this raises the problem how the relation 
can stand to the related qualities. If it is something, then 
it must itself be related to both qualities, and this leads to 
an infinite regress; but if it is nothing, the qualities are 
not related. Bradley's conclusion is that our experience, where 
relational, is mere appearance. Lotze, as this chapter shows, 
is not unacquainted with the difficulties which lead Bradley to 
such a conclusion, but, in harmony with his more positive atti- 
tude to experience, he is driven by them to a very different 
result. Bradley argues that, if our experience turns out to 
involve contradiction, it cannot be valid of reality; he pits 
experience against itself, finds that it is not consistent, and 
therefore rejects it; but in rejecting experience he would seem 
to be rejecting that which alone makes the rejection possible. 
Lotze, on the other hand, assumes the validity of our experience 
in general, and searches for a point of view that will remove 
contraddictions from it. He is more constructive, at least in 
his published works, and therefore, as it seems to me, ultimately 
more profound. This stark contrast between the two philosonherSj 
however, is true only of their fundamental attitudes in the 
writings in question; each, in practice, makes approaches to 
the position represented by the other. Bradley, that is to say, 
is not really willing to reject experience entirely, nor will 
Lotze accept it without considerable modification; but at the 
least there is a very striking and far-reaching difference of
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emphasis.
We must proceed with Lotze's argument. In what way, he 
asks, are we to conceive of relations in reality? The latter 
phrase, "in reality", should be noted, for it marks a necessary 
distinction between those relations which seem to belong to 
Things themselves and others into which Things are brought 
somewhat arbitrarily by the mind. This distinction must neither 
be misconceived nor pressed too far. It is misconceived, Lotze 
asserts, when it is regarded as a distinction between subjective 
and objective relations, for the latter kind of relation are in 
a very real sense objective. True, they are relations between 
our ideas of Things rather than relations between the real 
Tilings, but they are objective in the sense that they are in- 
dependent of the individual thinking subject, and of the several 
phases of his thought. Given the same conditions, they will 
always repeat themselves, for "our soul is so constituted, and 
v/e suppose every other soul which inwardly resembles our own to 
be so constituted', that the same a and b, how often and by 
vrhomsoever they may be thought, will always produce in thought 
the same relation." The distinction, further, is pressed too 
far when the relations that are introduced in Things by our 
thought are regarded as foreign to the nature of things. If 
this were so, if the thought-relations did not correspond to and 
express something in the Things themselves, then the process 
which produced them would be, not thought, but merely mental
1. "Afetaphysic, sect. 80.
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aberration. 1 The distinction, however, does mark a difference. 
The relations which we regard as belonging to Things themselves 
encounter and affect one another in reality, supplementing or 
annulling one another; but the other kind of relations exhibit 
their oppositions only in thought. The latter have to do with 
logic, the former with metaphysics; and it is the metaphysical 
relations which we regard as constitutive of reality, and about 
the real nature of which we have, with Lotze, raised a query.
The ordinary view, he proceeds, is that we have a mul- 
tiplicity of Things spread out in space, through which relations, 
like some kind of material threads, hold the Things together, 
and act as a bridge between them. It is inevitable, he adds, 
that we should endeavour to conceive of relations in this way, 
because only in space have we a concrete means of imaging 
what we mean by relations; but in so doing we are merely serving 
subjective ends. Relations, as existent in reality, cannot be 
soatial in character, for space, we are told, does not belong to 
the real world. "I hold," he says, "that space and all spatial 
connections are merely forms of our subjective intuition, not 
applicable to those things and those relations of things which 
are the efficient causes of all particular sensuous intuitions 
this kernel of Kant's doctrine I accept unreservedly."^ His 
reason for thus agreeing with Kant is not acceptance of the 
grounds on which Kant based the doctrine, to wit, that the 
necessity and universality of spatial experience proved its a
1. Microcosmus II, p. 578; Hetaphysic, sect. 81.
2. Microcosmus II, p. 603 f.
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priori character; not was he willing to deduce from it all of 
the Kantian deductions, notably, the limitation of spatial ex- 
perience to human consciousness. Lotze's main reason for deny- 
ing the objectivity of space is his insistent realism, which 
forbids him to think of empty forms as existing prior to the 
objects which are to fill them. S;ace, so he argues, is but 
the generalised result of an infinite number of possible re- 
lations of the logical kind, and so can have no existence except 
in "the activity of intuition which is conscious of this result 
of its relating movement, manifested in combination, division, 
and systematization. To speak, therefore, of relations 
between Things is to employ a spatial image, legitimate enough 
for practical purposes, he concedes, but not correctly expressive 
of the relations of the real world. What, then, is the.true 
idea lying concealed in this incorrect expression? It should 
be noticed, Lotze says, that, in order actually to contribute to 
the union of two Things, the thread of relation which we regard 
as between them would have to exercise, in some way, a definite 
tension upon them; and, however far we endeavour to remove this 
fact from the centre of our discussion by interposing inter- 
mediate links between two interacting elements, we must come to 
face it in the end. Ultimately we are driven to admit that the 
inner condition of one element, as soon as it exists, is the 
direct producing cause of some new inner condition in a second 
element. Here, says Lotze, we have our clue. There is no
1. Ibid., p. 609.
126.
need of supposing any thread of relation joining Things through 
an otherwise empty space which lies between them. All we need 
to suppose, he urges, is that Things are able to influence each 
other immediately, communicating directly to one another those 
modifications which, on any theory, they must be admitted some- 
how to communicate. "Let us admit," Lotze therefore concludes, 
"that there is no such thing as this interval between things, in 
which, as its various possible modifications, we sought a place 
for those relations, C, that we supposed to form the ground of 
the changing action of things upon each other. That which we 
sought under this name of an objective relation between things 
can only subsist if it is more than mere relation, and if it 
subsists not between things but immediately in them as the 
mutual action which they exercise on each other and the mutual 
effects which they sustain from each other." 1 That is to say, 
the conception of relations between Things must give place to 
the conception of interaction; and, since it is impossible to 
say what we mean by a Thing apart from its relatedness, the very 
conception of a Thing involves interaction, and justifies Lotze 
in making it the starting-point of his theistic argument.
There are some aspects of this proof of interaction which 
we cannot profitably discuss until we have considered other 
aspects of Lotze's teaching with which we are not yet in a 
position to deal. We would need to consider, for instance, to 
what extent Things may be said to have any existence at all in
1. Metaphysic, sect. 81.
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Lotze's teaching, and, though we have already touched on this 
question, we cannot answer it satisfactorily until his doctrine 
of the Absolute is before us. Until then, also, we are not in 
a position to deal with his suggestion of immediate and direct 
modifications of one Thing by another, which is, indeed, but 
another aspect of the former question. It should also be 
questioned whether this doctrine of essential relatedness would 
not disqualify Lotze from holding a doctrine of the Absolute, 
which, of course, must be unrelated to anything beyond itself. 
Some points, however, call for immediate attention. In the 
first place, once his rejection of the sensational doctrine has 
brought to his attention the doctrine of the essential related- 
ness of Things, Lotze's proof of the latter takes merely the 
negative form of a proof of the impossibility of unrelated Being, 
and this, we believe, is hardly satisfactory. We are not 
advocating a doctrine of pure Being, in the sense which Lotze 
rejects, but neither are we satisfied with the reasoning whereby 
he seeks to justify his rejection of it. We must challenge his 
right to claim that if "there is nothing that is unrelated, we 
are entitled to say that it belongs to the notion and nature of 
existence to be related." Of course we know of nothing that 
is unrelated, for an object enters into a relation when we 
perceive it. To some realists the reply is open that the very 
efficiency of the perceptual relation consists in the - facu unat 
it makes no essential difference to the object known, and that
1. Microcosmus II, p. 587.
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this object is known as sustaining a wealth of relations to 
tither objects. Lotze himself adopts this position, and indeed 
it may be regarded as one of his foundation principles. His 
whole philosophy is intended to be based on the claim that, as 
we have already seen, the only legitimate task of philosophy is 
to describe, not to create, reality. But he does not hold 
consistently to such a position. Like the pre-Critical 
philosophers, he has placed the perceptual relation on exactly 
the same footing as the objective relations, if we may so des- 
cribe them; but he differs from those philosophers in rejecting 
the conception of pure Being and making relations, not merely 
adjectival, but constitutive. Presumably, therefore, the 
perceptual relation is also constitutive, and, if this is so, 
the way is at least open for the Kantian ascription of the whole 
relational element in knowledge to the activity of the knowing 
mind. But this, in turn, would seem to involve, if it is valid, 
either a doctrine of the pure subjectivity of knowledge, or else 
some kind of conception of pure Being. When he is driven to 
make this choice, Lotze really adopts the former alternative, 
and he has therefore - inconsistently enough - committed "the 
unpardonable philosophic sin - the assertion of the thing-in- 
itself as an unknown and unknowable kernel of reality." 1 It 
would be true, I think, to say that while Lotze always rejects 
the conception of pure Being so far as our knowledge is con- 
cerned, his position in this respect is far from satisfactory.
1. Pringle-Pattison, Mind, Oct. 1895, p. 524; quoted by 
Mackintosh, Grit. Review, July 1902, p. 297.
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Another feature of Lotze's argument is open to objection, 
namely, his proof that an unrelated element could never enter 
into relations, or, once having done so, return to" unrelatedness 
again': The proof as it stands seems to be cogent, but he has 
proved the wrong point. What Lotze has proved is that an un- 
related element could never enter into the universe of related 
things, or subsequently escape again. But this is to assume 
that there is, and not merely appears to be, a universe of 
related things. But that real things are essentially related 
is the very point that calls for proof. Lotze has certainly 
shown that, within our experience, each objective element can 
be understood only as part of a net-work of related elements; 
but this is conceded from the start. What he had to prove was 
that things-in-themselves, entirely unrelated, do not exist, and 
I fail to see that any or all of his contentions has any validity 
as against, for instance, the Kantian phenomenalism. We have 
already pointed out, however, that this in itself does not com- 
pletely invalidate his proof of interaction, since the essential 
relatedness of all the objects of experience has not been called 
in question.
Another serious difficulty confronts Lotze f s argument. He 
has divided all relations whatsoever into two classes - relations 
that are merely logical, and interaction; is his classification 
exhaustive? It must be exhaustive, or the reasoning whereby 
he endeavours to establish the starting-point of his theistic 
argument becomes quite inconclusive. That reasoning progresses,
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to repeat, as follows; the Being of Things is essentially 
related Being; but, relation, as it exists in Things, is inter- 
action; therefore interaction is essentially involved in the 
Being of all Things, and is a universally valid basis for further 
reasoning. But the argument breaks down, whatever we may think 
of its conclusion, if it can be shown that not all relations in 
Things can be regarded as interactions. And this must surely 
be the case. Take, for example, an instance where one object 
is said to be bigger than another; can we properly regard this 
relation in terms of interaction? It may be replied that a 
relation of size is spatial, and that Lotze regards space as 
only a subjective form. But even if Lotze's view of space be 
granted, since it is not our place to attempt to refute it at 
-oresent, size cannot be resolved into a merely subjective re- 
lation in this way; for, as Lotze himself admits, even those 
mental relations have some objective foundation, if thought is 
not to be mere mental aberration. What then, we may ask, is it 
in the object which we interpret spatially as a relation of 
size? Lotze would reply that it is a difference in intensity 
of Being - whatever that may mean. Very well, can that differ- 
ence be resolved into interaction? It must, I think, be recog- 
nised that, whatever it may be in objects that corresponds to 
their relatedness in human thinking, it must be of at least two 
kinds, to which the terms static and dynamic, however unsuitable, 
are somehow applicable. However the case may be in regard to 
the dynamic, it does not seem profitable to attempt to reduce 
that which we have proposed to call static to interaction.
Chapter IV. 
THE ABSOLUTE.
Briefly to summarise before proceeding; Lotze has 
proposed to make the principle of interaction the basis of the 
first step in his theistic argument, and he has attempted to 
justify this procedure by appeal to the uncontradicted testimony 
of experience, to the presuppositions of thinking, and to the 
implications of our conception of the Being of Things. We 
have now to see how, from this starting-point, he develops the 
reasoning which will ultimately lead, so he considers, to the 
conclusion that a personal God exists.
Interaction, as far as he has yet informed us, involves 
two or more Things, the states of each of which are somehow 
determined by those of the others, by means of a relation which, 
however, is more than a mere relation, and which lies, not 
between them, but in them. He has also shown us some reason 
for questioning the aeparateness of these Things, but in this 
respect has already progressed somewhat beyond the popular view 
of interaction. "In the first instance we only find occasion 
for assuming the exercise of an influence by one element a 
over another b in a change to b' which occurs in b when a, 
having been constantly present, incurs a change to a 1 ." 1
1. Metaphysic sect. 45.
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Science, that is to say, ordinarily conceives of interaction as 
occurring between Things that are yet essentially independent, 
and this view, Lotze concedes, has been forced into the respect- 
ful attention of metaphysicians by its advocacy, in their field, 
on the part of Herbart. Lotze, however, proposes to show that 
the fact of interaction makes such a pluralism insupportable, 
both because it involves a commensurability of Things which is 
inconsistent with the independence which Herbart and the 
scientists attribute to them, and because interaction, on a 
pluralistic basis, would have to take the wholly inconceivable 
for-n of "transeunt action." We must differentiate these two 
reasons a little more clearly before taking up each in turn. In 
order fully to explain a given effect, Lotze urges, it is 
necessary to state, not only its logical ground, but also the 
operative causes. It is worth remarking, in passing, that this 
distinction has not always been drawn. On the contrary, we 
find in Descartes, very notably in Spinoza, and also in Leibnitz 
that the cause and the explanation of an event tend to-be 
identified. It was Hume who first truimphantly divorsed ground 
from cause; Kant insisted on the separation, and to him, per- 
haps, its general acceptance is due. Lotze's argument draws 
its strength from a clear recognition of the distinction. By 
causes he understands all those real things of which the 
connection with each other, when brought about, leads to the 
occurrence of facts that were not previously present. The 
reason or ground, on the other hand, is neither a thing nor a
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single fact, but the complex of all relations obtaining between 
things and their natures, relations from which the character of 
the supervening effect is deducible as a logically necessary 
consequence. 1 The full explanation of an effect, that is to 
say, involves a logical and a metaphysical aspect, a sufficient 
reason and an efficient cause. Now, the very application of 
the concept of sufficient reason, so Lotze contends, is enough 
greatly to modify the Herbartian and scientific pluralism, 
although we have to rely on the other factor, he concedes, on 
the idea of causation, in order finally to refute that position.
We shall consider first what Lotze has to say on the 
subject of comparability or commensurabllity. Herbart taught, 
according to Lotze, that the contradictions revealed in 
experience make it necessary for us to substitute, for the 
apparent things of perception, a multiplicity of real beings, 
each of which is to be regarded as a simple and positive quality, 
apparently after the analogy of sensible qualities. Of these 
simple qualities, it is admitted by Herbart, we have no direct 
knowledge; but he wishes to think of them as different from 
each other, though unchangeably self-identical. Lotze charges 
that this self-identity, as conceived by Herbart, is different 
in the case of soul-reals from what it is in the case of all the 
others, involving in the former case an active self-maintainance 
which takes the form of ideas, while in the case of other reals 
it merely involves a "completely undisturbed continuance of that
1. Ibid., sect. 51.
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which in its nature is inaccessible to every disturbance that 
might threaten it. 1' 1 However, he continues, Herbart undoubtedly 
wished to regard all reals as self-dependent, standing in need 
of no relation whatsoever in order to their Being, and just for 
that very reason capable of 'freely entering into every kind of 
relation. Even Herbart allowed, however, that the reals stand 
in one essential relation to each other, namely, coexistence, 
with Lotze's treatment of which we will have shortly to do. 
Here we will merely record the fact, and notice that, according 
to Herbart, their coexistence makes it necessary for the reals 
to enter into some of the relations which are rendered possible 
for them at all only by their essential independence. But the 
mere fact that the reals can ever interact, Lotze replies, 
proves a comparability between their natures which renders the 
doctrine of their essential independence quite untenable. For, 
if all the world-elements were as incomparable, he argues, as, 
for instance, our feelings of red and of sweet, then the 
relation between any two such elements would not differ from 
that between any other two; and there would be no reason, there- 
fore , for attaching a certain consequence to any one pair of 
related elements rather than to any other, or indeed for attach- 
ing any consequence to any antecedent whatever. In practice, 
Lotze points out, as soon as Herbart faces the task of showing 
how the world that appears is produced by the reals, he has 
himself to admit this commensurability. He has to regard his
1. Ibid., sects. 23, 24.
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incomparable reals as possessing certain contingent aspects, 
according to which, for the simple real and without detriment to 
its simplicity, it is possible to regard combinations of several 
qualities as substituted; and these he has to view as comparable. 
This fact of comparability, Lotze continues, is generally taken 
for granted in practice; but it is not so generally recognised, 
he adds, that it renders quite impossible the doctrine of the 
essential independence of things of which also the popular view 
is inconsistently convinced. It is perfectly evident, he 
concedes, that we cannot argue at once from it to the common 
origin of things or to their permanent immanence in one Being. 
Such an inference could have only a measure of probability. In- 
stead this comparability is to be regarded, he says, as only a 
"first suggestion" in the direction of such a conclusion; for 
it certainly does demand that the world-elements be conceived as 
"members of a system in which various series are in some way 
related to each other," so that ultimately it would be possible 
"for one to proceed from the nature of each individual element 
to the nature of every other, by a definite number of steps, 
taken within this net-work of system." 2
So much, then, is involved in the logical element which 
every complete explanation of an event must include. But Lotze 
insists, as we have seen, that a logical ground is not enough. 
"The most that follows from the comparable natures a and b 
concerns the result which they are necessitated to produce, or
1. Ibid., sect. 69. *. Phil, of Relig., sect. 17.
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the manner in which they are necessitated to act upon one another^ 
but it does not follow that they must produce anything whatever, 
or that they must act at all upon each other." For a full 
explanation, therefore, we must also discover the causa 
efficiens, he urges, the dynamic factors, which, since the logical 
factors are permanently valid, will have to be variable in 
order to account for the variability of the occurrence of the 
event. When Lotze has shown what is involved in causation, it 
will have to be conceded, he concludes, that, though things are 
separate from one another relatively to our apprehension, they 
are actually only parts of a single Being, and not independent. 
The problem to be faced is this: here are two elements so 
related in the real world that a definite change in one of them 
is invariably accompanied by a certain change in the other; 
what can that active relation in the real world be?
Perhaps the first suggestion that demands examination, 
according to Lotze, is that this variable real relation is 
spatial coexistence. This was Herbart's view; it is regarded 
by many as self-evident; and it can plead in its favour, he 
admits, the fact that at least some of the relations between 
things, and these precisely the relations of interaction, vary 
directly with the distance involved. Lotze's doctrine of the 
subjectivity of space, to which we referred in our preceding 
chapter and which we will elaborate more fully later on in the 
present chapter, would naturally prevent his acceptance of such
1. Ibid., sect. 18.
137.
a suggestion; but he does not base his rejection of it, in the 
present discussion, on that doctrine. His reply to Herbart is 
that the latter furnishes no proof of the necessity of conceiving 
in spatial terms the coexistence which, ontologically considered, 
is "merely the indication of a postulate, not the indication of 
that by which this postulate is fulfilled." That is to say, he 
urges that the term coexistence can only mark the necessity of 
postulating some relation of two reals which banishes their 
independence of each other, but it cannot indicate what that 
relation is. In spite of this fact, Herbart was mislead, so it 
seems to Lotze, merely by the spatial implications of the term 
he employed, into identifying that ontological relation which he 
called coexistence with spatial coexistence. His advocacy of 
this position, Lotze concludes, may therefore be disregarded; 
because his system, far from laying on him a necessity, did not 
even give him a right so to teach. The popular view that the 
suggestion under examination is self-evidently true, Lotze 
continues, is certainly erroneous. For, if there is a self- 
evident connection between spatial coexistence and reciprocal 
action, the analysis of the former concept, he rightly insists, 
must reveal the latter as one of its constituent ideas. But this 
is clearly not the case; or at least, Lotze says, if he is in 
error in thinking so, it is an error which he has attempted in 
vain to discover. The importance of distance in relation to 
the laws of motion is, of course, undeniable; but it is a fact, 
he urges, which stands greatly in need of careful metaphysical
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interpretation. We cannot regard the space between objects as 
the determinant factor in their interaction, for, as a matter of 
simple observation, the nearest neighbours, he points out, do 
not always interact most freely. The interaction of elements 
is determined, so Lotze explains it, not by space, but by their 
own natures, and it depends on their metaphysical affinities. 
Indeed the distance between objects is really itself only one 
way in which their metaphysical affinity manifests itself; and 
to substitute the manifestation for the real, he contends, is to 
reject what is in favour of that which merely appears. Even if 
it could be shown, he urges in conclusion, that spatial contact 
is an indispensable precondition of interaction, the question 
would still remain as to how spatial contact can make possible 
that which is otherwise impossible; and this question, he 
contends, no analysis of the idea of spatial coexistence can 
answer. It follows, therefore, that spatial coexistence cannot 
be regarded as the metaphysical cause of an event.
A second, very popular attempt to explain the interaction 
of a and b is by reference to a law which constrains b to change 
in a particular way whenever a changes in a certain way. But 
Lotze rejects this attempt, also, as wholly vain. Laws, Lotze 
is continually insisting, are not constraining forces separate 
from and superior to things, determining their changes; they 
are simply human formulae descriptive of the observed changes of 
things. The things act in certain uniform ways, and we express 
this fact in general statements, or laws. Lotze states this
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truth very strikingly when he says, "Now we know that it might 
be ordained by a law external to a and b that b should direct 
its course according to these different circumstances; but it 
would only obey this ordinance if it were superfluous, and if its 
own nature moved it to carry out what the ordinance contains." 
A law, in short, is at best only a statement of the sufficient 
reason, and can never be the efficient cause. But it is the 
latter, not the former, of which we are in search. The fact 
that the state of one element should contain a call to another 
element to change its state, and the fact of the internal con- 
sistency of each being, both show that there is some universal
system of constraining power corresponding to our system of
P laws; but it is the metaphysical system, and not the system of
laws, with which we are now concerned.
When thus it is brought face to face with the actual 
problem, Lotze continues, popular thinking usually seeks a 
solution in terms of the transfer of an influence from an active 
element to another which is regarded as passive. It.is in- 
volved in what we have said above that Lotze regards the 
recipient element, if the expression may be allowed, as also 
necessarily active. For if the second element is to be affected 
by the condition of the first, he claims, it must somehow be 
aware of that condition, and must change itself in harmony 
therewith. This idea will appear again as we proceed. When 
the popular view is rectified in this particular, it is an
LMetaphysic, sect. 45. 2. Microcosmus I, p. 444.
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accurate indication of the fact which calls for explanation, 
Lotze concedes, but that it is not itself an explanation of that 
fact becomes evident when werstrive to determine more precisely 
what it means by the vague expression, "an influence." The 
clearest answer to this question, he considers, would be to 
regard the influence as a Thing capable of independent existence 
which detaches itself from the one element, passes unchanged 
through the intervening space, and then enters into connection 
with the second element. He offers, as an illustration, the 
passage of water from a wet to a dry body, in consequence of 
which the latter undergoes characteristic changes. This 
suggestion, he admits, has several distinct advantages over any 
other which may be offered. In the first place, it avoids all 
those difficulties, which are insoluble problems for the other 
views, with regard to the relation of states to their subject, 
motion to that which moves, and so forth; and it is perfectly 
easy to understand how a transferred thing can exist during the 
interval of the transfer. But for all that Lotze cannot regard 
even this view as adequate. In the case of his illustration, 
as he points out, the passage of water from the first object to 
the .second obviously does not, except in the superficial view of 
practical expediency, explain the changes that are observable in 
the second object. Without this transfer the changes would not 
occur - that is conceded; but when the transfer is completed
*«,
the changes have still to follow. The transfer, which precedes 
the arrival of the water at the second object, cannot be the
141.
explanation of changes which do not occur until after the arrival 
This illustration he regards as typical; and we may say in 
general, he concludes, that the transfer of a thing from one 
object to another may be a necessary preliminary condition of 
changes in the latter object, but it cannot be their explanation.
The alternative suggestions, that the transferred influence 
is not a causative thin.3, but a force, an action, or a state, 
are even less satisfactory to Lotze. For, in the first place, 
as he points out, it is wholly illusory to imagine that a state 
or event could detach itself from the thing of which it is a 
state or in which it occurs, and still persist. If, however, 
it could thus tear itself loose, he adds, we are utterly unable 
to conceive of it existing in the void between the interacting 
elements. For only things and their states or conditions 
exist, and what is not a thing and is not in a thing has no 
existence. But space is no thing; and so this influence 
while on its way between the interacting elements, would be 
neither a thing nor in a thing, and would therefore have no 
existence at all. Even if this were not so, he continues, it 
would be quite impossible to account for the passage of the in- 
fluence to one element rather than to any other without pre- 
supposing the very interaction which we are striving to explain. 
For the element it leaves could determine its direction, only if 
we presuppose a causative relation between it and that element; 
and, in addition to having thus assumed the very thing to be 
explained, we would still have on our hands the unsolved problem
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why the original element selected one of the many possible 
elements, father than any other, to be the goal of the transfer. 
The answer to the latter question, Lotze insists, would involve 
an action of the chosen element on the original element which is 
absent in the case of all the other elements. "Thus for the 
second time we should have to presuppose an action which we do 
not understand before we could present to ourselves so much as 
the possibility of that condition which is no more than the 
preliminary to a determinate action." When, finally, the 
migrating state had overcome all these difficulties, Lotze 
continues, and had arrived at the metaphysical place which is 
occupied by the second of the interacting elements, we would 
still be by no means at the end of our problems. For, in the 
first place, he explains, an arresting action of this second 
element upon it would have to be assumed in order to account for 
the fact that the motion of the state does not continue on 
beyond the .second element indefinitely; and, in the second 
place, once this had been done, its change from being, as it 
were, a state at large, to become a state of the second element 
would still be entirely unintelligible. In short, we are 
driven to the conclusion that causal interaction cannot be ex- 
plained in terms of the transfer of an influence, however it 
may be conceived.
This result, to which we have been led by the difficulties 
Involved in the notion itself, is further reinforced, Lotze
1. Metaphysics, sect. 56.
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maintains, when the metaphysical conclusions that follow from it 
are taken into consideration; for, he holds, it is responsible 
for the erroneous belief that an effect must resemble its cause, 
and for the allied error that only such objects can interact 
whose natures are homogeneous. These beliefs follow naturally, 
he claims, from the presuppositions of the transference theory; 
namely, that the transferred influence is a ready-made effect, 
and that the object affected, being passive, is bound to accept 
as one of its own states any such ready-made effect as reaches 
it. But Lotze denies, as we have seen, that the object affected 
is passive, and it follows at once that the effect cannot be 
ready-made. This being so the doctrines of the homogeneity 
of interacting elements, and of the similarity of cause and 
effect lose their foundation, and with them vanishes the plausi- 
bility of that view which empoverishes the universe by endeavour- 
ing to reduce all events to vibrations, and to oversimplify the 
manifold variety in the natures of things.
The popular view of interaction, therefore, to continue 
the thread of Lotze f s argument, is so full of difficulties that 
either it or some of its constituent elements must be rejected. 
But the first course is closed by the proofs of interaction 
already considered, and Lotze therefore turns to an examination 
of its constituent elements. His discussion of the implications 
of logical explanation has already indicated where the weak 
point lies. The cause of all the trouble, Lotze is sure, is 
the initial assumption of a plurality of Things underlying, and
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accounting for, the multiplicity of appearances, and the sub- 
sequent identification of each of these Things with that 
unconditioned Being which we regard as lying at the foundation 
of this conditioned Being. In order to remove the difficulties 
in the conception of interaction, in short, we must abandon our 
old prejudice that Things are independent unities, and must 
somehow merge them into a single, real Being. But Lotze is 
careful to insist that this conclusion is not to be regarded as 
a conjecture happily hit upon as a means of rendering reciprocal 
action intelligible; it is not what we have to think in order 
to achieve such a result, so he contends; it is rather what we 
do think as soon as we make clear to ourselves what we mean 
by interaction.
Before going any further, we may, I think, freely admit 
that Lotze's indication of the intellectual difficulties in- 
volved in the popular conception of interaction has been 
successful in the main. These, of course, were no discovery of 
Lotze's. The problems Involved had been more or less clearly 
evident at least since the time of Descartes. Henry More 
urged them as against Descartes's view of interaction, and a 
recognition of their importance drove the Cartesians to 
Occasionalism. Locke also finds that the transference of 
motion is "as obscure and inconceivable as how our minds move or 
stop our bodies by thought"; and, he adds, "Constant experience 
makes us sensible of both of these, though our narrow understand-
1. Kemp Smith, Cartesian Studies, p. 73 ff.
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Ings can comprehend neither."-1 Without an examination of its 
details, therefore, which is hardly called for in the present 
discussion, we shall readily concede the general validity of 
this part of the argument, and pass on at once to enquire how 
far the solution which Lotze offers may be accepted. In order 
to arrive at some answer to this question, we must consider the 
further development of the discussion. I am informed, on what 
should be good authority, that the usual criticism of Lotze 
assumes that his argument is wholly cosmological. I have not 
been able personally to check up this statement, but, if it be 
true, such criticism is based on a misconception that is quite 
unpardonable. We have already seen, in the preceding chapter, 
that he expressly disclaims that his cosmological argument is 
anything more than a preliminary step. When this step has 
been elaborated, further, he is careful to point out that he 
has so far proved only the unity of the Absolute, and is not yet 
in a position to indicate what the Absolute is, what the nature 
of its unity may be, or how we are to conceive <bf the relation 
between the Absolute and the changes which are popularly regarded 
as instances of interaction. Nor can any inference yet be made, 
he adds, as to the process of creation or the particular order 
of Nature, except to such consequences as would follow, in any 
creation, from the unity of the Supreme Cause, whatever his 
nature. 2 We may, however, take note of one or two suggested 
criticisms before opening up this more detailed discussion.
1. Ibid., p. 197. 2. Microcosmus I, p. 445.
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It is urged, for instance, 1 that Lotze's derivation of the 
Absolute from the fact of interaction is valid only if every 
case of interaction involves the whole universe, for only the 
objects actually included in any instance of interaction are 
thereby proved to be parts of a single whole; that, further, 
this vital element in the proof is not recognised by Lotze to be 
such; and that, finally, he not only does not believe the 
assumption, but actually advances an explanation - to wit, the 
connection of all the changes in any event with the preservation 
of the meaning of the Absolute - for the fact that it is not 
true. In other words, the charge is, if I rightly understand 
it, that Lotze is so inconsistent as to employ the nature of his 
Absolute as an explanation of the non-existence of one of the 
most vital elements in his proof of the Absolute*s existence. 
Such an objection, if valid, would be quite fatal to Lotze's 
argument. A priori, that such a careful thinker as Lotze should 
land himself in such a palpable contradiction by failing to 
notice so vital an assumption would seem to cast suspicion on 
the validity of the charge. We have ourselves had occasion, we 
must admit, to refer to what look like contradictions in his 
teaching; and we may further concede that this would seem to be 
almost inevitable in one whose thinking was so unsystematic. But 
yet it should be recognised that Lotze had, in a highly developed 
state, the Kantian virtue of making clear the hidden assumptions 
of the views that came before him, and indeed it was precisely
1. Thomas, Lotze's Theory of Reality, p. 188.
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his devotion to this task which contributed more than any other 
factor, we may urge, to the lack of systematisation in his final 
conclusions. If this be so we would not have expected him to 
overlook, as is charged, what would appear to be such an obvious 
assumption of his own.
And yet it does not appear that Lotze ever considered it in 
relation to his argument for the Absolute - this we will have to 
admit. Such a criticism may point out, with perfect justice, 
that, in the Philosophy of Religion,- Lotze states his starting- 
point as though he was totally oblivious of such an assumption; 
and it may further be argued, at least with some plausibility, 
that his subsequent discussion indicates some of the reasons 
for its escaping his notice. For, as his proof of interaction 
clearly shows, and as this passage implies, he identified inter- 
action with that in things which is logically expressed in our 
system of natural laws; and in consequence of this identifi- 
cation, it may be contended, the necessity of assuming a unitary 
and universal system of laws led him to regard interaction as 
also unitary and universal. But this, it may further be urged, 
is to overlook the all-important fact that, whereas the less 
general laws are unified by the mind by means of laws of in- 
creasing generality until at last one absolutely general law, at 
least ideally, unifies them all, it is hardly possible to think 
of particular interactions as being unified in any such fashion. 
Another factor, it may be added, that determined Lotze ! s thinking 
causing him, by its subconscious influence, to overlook the
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assumption on which his reasoning rested was the fact that, in 
certain scientific fields, we do have in mind a unitary system 
of interactions. For instance, we do regard physical inter- 
action in this way, and do not hesitate to say that the ultimate 
explanation of the course of a feather carried before the wind 
would involve every physical feature of the whole universe. But 
it may be replied, as Thomas does, that there are other kinds 
of interaction, - for instance, chemical interaction - which 
cannot be reduced to physical terms, and that, .according to 
Lotze himself, the free activity of spirits produces effects in 
the world, which would be another obstacle in his path. Such 
considerations might seem to necessitate Thomas's conclusion 
that "reciprocal action cannot of itself lead to a world unity," 
and that Lotze's proof has therefore broken down.
Such reasoning, however, is based on a misunderstanding of 
Lotze's real contention. He is not arguing that since any 
instance of interaction binds into a unity the interacting 
elements; and since - the suppressed premise - the various 
instances of interaction, either singly or collectively, run 
through the whole universe; therefore the universe is a whole. 
His argument is, in a sense, less direct than that. It is based, 
not directly on interaction, but on the difficulties involved in 
interaction; and the contention is not only that any instance 
of interaction is inexplicable unless we recognise in it the 
present of an active unity which is the Absolute, but also that
1 . Ibid., p. 188.
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we actually make this assumption, or recognise this unity, when- 
ever we indicate a case of interaction. What is more, - and 
this is rather a confirmation of Lotze's reasoning than a 
necessary presupposition of it - the gap between the physical, 
chemical, sensuous, and intellectual spheres is by no means as 
absolute as the objection we are considering would seem to imply. 
It is true, no doubt, that such gaps must be recognised; but it 
should also be acknowledge that nature is able to transcend 
them, and that continuity is a fact in nature as well as a 
necessary working hypothesis of science.
It is when we come to consider the results at which Lotze 
arrives that the more .serious questions confront us. One point 
we may notice in passing. In the Metaphysic he clearly 
recognises, and takes it for granted that his readers will 
readily agree, that immanent action is "completely incomprehen- 
sible in respect of the manner in which it comes about." But 
his solution of the problem of transeunt action is to reduce it 
to immanent action. Has he not, then, endeavoured to explain 
in terms of the inexplicable, and are we any better off for his 
"solution"? This is the point to which we referred, in our 
third chapter, in discussing Lotze's criticism of Occasionalism. 
The answer to the first part of the question must be in the 
affirmative, but whether he is justified in this course is 
another question. That a philosophic system takes for granted 
certain data to which experience testifies, but for which no
1. sect. 46.
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explanation is forthcoming, need not be regarded as invalidating 
the system so far as it goes. Every system is bound to do this; 
but all such data should receive the closest scrutiny. Lotze 
endeavours to Justify himself in the present connection, as we 
saw, by claiming, first, "that the unity of the essence, in 
which the unintelligible process in this case goes on, makes it 
seem superfluous to us to enquire after conditions of its 
possibility," and, second, that "if we refused to be guided by 
this fundamental thought, there would be no hope left of finding 
means of explanation for any occurrence whatever." However 
that may be, I venture to think that further consideration of 
what he means by immanent action, especially as it occurs,accord- 
ing to his theory, in the Absolute, might have, resulted in far- 
reaching changes in his system as a whole. A study of the 
passage in the Fetaphysic where immanent action is discussed 
does not allay the suspicion which the system as a whole has 
created that by immanent action Lotze really means action within 
a complex unity, which, however, is transeunt in its relation to 
the relatively independent elements in that unity. But if that 
is so, any instance of what is transeunt action, when only the 
interacting elements are considered, is also immanent action, 
when the universe is considered; and Lotze's change of transeunt 
into immanent action is merely an insistance that the whole be 
taken into consideration. It is this aspect of Lotze's teaching 
which leads Thomas to complain that he has uncritically taken
1 . sect. 46.
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over into his system the popular conception of the meaning of a 
Thing. If this be his real view of immanent action, and if it 
be consistently applied, the nature of the Absolute in which 
action is immanent becomes immediately evident; for we may then 
think of the Absolute as an active whole within which are 
elements, relatively independent of one another and of it, but 
which somehow renders it possible that the states of one of 
these elements should immediately influence the states of others 
in what is popularly regarded as interaction. And this is 
clearly Lotze's main teaching. But sometimes he seems to wish 
to take the term immanent more seriously, to deny even the 
relative independence of the elements within the Absolute, and 
to be left with a blank Monism in which differentiations are but 
the product of a distorting human perception. The question of 
what we are to understand by immanence is thus the same as that 
question which we raised in the preceding chapter, but found it 
necessary to postpone; viz., what really becomes of Things in 
the Lotzian system? This question cannot be put off any longer; 
it goes to the very heart of Lotze f s argument so far as we have 
yet traced it, and an attempt to answer it will involve an 
exposition of the later stages of Lotze ! s theism. We may state 
the situation, perhaps, in the following terms: If Things have 
not vanished in the Absolute, then we are left with a Pluralism 
which contains at least a potential threat to the Absolute's 
very existence; the blank Monism that would seem to result, if
1. Lotze's Theory of Reality, p. 74 ff.
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Things have disappeared in the Absolute, is quite abhorrent to 
Lotze's interests, scientific, aesthetic, moral, and religious; 
if, according to Lotze, the truth lies somewhere between the 
extremes, then we wish from him some clear and consistent 
indication as to its precise relation to these extremes.
An examination of the relevant passages will show, I 
believe, that it is the intermediate position which Lotze wishes 
to maintain, and that this agrees with the conception of the 
Absolute to which we were led by our interpretation of his use 
of the term "immanent action." But, at the same time, even the 
most sympathetic reader will have to ad-nit that, under the 
stress of the varying interests of his particular discussions, 
he has allowed himself to employ expressions and illustrations 
which would more ftaturally identify him, now with the one, now 
with the other, of the two extremes. We are told that a change 
in any one element is a change in the Absolute, and does not 
need to become such, the reason being that finite things are 
mere modifications, or parts, of the Absolute, which is in them 
the truly existent; and, lest it might be thought that even 
here things are granted to have a certain independence of the 
Absolute, we are further informed that it is only relatively to 
our faculties of presentation and observation that the unity of 
the Absolute resolves itself into single things. In such 
passages as these, the Absolute appears to be regarded as an 
undifferentiated unity, its apparent differentiation being due
1. Metaphysic I, p. 16?.
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to its distortion in the medium of human perception. At other 
times, however, Lotze uses expressions which lay more stress on 
the independent reality of things. Things are the moulds into 
which the Infinite has been cast; and this must not be regarded 
as a mere transitory, unessential, or phenomenal modification 
of the Infinite, for, we are told, the relation of the finite
many to the Infinite One is a permanent relation of real to
1 2real, which is further described as a relation of interaction. 
Although we are told that the Absolute is a sovereign power, and 
not a mere indifferent bridge for the passage of action between 
elements,^ still in other passages this is precisely the way in 
which it is represented. It does seem at times to be just the 
background of Being, which space could not supply, in order that 
action can pass from one element to another without having to 
leave the "solid background of being." The elements, too, are 
granted sufficient independence to be able to initiate action, 
which forces the Absolute, in turn, to make a compensating re- 
action - the latter often appearing in elements different from 
the former - in order to retain, or restore, its own identity. 
It would be easy to multiply instances of the conflicting ten- 
dencies in the expressions which Lotze employs, but these per- 
haps will suffice to indicate that neither Scylla nor Carybdis 
has been always and entirely avoided.
So far, Lotze has dealt with the conception of Things and 
their unity in an Absolute, all of which, as far as we yet know,
1. Microcosmus II, p. 659. 2. Metaphysic, sect. 246. 
3. Microcosmus I, p. 381.
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may be wholly material. He has, indeed, indicated that space 
is a mere subjective form, and he now goes on to hint that all 
his spatial and material expressions are but unsatisfactory 
figures. He has also spoken of elements needing to be aware of 
the changing conditions around them - an expression which sounded, 
somewhat strange, but which one might be inclined to interpret 
as figuratively as, Lotze contends, Herbart's term "coexistence" 
is to be understood. One is hardly prepared, therefore, for 
the somewhat startling way in which a discussion which has so 
far moved on the level of apparently physical interaction, and 
an Absolute which is involved in this conception, move up into 
the vastly different atmosphere of souls and spirits; or perhaps 
we may say, with Ward, - what is the same thing from the opposite 
side - that it seems more than passing strange, after we have 
made the transition with him, that Lotze ever discussed this 
problem of causation at all in connection with physical action. 
When we have seen how the transformation takes place, we must 
return,.on this higher plane, to the problem which we are 
discussing; namely, the relation of Pluralism and Monism in 
Lotze's system.
We will take up first Lotze ! s conception of matter, and it 
sill be evident that several of his strongest convictions con- 
verge in the view he has adopted. Of these the most important 
is the fundamental conviction, shared by Leibnitz, Fichte, and 
Idealists generally, that the only kind of existence that is
1. Realm of Ends, p. 215.
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ultimately conceivable is existence for a self. Lotze insists 
that our own existence depends on self-consciousness, and would 
vanish with it; and this, he adds, is the only kind of existence 
with which we have any direct acquaintance. "What manner of 
being, however, could we consistently predicate," he asks, "of 
that from which we had expressly excluded the universal charac- 
teristics of animate existence, every active relation of itself, 
every active distinction from everything else?" 1 Nor is he 
content to say that the reality of material things consists in 
their being known by sentient beings. He is very insistent that 
atoms must have an existence independently of us, a,nd this seems 
to drive him, not to the position of Berkeley whom, in many 
respects, he resembles, but to the position that atoms experience 
their own existence. Their existence must, like ours, depend 
on self-experience. "Precisely what we want is this: that the 
things shall really enjoy these states of their own, and not 
merely be thought of as existing in them; Reality is being for
o
self." Material things, in short, are souls; under our gaze 
atoms have come alive.
In the Philosophy of Religion, Lotze's conclusion is not 
quite so definite. In the chapter on Government, he points out 
that the very conception of divine government implies a certain 
independence of behaviour on the part of finite individuals, in 
the exercise of which they "threaten to withdraw from a plan 
prescribed to them, which the governing principle intends to
1. Metaphysic, sect. 98.
2. Outlines of Metaphysic, sect. 82.
3. Gh. VII.
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realise." Such independence, he considers, can only reside in 
the possession by the elements of their own states, and in their 
power of initiating processes which do not proceed from the 
Absolute. "If now we consider how these abstract postulates 
might be fulfilled, we find but one Reality which actually ful- 
fils them; namely, spiritual life." But if this be so, "then 
our current idea of a motionless, blind and lifeless 'stuff 1 , 
which should exist outside of us, can signify nothing that is 
actual," and we are left with the alternatives of either a 
Fichtian Idealism, on the one hand, according to which "the self- 
coherent semblance of such a 'world-stuff 1 ..... is merely 
produced within spirits, and for them only, by a universal power 
which works in all spirits", or, on the other hand, a Spiritual- 
ism which regards the atoms as living beings, which experience 
their own states. Between these alternatives, he adds, religion 
does not force us to choose - but metaphysics, apparently, is 
more decisive. For here the conception of action and passion 
involved in interaction forces us, Lotze feels, to adopt the 
Spiritualist view. Up to this conclusion he leads but gradually. 
We are first informed that the scientific conception of the 
atoms as homogeneous in nature, or identical in substance, is 
only one of several possible views. Science, he says, is in- 
terested only in the external activity of the atoms, not in their 
internal character, and its attitude to the latter question is 
adopted merely because, in this way, science is enabled to pursue
1. Microcosmus Bk. I., Oh. II.
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its interests without a complication of its problems which, for 
its limited purpose, is entirely unnecessary. The view in 
question, however, so Lotze argues, is not only opposed to naive 
reflection; it is not even required by any higher point of view, 
and it is actually rendered suspect by the persistence with 
which many natural products retain their distinctive attributes 
under large variation in their conditions. It is, indeed, quite 
possible to be strictly scientific, he considers, - and the 
authority of his high scientific standing must not be forgotten
- and still to hold both that forces do not attach themselves 
to a lifeless inner nature of things, but arise out of things, 
and also that nothing can take place between the individual 
elements until something has taken place within them, - to hold, 
in short, that each atom is a living point inwardly in a state 
of motion.
Lotze proceeds at once to convert this possibility into a 
necessity. He feels that any theory is unsatisfactory which 
holds that one half of creation - that which we comprise under 
the name of the material world - has no function save that of 
serving the other half - the realm of mind. Such a theory would 
apparently do away with all the characteristics which contain 
for naive feeling the essence of all the poetry of life; and 
its repulsiveness to aesthetic feeling is not entirely removed, 
he continues, even by the perfectly just reflection that the 
world revealed to us by our sense-experience has a value and a
1. Ibid., Bk. III., Gh. IV.
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reality, whether it be an exact copy of the external world or 
not. In order to show that the aesthetic "longing" which under- 
lies this conviction is a valid insight into reality, Lotze goes 
on to argue that the form in which we immediately apprehend 
matter a- namely, infinitely divisible extension - is an illusion. 
He insists that only a system can be extended, and that the 
ultimate points which constitute it must be unextended. Matter 
is really a system of unextended beings that, by their forces, 
fix one another's position in space - this is the result so far 
achieved - and, by the resistance which they offer to any attempt 
to make them change their place, produce the phenomena of im- 
penetrability, and the continuous occupation of space. But 
later we learn that this conclusion must be revised in the one 
respect that the atoms are not in space, the latter being only a 
subjective form of our apprehension. What, in the atom, corres- 
ponds to our spatial experience is really interaction; which 
means, as we have seen, that the change of the states of one 
thing is followed by the change in the states of some other, in
such a way that the second suffers in consequence of the con-
2 dition of the first. But it is impossible to give any meaning
to the verb "suffers", so the argument proceeds, without pre- 
supposing a capacity for feeling in that which suffers. It 
follows, therefore, that the atoms must be regarded as living 
souls. Even here, however, Lotze is very cautious. He proceeds 
to discuss the threefold question whether we should, in view of
1. Ibid., Bk. IX., Ch. II. 2. Ibid., Bk. IX., Ch. III.
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this conclusion, regard things as merely subjective forms; or, 
with Idealism, abandon the conception of things altogether; or 
finally strive somehow to supplement the ordinary views so as to 
make room for this conclusion. The first possibility does, not 
appeal to him. He is very sympathetic toward Idealism, in the pre- 
sent connection, but he dissociates himself from it as follows: 
"The real difference between Idealism and our view is that 
Idealism regards things as selfless, and therefore as states of 
the Infinite; we hold that things are probably not selfless 
though we cannot know whether they are or not."
A lengthy criticism of these views would lead us too far 
out of our course, both immediate and general, and we will not 
attempt it. We may pause in our exposition of Lotze's main 
argument, however, long enough to associate ourselves with the 
usual criticisms of panpsychism; namely, that even if an atom 
were a soul it could not possibly know itself as Efficiently as 
we can know it; and, secondly, that, even if it could, what we 
need from it is its body, and not its soul. We have already 
said enough of Lotze's views to show that he would admit the 
truth of the second contention, from the limited view-point of
\
science, but would insist that higher points of view demand the 
soul of the atoms. He has, therefore, to some extent forestalled 
this criticism, and we are justified in bringing it against him 
only if we are not satisfied with what he has to say about the 
higher points of view. This is our position, though we cannot
1. Ibid. II., p. 647.
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pause to develop it. It is highly significant in this connection 
that, as Thomas points out, Lotze first differentiates the 
souls of things, which have only self-experience through feeling, 
from spirits, which have an additional self-knowledge through 
ideas, and then drops out the former, giving them no function as 
souls, in the higher development of his system. Although they 
are souls, like Leibnitz, Lotze gives them no place, as souls, 
in his kingdom of spirits - evidently bacause, whatever the 
nigner pointr? or view require, the highest point of view cannot 
tolerate their claim to be kindred to spirits. This also indi- 
cates Lotze's attitude to the first criticism. He would admit 
that, as far as ideal knowledge is concerned, the contention is 
obviously justified; but he would claim for the atom-souls a 
self-experience which constitutes their unique contribution to 
the sum of knowledge, on which their existence depends, and from 
which he expressly excludes human knowledge. We shall see, too, 
in the sequel, that he attributes to this self-experience an 
importance which, whatever we may think of it, must never be 
overlooked in the interpretation of his views. Professor Pringie-
o
Pattison contends^ as against pan-psychism, that we know spirits 
only in bodies, and that indeed bodies seem to be necessary for 
their individuation. If, therefore, we use the analogy of 
finite spirits, as Lotze does, we would have to regard the atom- 
souls, he urges, as possessing bodies; and thus, to regard the 
atoms as souls at all, would result either in merely pushing the
1. Lotze's Theory of Reality, p. 175 f.
2. Idea of G-od, p. 425.
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problem one step further back, or else in embarking on an in- 
finite progress. Such an objection I would have to regard with 
some caution, because the existence of an unembodied spirit does 
not seem impossible, or even improbable, to me. All the necess- 
ities of the case in point, however, - we may readily agree with 
Professor Pringle-Pattison - seem to be satisfied by the doctrine 
that man and Nature are "organic" one to the other; and it does 
not seem at all necessary that the relation of Nature to a know- 
ing mind should shut us up to a choice between a subjective 
Idealism, on the one hand, and pan-psychism, on the other. Our 
general purpose, however, is to study Lotze' s Absolute, and our 
present concern with his theory of things is merely in order to 
throw some light on the place of the Absolute in his system. We 
are now striving to discover the relation of things to the 
Absolute. We have so far seen how, on the apparently physical 
plane, Lotze tends to vacillate between the extremes of Plural- 
ism and Monism; and we have outlined his attempt to transform 
things into souls. We must now notice a similar process in 
his characterisation of the Absolute.
It might have been thought that the Absolute which exists 
as an explanation of interaction would have to be a material 
Absolute; but this does not appear to be the case. It is 
necessary, Lotze repeatedly urges,that science should reduce the 
interactions to mechanical principles of explanation; but this 
is so, he explains, only because scientific attention is directed 
exclusively to the external behaviour of the interacting elements
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and not to their internal character. A mechanistic science, 
however, does not justify a materialistic philosophy; and if 
the so-called material atoms are in reality souls, then the 
Absolute in which interaction forces us to believe - or rather 
which it presupposes - need not be material either. Further 
than that; Lotze contends that the Absolute cannot be regarded 
as purely material, unless all the spiritual factors of the 
world are to be sacrificed. Instead, he feels that "the 
assumption that the common substance of the world is only matter, 
and matter as endowed only with those properties which we in 
physical science attribute to every portion of the same, has 
probably never been made in earnest by anyone; 1 for such a 
view would have to deduce everything in the world merely from
a matter whose sole properties are space-filling, inertia,
*
divisibility and mobility. But this, Lotze is convinced, is 
clearly impossible. He is persuaded that every mode of thought 
that calls itself Materialism ultimately rests on the presupposi- 
tion, and must soon be led by a little reflection to admit the 
fact, that matter is really something much better than it looks 
from the outside, and that it really possesses an inner life as 
well as an outer manifestation.* In an eloquent passage in the 
Microcosmus, Lotze strives to show how the mechanical view can 
recognise a moral impulse as "one of the most important and 
original characteristics of the soul 1,' and that it is, in this 
respect, "very different from that bizarre Materialism which
1. Microcosmus I, p. 423 . 2.Phil, of Relig., sect. 22. 
3. Metaphysics, sect. 240. 4. Vol. I, p. 442.
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takes on itself the office of bringing intelligent life out of 
unintelligent matter as an incidental product whose trifling 
and precarious value does not permit of its setting up any pecu- 
liar claims in presence of matter, the one true substance," 
the difference between these views being due, of course, to the 
former's recognition that atoms are living souls. The crucial 
objection to materialism, therefore, is the independent origin 
and nature of spirit. When this is recognised, "Materialism 
may prolong its existence and celebrate its triumphs within the 
schools, where so many ideas estranged from life find shelter, 
but its own professors will belie their false creed in their 
living action. For they will all continue to love and hate, to 
hope and fear, to dream and study, and they will in vain seek to 
persuade us that this varied exercise of mental energies . . . 
is a product of their bodily organisation, or that the love of 
truth exhibited by some, the sensitive vanity betrayed by others',1
- he later adds, the work of systematising the materials of 
sense manifested by all - , "has its origin in their cerebral
o
fibres." What, then, is the basis of this belief in respect 
of spirit?
Lotze has two reasons for his denial that it rests on the 
fact of freedom; firstly, freedom appears, he teaches, only at 
one point in the mental life, and so cannot be regarded as one 
of its universal characteristics; and, secondly, we have no 
assurance that freedom does not also characterise some of the
1. Microcosmus I, p. 339. 2. Ibid., p. 263.
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vast tracts of nature that are unknown to us. Nor does it 
rest on the fact, he continues, that sensations, ideas,emotions, 
and desires are not comparable with those states - spatial 
motion, figure, position, and energy - which we believe we ob- 
serve in matter; for this fact would not exclude the possibility
p 
of a common ground for these two types of experience. This
latter theory, however, is found to be unproductive for the 
psychology of the individual, he urges, and it is, further, quite 
excluded by the fact of the unity of consciousness, upon which 
the belief in the independence of spirit securely rests. Before 
we proceed to examine further a contention which ^ust always 
sound suspicious to readers of Kant, we should notice what Lotze 
has to say of this identity theory, not in the realm of psy- 
chology, but in that of cosmology. Here, he says, it has, "at 
first, more to recommend it; and it forms the text of the spirit- 
ed descriptions in which Pantheism glorifies the unresting life 
of the eternally One Substance, both corporal and spiritual, 
which in ceaseless vicissitude fashions its individual shapes, 
and lets them be absorbed again into itself. But such a view, 
as he points out, is only a dualism, thinly veiled in Spinoza's 
case by his assumption that extension and thought are only two 
out of an infinite number of incomparable divine attributes, of 
which the others are unknown to us, and quite unresolved by the 
Schellingian assumption of a single root, from which they issue 
as consequences, but which they do not constitute. Such a single
1. Metaphysic, sect. 238.
2. Ibid., sects. 239, 240.
3. Phil, of Relig., sect. 23.
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root, as Lotze urges, may sound well enough in words; but nothing 
in our experience can be typical of its nature, and it is quite 
incomprehensible to us. In the cosmological field, therefore,
- this, in brief, is Lotze's contention - this theory is no 
advance on an explicit dualism, and in the field of psychology 
the fact of the unity of consciousness excludes it by establish- 
ing the independent reality of spiritual substance. It is the 
latter claim which we must now investigate.
By substance, here, Lotze does not mean that the soul is a 
hard kernel of unchangeable, spiritual stuff which must be in- 
ferred as the ground of the unity which all consciousness mani- 
fests. He has already disposed of the idea of substance as a 
permanent something underlying the facts of change, and instead 
has proposed to regard substance as a unitary group of qualities 
changing according to law. He therefore feels Justified in 
saying that "the fact of the unity of consciousness is eo ipso 
at once the fact of the existence of a substance: we do not need 
by a process of reasoning to conclude from the former to the 
latter as the condition of its existence, - a fallacious process 
of reasoning which seeks in an extraneous and superior substance 
supposed to be known beforehand, the source from which the soul 
and each particular thing would acquire the capacity of figuring 
as the unity and centre of manifold actions and affections. 1' 1 
This being so, the Kantian criticism of Rational Psychology does 
not apply to Lotze. For Kant was denying the validity of an
1. Metaphysic, sect. 243.
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inference from the unity of our consciousness, as it appears to 
us, to the existence of a simple substance lying behind and 
causing it. To Lotze it seems utterly inconceivable that anyone 
who has followed his ontological discussions should look for the 
'what' of a thing in anything other than in what the thing is 
and does, or imagine that the soul is unknown because it is not 
possible to point to any substance lying behind and causing its 
activities. The conception of substance which we have attri- 
buted to Lotze may not have been consistently adhered to in his
o
various references to the subject, but it is of extreme value, 
as modern Idealists have recognised, and a sympathetic reader 
will both give him the credit for it and also understand his 
references in its light whenever possible. To such a reader 
the harsh and dogmatic criticisms which are brought against 
Lotze by Leonhard Stahlin, though they will be admitted to have 
all too much foundation in Lotze's writings, will yet seem one- 
sided and unfair. But not only is Lotze not arguing to that 
idea of the soul which Kant shows to be without foundation; he 
is not even arguing from the felt unity of consciousness. His 
contention is that the unity of the self as subject is involved 
in the mere fact of judgment, and "supposing the self appeared 
to itself as a multiplicity, we should on the same grounds con- 
clude that it was certainly mistaken if it took itself really to 
be what ±t appeared. Every judgment, whatever it may assert, 
testifies by the mere fact that it is pronounced at all, to the
Llbid., sect. 245. 2. cf. Pringle-Pattison, Idea of 
3. Kant, Lotze, Albrecht Ritschl Immortality, p. 78 ff. 
(Eng. tr.), p. 120 ff.
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indivisible unity of the subject which utters it."
The foregoing proof of the independent reality of spiritual 
substance is sufficient, according to Lotze, to dispose of 
Materialism, and herein accordingly is to be found "one of the 
motives that lead us to the opposite attempt, - to the pure
Spiritualism which undertakes to comprehend the spirit alone as
P 
truly existent, and all else as its product." It is, of course,
only one of the motives leading to Spiritualism, not a complete 
proof of that doctrine; for a disproof of crude Materialism, 
and a rejection of the Spinozistic-Schellingian Pantheism on the 
ground that it is practically dualism - and this is all that 
Lotze has so far accomplished - does not suffice to banish matter 
entirely, and to establish Spiritualism. In order to this 
result some more positive proof of the last named doctrine will 
have to be advanced. It will have to be shown that such a 
doctrine can be satisfactorily worked out, and this, when it is 
accomplished, will have to throw some light on the strange 
illusion that there is such a thing as matter. Even though it 
has been proved that matter is not the whole story, it has not 
been shown so far that the inclusion of matter in the universe 
does not add to the value of the whole. Dualism, of course, is 
abhorrent to that demand for system which is the very nature of 
our thinking, but the general objection to dualism may not be 
regarded as sufficient to establish a pure Spiritualism, when 
only the independent reality of spiritual substance has been
1. Metaphysic, sect. 244.
2. Phil, of Relig., sect. 23.
3. cf. Moore, Princ, Eth., p. 206.
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proved; and this is true for the simple reason that human 
thought is still, by general confession, far from its goal, and 
dualism may possibly turn out to be the best that the facts will 
so far warrant. With such a contention Lotze himself would not 
disagree. We must therefore enquire what other reasons he 
advances in support of Spiritualism; and it will be both con- 
venient and justifiable for us to merge this enquiry into an 
investigation of his positive proof of the personality of the 
Absolute, since he will not tolerate any view which would regard 
the Absolute as spiritual, but not personal.
For practical purposes we may divide his arguments into 
three types - the metaphysical, the moral, and the religious - 
though various motives may be admitted to underlie some of them. 
To deal first with the metaphysical considerations - Lotze 
urges, against those who would limit personality to finite 
beings, that finitude is not a sine qua non of, but is really a 
hindrance to, personality, and that in truth only the Infinite 
can be a person. The argument - if Lotze intends this as such
- is that belief in the personality of the Absolute is a 
necessity forced upon us by the demand that our ideal of person- 
ality should exist in reality. With this consideration we will 
have to deal more fully in our next chapter; here we would 
merely point out that, even if its validity be conceded, it can 
prove the personality of the Absolute only when the identity of 
the Absolute with the G-od of religion has been further estab-
1. Microcosmus II, p. 726.
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lished. Until this has been done, it may still be possible to 
hold that the Absolute somehow comprehends within itself a 
Perfect Person, a host of finite persons, and a world of matter. 
I am not now arguing for such a conclusion, but am merely indi- 
cating that Lotze has not yet banished this as one of the 
possibilities, or at least has done so only because he has taken 
much for granted. Another of his metaphysical arguments is 
that the only kind of existence conceivable is existence for 
self. We have already noticed this assumption in connection 
with his argument for pan-psychism, and have seen reason to re- 
ject it. If it were valid, matter would be banished from the 
universe, and the Absolute would have to be, if not personal, at 
least spiritual. A third metaphysical argument arises from the 
fact that, according to Lotze, the Absolute interacts with the 
finite elements of the universe. Lotze is convinced, as we 
have already seen, that interaction involves a capacity for 
action and passion on the part of the elements concerned, and 
this capacity is peculiar to souls. The interaction of the 
Absolute with finite things, therefore, shows that it is at least 
a soul. This argument does not carry much conviction with it. 
We may grant that the terms "action" and "passion" are primarily 
applicable only to persons; but that they must therefore be 
predicable only of living things does not seem to follow from 
this fact. If the application of these ter^s to the world-elem- 
ents, as Lotze argues, must carry with it the implication of life, 
why cloes it not, contrary to Lotze' s teaching, carry also the
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implication of a personality, as fully developed as we find it 
in human beings? And if it does not do the latter, why should 
it do the former? It does not follow, from the use of the same 
terms, that the objects designated are similar, except in the 
respect which the employment of the terms is explicitly intended 
to mark. In the present case, we are clearly endeavouring to 
understand physical motion in the light of our own self-exper- 
ience . To speak of world-elements "acting" and "suffering" is 
obviously a metaphor, borrowed from human experience, and inten- 
ded to signify only that these elements are the points of origin, 
in the one case, and the destination, in the second, of a trans- 
ferred motion; or if this is not the case, some proof other 
than the mere terms employed will have to be advanced for under- 
standing those terms literally. None of Lotze's metaphysical 
arguments, therefore, can be said to be impressive.
The moral argument, according to Lotze, will establish the 
full personality of the Absolute. It depends on the ethical 
demand that wisdom, justice, and holiness shall have an objective 
existence in the universe; and it concludes that, because these 
are personal attributes and can exist only as belonging to 
persons, the universe must be a personal Being. "The longing 
of the soul to apprehend as reality the Highest G-ood which it is 
able to feel, cannot be satisfied by or even consider any form 
of the existence of that Good except Personality. So strong is 
its conviction that some living Ego, possessing and enjoying 
Self, is the inevitable presupposition and the only possible
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source and abode of all goodness, and all good things, so filled 
is it with unspoken contempt for all existence that is apparently 
lifeless, that we always find the myth-constructing beginnings 
of religion busied in transforming natural to spiritual reality; 
but never find them actuated by any desire to trace back living 
spiritual activity to unintelligent Realness as to a firmer 
foundation." It is this immediate certainty which, as we saw 
in our second chapter, underlies all the traditional "proofs",
according to Lotze, and very nearly receives expression in the
2 Anselmic form of the ontological argument. Lotze goes on to
discuss the relation of truth and goodness to God, raising the 
old questions as to whether G-od recognises truth and goodness, or 
creates them. His answer is the same in each case, that neither 
alternative is correct. For, he insists, even if Good could be 
decided independently of God, He could recognise it as Good only 
if it actually were so for Him by reason of His own nature; and 
the same is true in respect of God's creating Good. "The Good 
cannot be established by any divine will, nor be to it an object 
of recognition, unless that will already contains that Good in 
the same way as we have said that truth must be contained by the 
mind which apprehends it.'1 ^ The contention is, then, that 
ethical goodness must be a characteristic of the Absolute, and 
that the Absolute must, for this reason, be a person. Such an 
argument will be received by many readers with assent. It is the 
same consideration which Rashdall, for instance, has warmly
1. Microcosmus II, p. 6?2.
2. Ibid, Bk. IX., Ch. V.
3. Ibid., II, p. 698.
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advocated though his G-od is not the Absolute. He says, "Only 
if we believe in the existence of a Mind for which the true
n
moral ideal is already in some sense real ..... can we
rationally think of the moral ideal as no less real than the
1 world itself," a contention which Sorley also regards as valid f
This will be regarded as the true moral argument, which Lotze 
should have referred to, but did not, when, in the Lectures of 
1879, he claimed to be discussing the moral argument.
A modern reader of Lotze, however, must inevitably be 
driven by this contention of his to consider the contrary con- 
tention of Bradley, Wallace, Bosanquet, and others, that morality 
cannot be regarded as a characteristic of the Absolute. Bradley 
says of goodness in general that "it manifests its relativity by 
inconsistency, by a self-contradiction in principle, and by a 
tendency towards separation in that principle's working, an 
attempted division, which again is inconsistent and cannot rest 
in itself. G-oodness, as such, is but appearance which is 
transcended in the Absolute."^ A lengthy discussion leads him 
to the result that moral goodness and badness do not depend
entirely on ourselves, and that therefore it is a moral principle
5 to be non-moral, that is to say, to be religious. Morality,
in short, essentially transcends itself, and is therefore not 
ultimate. Wallace claims that morality, which essentially 
involves the idea of obligation eliminates itself by perfecting 
itself, for it then passes into the guise of autonomy. "Perfect
1. Sorley, Moral Values, p. 347. 4. Ibid., o. 436.
2.Ibid., p. 348 ff.
3. Appearance & Reality, p. 429. 5. Ibid., p. 438.
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morality and perfect religion carry us beyond themselves to an 
absolute in which we may suppose them to be satisfied: satisfied, 
however, by being carried out to that consummation which destroys 
what is their very essence.' For Bosanquet morality belongs 
to the "world of claims and counterclaims" in which finite in- 
dividuals foolishly stand in isolation, or attempt to do so, and 
make claims against the whole. This attitude, he holds with 
Bradley, is necessarily transcended in religion, in which the 
self identifies itself with the whole. Lotze's argument, 
broadened out, would be that values can be conserved only in a 
Person; a proposition which the Absolutists to whom we have 
referred are not willing to accept. For them, as for Lotze, 
values are preserved in the Absolute, but they differ from Lotze 
in regarding the Absolute as, not personal, but superpersonal. 
In so far as this last term is to be understood, negatively, as 
a protest against limiting the character of G-od to what we are 
acquainted with in human personality, it is extremely valuable; 
but with this protest Lotze would actively associate himself. 
When a positive significance is to be given to it, the difficul- 
ties begin. It is hard to see how Bradley's Absolute, when he 
compares it to an undifferentiated feeling, can be legitimately 
described as superpersonal at all, though perhaps he did not 
mean this analogy to be pressed very far. This tendency to 
describe the Absolute as superpersonal is very apt to pass into 
the region, so it seems to me, where words are used without
1. Lectures & Essays on Nat. Theol. & Ethics, p. 277.
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corresponding ideas; and great caution is called for in 
consequence.
It must be admitted, however, that this moral argument has 
to face some serious difficulties, some of which are due to the 
characteristics of the Lotzian system, while others are more 
general. In the first place, it is hard to see how the highest 
value of all, namely love, can exist in a one-and-only person, - 
unless, indeed, as is Maintained in the Christian doctrine of 
the Trinity, that single person be also, in some sense, manifold 
in respect of personality. But Lotze was not fully willing to 
adopt this doctrine from Christianity, which would have saved 
him in this connection. A second difficulty, for Lotze, arises 
out of his definition of the term, "value." For him value 
signifies the enlargement of the soul in accordance with its 
true nature; but one is constrained to ask how such a conception 
can be applied to the Absolute. An obvious reply would be that 
our true relation to the Absolute enlarges our soul, and that 
the Absolute therefore has value for us. But Lotze claims more 
than this. He is not content merely to argue that the Absolute 
has value for us, for this would not necessarily involve its 
personality. He is maintaining that the Absolute has value in 
itself; but how, on his definition of value, is that possible? 
The Absolute certainly cannot be thought of as enlarging itself 
by absorption from without, nor yet, unless it is to be regarded 
as imperfect, by a progressive organisation of its content. But
1. Phil, of Relig., p. 149.
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this exhausts the ways known to us in which enlargement of life 
is possible. And, indeed, if we are to accept Lotze's doctrine 
that the supreme purpose of the Absolute is the preservation of 
the equation LI = M, how can enlargement at all be also predicat- 
ed of it? 1 There is another question which we must raise in 
connection with this argument of Lotze's. We may admit - as, 
I think, we must - that value can exist only in persons, or for 
persons; that is to say, that instrumental value, if there is 
anything which possesses only that, exists only for persons, and 
that intrinsic value exists only in persons. As I have above 
indicated I cannot sympathise with the denial of this proposi- 
tion on the part of the Absolutists. We may also admit that 
value must be, in some sense, objective. But do these admiss- 
ions necessitate the conclusion of pure Spiritualism which 
Lotze wishes to establish? I think not. In what sense do we 
affirm moral predicates of Nature? In order to complete his 
argument Lotze would have to show that something more is necess- 
ary than is allowed for, for instance, by Professor Sorley. 
The latter would allow to Nature only an instrumental value, and 
contends that those who seem to predicate intrinsic value of 
Nature are, consciously or unconsciously, personifying her. What 
these writers, if Sorley is correct, are doing figuratively, 
Lotze is doing in sober earnest, but this would seem to demand 
some further Justification. As we saw above, Lotze does pro- 
test against regarding anything as possessed merely of instru-
1. cf. Thomas, Lotze's Theory of Reality, p. 18? f.
2. Moral Values etc., Ch. V.
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mental value; but his protest is represented as based on an 
aesthetic longing, that is, on feeling, and this we can hardly 
recognise as a sufficient foundation for it. But we need not 
return again to this topic, which we have already disposed of.
Lotze also has certain religious arguments for the nerson- 
ality of the Absolute, which apply to the Absolute at all only 
if its identification with the God of religion be conceded. This 
question we will take up in our next chapter; at present we will 
concede the point and confine our attention to the arguments as 
given. Lotze says, "the religious mind is led to apprehend the 
Supreme Good under the form of a Personal God both by humility 
and the longing to be able to reverence and love. I have not 
noticed,in his writings, any more expanded reference to humility, 
and am therefore driven to an interpretation of my own. It is 
a fact that humility is an essential element in the religious 
consciousness. If, now, it be true that we are so conscious of 
the value of personality that anything non-personal must necess- 
arily seem inferior, then it would follow that the Object toward 
which we persons are to feel humility must be a Person. Such an 
argument would obviously lose its force if anything that is 
superpersonal could be shown to exist. To my present thinking 
it appears to be valid; though I cannot pretend to offer any 
more convincing defence of it than that which is suggested above 
in connection with the doctrine that the Absolute is superperson- 
al. Such an argument, and the demand of the religious attitudes
1. Microcosmus II, p. 6?6.
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of love and worship for a personal Object, seem to be the strong- 
est proof we can offer, - other than the Person of Jesus Christ, 
which proof is not in order in this discussion - , of the 
existence of a personal G-od.
Lotze has a second religious argument, namely, that certain 
of the doctrines that are essential to religion involve the 
personality of G-od. The argument here centres around the 
doctrine of G-od's eternity, which, he says, we are constrained 
to hold both because of a religious need for reliability on G-od's 
part, and because "eternal duration is aesthetically an imposing 
idea on account of a sublimity which is worthy of the Absolute 
Principle." 1 By describing G-od as eternal, we do not mean to 
say, Lotze thinks, that He eternally fills time in a perfectly 
unchangeable way, for such an idea would be of no service to 
religion. We think of Him as a living G-od, the subject of 
change, and yet we mean also to assert that He remains identical 
with Himself throughout the changes. For this to be possible, 
Lotze continues, not only must His successive states be com- 
prehensible as different consequences of one and the same nature, 
but He must comprehend Himself as a unity. "In no respect can 
we assert of selfless 'Things', but only of a self-conscious 
'Spirit', that it remains in the course of its history one and 
the same; and, for the very reason that only it actualizes the 
aforesaid unity by means of this deed of self-consciousness." 2 
This argument clearly rests on the belief of Lotze's that
I.Phil, of Relig., p. 51. 2. Ibid., sects. 31, 32.
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existence must be felt existence, and unity must be felt unity. 
With our rejection of that belief, the argument in this form 
loses its cogency. Such an argument also raises a question, 
which we must face in the following chapter, as to how Lotze 
determines what is, and what is not, an essential religious 
doctrine - a question which, widened out, may be called the 
problem of Lotze's sources.
That religion may be made the basis of an argument for the 
personality of God, certain contentions that have received great 
prominence in modern times will have to be rejected. In the 
first place, it is denied that .religion demands a personal 
Object. Bradley defines religion as "a fixed feeling of fear, 
resignation, admiration or approval, no matter what may be the 
object, provided only that this feeling reaches a certain 
strength" - which, he admits, cannot be accurately determined - 
"and is qualified by a certain degree of reflection." He 
recognises that the term is used in senses which are higher or 
lower according as the object of the feeling is higher or lower, 
though he does not clearly indicate what his standard of judgment 
is in this connection. He contends that, in the highest sense, 
religion can have but one object, and that this object must be 
of such a nature as to render possible toward it, what is impli- 
cit in all religion, an attitude of moral'prostration. But 
whether moral -orostration is ultimately possible toward any but 
a personal object may well be called in question. In his
1. Appearance & Reality, p. 439, n.
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earlier writings, I believe, Bradley was willing to admit that 
religion demands a personal God, though he denied that the 
Absolute can be identified with that God. Bosanquet also has 
denied that religion requires a personal object; but he makes 
his cp.se plausible, so it nee^s tc i.ie, only by aba_j.Aoning his 
ov;n general principle of founding on experience at its highest. 
If this general principle justifies him in finding in religion 
the key to the nature of reality, surely it should drive him to 
finding it in the highest religion. By generalising what is 
common to all religions, instead of fixing on what is peculiar 
to that religion which he admits to be the highest; by incon- 
sistently reducing religion, that is to say, to its lowest, 
rather than to its highest, terms, he resolves it into a sense 
of dependence, and denies that dependence needs a personal 
object. On the contrary, it seems likely that, In the cases 
where the object of dependence is not a person, it is personified 
or else regarded as under the control of a person. A more 
serious challenge to the argument from religion to the person- 
ality of the Absolute is the contention of Bradley and Wallace 
that religion is transcended, and, as .such, destroyed, in the 
Absolute. Bradley argues that religion, because it is practical 
is dominated by the self-contradictory idea of the Good. It 
exists "by a kind of perpetual oscillation and compromise," 1 and 
is therefore mere appearance. Faith, which he regards as the 
central point of religion, is a contradiction between making
1. Ibid., p. 440 ff.
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believe and making as if we did not believe. Practically, 
religion is a compromise between a peace which forgets discord, 
and thus tends to pass into immorality and irreligion, and a 
consciousness of the discord, which banishes its peace and per- 
fection. It belongs to relational consciousness, since it 
implies a relation between man and G-od; and this particular 
relation, like all the rest, passes into contradictions. That 
religion does essentially imply a relation between man and G-od, 
I am willing to admit and, against Wallace, to contend. Whether 
this reduces religion to mere appearance will depend on our 
attitude to Bradley's view of relations, which we have already 
called in question in our third chapter. It may also be ad- 
mitted that religion usually manifests itself as an oscillation 
such as Bradley describes, but that it does so always and 
essentially is not so evident. There is, I think, a truer view 
of what religion at its best involves than Bradley has presented 
to his readers; a peace, not merely in spite of, but actually 
in and through discord, is what such a religion would make 
possible. The same criticism applies, mutatis mutandis, to 
Wallace. He argues that the aim of the religious man is like- 
ness to God, the ideal limit of which is identity. The perfection 
of religion, therefore, by reducing the terms to a unity, would 
be its destruction. It may, however, be questioned whether 
identity is the true ideal of likeness, although it must be 
granted that identity has been the goal of much religious
1. Essays & Lects. etc., p. 276.
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aspiration. 1 Likeness would rather seem to involve a distinc- 
tion between similars. Surely the promise is not ridiculous, 
"but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; 
for we shall see him as he is." 2 And when, for likeness, we 
substitute fellowship as the truer aim of the religious man, 
this distinction, as well as the essential personality of those 
who enjoy the fellowship, is made even more emphatic.
What may be regarded as a psychological argument for 
Spiritualism arises out of the analogy which Lotze draws between 
the Absolute and the human soul, in respect of the way in which, 
in both, the unity is maintained through a diversity of elements, 
This is the psychological form of what we have called Lotze's 
second religious argument. The soul, he says, "is exhausted in 
thought no more than in any other particular form of its manifes- 
tation; in all fully present and active, it finds in each but 
a one-sided and partial expression, and behind the action evolved 
at each several moment a larger and more abundant and potential 
reservoir remains undisclosed and concealed. And this very 
wholeness of the soul's presence, common alike to all the mani- 
fold forms of its manifestation, is the instrumentality that 
makes the reciprocal action of the various internal states 
possible, and fixes the character of their resultant." Exactly 
similarly he conceives the Absolute. It was therefore quite 
natural that he should regard it as personal spirit. We will 
take up this question of the personality of the Absolute in our
1. cf. Urquhart* Theosophy etc., pp. 55, 62 f., 179. 2.1 John 3:2. 
3. TTicrocosmus I, p. -383. 4. Ibid.,pp. 383 f.
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next chapter; we must now return to the question in hand, viz. 
the relation between Pluralism and Monism in the Lotzian system. 
We began with a world of interacting elements, material as 
far as we then knew, and followed Lotze's argument which sought 
to show that this involved an Absolute, which we might have been 
pardoned for regarding as also material. Our question was as 
to whether the elements really disappeared in the Absolute, as 
the argument might seem to require, or maintained some kind of 
independence. We glanced, in answer, at certain physical ana- 
logies of which Lotze availed himself, and found that some of 
them were decidedly monistic, while others were more pluralistic, 
in significance. But his indication of the inadequacy of these 
analogies led us to study the way in which he sought to convert 
the world-elements into souls, and his Absolute into a personal 
spirit. Our question now arises again. Are the elements to be 
regarded as independent of the Absolute, or are they not? It 
will have to be admitted that Lotze still vacillates, and this is 
only to be expected. It may be true that the elements are in a 
sense independent, and in another sense dependent. The Christian 
would want to adopt such a position; and if Lotze has urged this 
view it may be regarded as a point in his favour. We must also 
be prepared to find that Lotze cannot tell us as much as we would 
wish to know as to the senses in which the elements are both 
dependent and independent. It may well be, - it is highly 
probable, - that the present stage of human insight does not 
afford sufficient data for a decision, and it is possible that
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what look like self-contradictions may be an evidence of greater 
profundity than harmony might be. Our task at present is merely 
to record the facts as they stand in Lotze's writings.
And, first, we may draw attention to Lotze's comparison of 
the Absolute with the human soul. The human soul is a spiritual 
substance; that is, according to his best view of substance, a 
unitary group of states changing, under different conditions, 
according to a law. The soul acts as a whole in any of its 
states, so that the production of one state affects the whole 
soul, and thus calls forth other states. The various states 
interact, the result being determined by the nature of the whole, 
Here, then, we have a type, Lotze says, of the Absolute. The 
soul, in its indivisible being, typifies the Absolute, and the 
mental states stand for the finite things in the Absolute. This 
analogy would most naturally indicate that the finite things 
can have no independence of the Absolute, other than a state can 
have of that of which it is a state; but the assertion that the 
various states interact is scarcely harmonious with such a 
view. If he were willing to regard this as only a figure of 
speech, applicable only in a limited sense, and borrowed from 
the realm of physical experience, we might be prepared to over- 
look the point; although even this should have been rendered 
impossible for Lotze by his belief that the whole soul acts in 
each of its states. If this is what he means by interaction 
in general, - and this is the conception of it that undoubtedly 
underlies his cosmological reasoning - , then he has no right to
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grant to the elements the measure of independence vrhlch he does 
allow them. For he admits that the theological doctrine of 
divine Government Involves the independence of the finite par- 
ticulars, a.iid this is found by him to consist in their possess- 
ion of their own states, and of the power to initiate action. 
3oth of these aspects of freedom belong to human spirits, accord- 
ing to him, the latter being the indispensable condition of 
morality, and at least the former belongs to sub-human souls. 
Later2 he speaks of piety as the only means whereby "the finite 
spirit ceases to be such absolutely dependent product of the 
course of nature," and of God as standing nearer to humanity in 
some cases than in others.' It should be obvious that his 
cosmological reasoning is based on a view of interaction which 
logically involves consequences which he is not willing to 
accept. The result is that between the scientific plane on
^
which the first part of his argument moves and the realm of 
values in which the later stages of the reasoning find themselves 
at home there is a gulf which Lotze never succeeded in crossing. 
It is one of his merits that he was not oblivious to this fact, 
and explicitly declared the passage from existence to value to 
be the fundamental, but insoluble problem of metaphysics.
1. Phil, of Relig., sect. 55.
2. Ibid., sect. 82.
-$. Ibid., sect. 89.
Chapter V. 
SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS.
In the preceding chapters we have examined Lotze' a attempt 
to establish the conclusion that there exists an Absolute, which 
is a Person in the fullest sense of the term. It is necessary 
that, before bringing our discussion of his theistic philosophy 
to a close, we should draw attention to certain points which 
have not yet received the attention which is their due. The 
first of these special problems arises out of the widespread 
belief that Personality and Infinity are incompatible attributes, 
By way of approach to it, we may indicate some of the difficul- 
ties which any such a philosophy may be expected to take into 
consideration. These we may conveniently gather around two 
main questions, the second of which arises only if the first 
receives an affirmative answer.
The first, and most basic, question is this, Is there an 
Absolute at all? The discussion of this question is somewhat 
complicated by a confusing uncertainty in the meaning of the 
term Absolute. We have already seen in Lotze a tendency to 
waver in this respect. Running through, and fundamental to, his 
whole system is a conception of the Absolute as not merely the 
Whole, but the All; a tendency to lose the finite in the In- 
finite; but he also wishes to think of the Absolute as different
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from the All, as the ground of all, or as a Personal Spirit 
standing over against finite spirits. Perhaps it would not be 
too much to say that a similar tendency is discoverable in all 
the principle exponents of Absolutism. To support such a con- 
tention would take us far beyond the limits and purpose of the 
present discussion; but we may quote with approval the remark 
of Professor Pringle-Pattison, in regard to the theories of 
Bradley and Bosanquet, "It would seem, then, as if the unity with 
which the system concludes tends to abolish the plurality of 
centres from which it starts.' But it would seem that Pringle- 
Pattison has himself fallen at times into a similar confusion, 
in many passages apparently equating the Absolute with the All, 
and yet so characterising it elsewhere as to make such an iden- 
tification impossible. The reasons for such a wavering are 
the affirmative and negative considerations which our question 
calls forth. The extremes are, on the one hand, an absolute 
Monism towards which those interests seem very naturally to lead 
which favour the belief in an Absolute at all, and, on the other 
hand, a Pluralism the attractions of which seem always strong 
enough to induce the Absolutists, in one way or another, to 
modify their characteristic conception. The main considerations 
that favour the belief in an Absolute are the intellectual and 
aesthetic demand for wholeness, a demand which is progressively 
justifying itself, as far as we can see, in practice, and the 
moral demand for security; Pluralism is favoured by the moral
1. Idea of God, p. 276.
2. Mackintosh, Contemp. Review, Dec. 1917; ct. Supp. E, Idea 
of G-od, 2nd. Edn.
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demand for freedom and progress, and by practical experience of 
the reality of finite existence. Since the only satisfactory 
relation to these contending claims is not that of disjunction, 
but that of inclusion, we find pronounced Absolutists, on the 
one hand, making concessions to the opposite opinion, and equally 
convinced Plural!sts, on the other, verging in the direction of 
the position from which they explicitly revolt. Others, like 
Professors Pringle-Pattison 1 and Sorley , explicitly set out to 
balance the claims of monism and pluralism; and this, we may 
say, was also Lotze' a purpose.
Secondly, we must ask, Is the Absolute of philosophy the 
God of religion? And this question will lead into the heart of 
Lotze's system, for he adopts and defends the affirmative answer. 
Among modern writers who believe in the Absolute, Bradley would 
champion the negative side, but most of the others will be found 
against him. Bosanquet would deny that the Absolute is the 
personal G-od of popular Theism, but would regard it as the proper 
object of enlightened religious devotion. Webb wishes to iden- 
tify the Triune G-od of Christian Theology with the Absolute, and 
sweepingly rejects all theories of a finite God,except Bradley's, 
on the ground that, by abandoning the attempt to identify God 
with the Absolute, they are abandoning the quest which is Reli- 
gion.^ Professor Jones was also insistent that a failure to 
make this identification would not only stultify the unity of 
human thought, but would finally destroy religious faith by
1. Idea of God (2nd. Edn.), p. VIII.
2. Moral Values, p. X.
3. God & Personality, Ch. VI. etc.
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undermining the ultimate reality of its Object. The most impress- 
ive reason for regarding the Absolute as the God of religion 
seems to be the religious demand that its Object should possess 
supreme and ultimate reality; and - setting aside, for reasons 
indicated in our first chapter, the Ritschlian contention that 
God is to be conceived, not in terms of metaphysical reality, but 
only in terms of religious value - we may admit that, if the 
desired result can be achieved only by making the identification 
in question, then anyone who has had a vital religious experience 
is left without a choice in the matter. Another religious 
consideration which bears on the same conclusion is the complete 
independence of any necessary relation to an external reality 
which religion usually predicates of God, and which, according 
to Lotze, 1 is what we mean by God's unity. There can be no 
doubt that the very strongest assertion of the self-dependence 
and independence of God, such, for instance, as led, in combin- 
ation with his peculiar doctrine of knowledge, to Mansell's 
agnosticism, is grateful to the religious consciousness;although 
it may also be true that, in this respect, the religious con- 
sciousness is not self-consistent. Such an independence on 
God's part is possible, if there be an Absolute at all, only if 
God is the Absolute. The alternative seems to be a finite God, 
arr1 this, many feel, is no God at all. Lotze shares this atti- 
tude. rjfe thinks that it is a sufficient condemnation of poly- 
theism to say that, in the only form which is not "useless and
1. Phil, of Relig., p. 46.
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adventurous", it involves the finitude of its gods. 1 If it c^n 
be shown, however, that a God who is in some sense finite will 
satisfy all the essential requirements of the religious con- 
sciousness, then the ground will be cut from under the contention 
that G-od must be identified with the Absolute. It is perfectly 
obvious that both finitude and infinitude are predicable of the 
same subject without contradiction; and it is perfectly possible, 
therefore, that G-od may be regarded as Infinite in some essential 
and characteristic respect, and yet as finite in the sense that 
He is not the All. What is more it is possible that experience 
may furnish sufficient data to lead to such a conviction without 
furnishing enough to permit of a satisfactory definition of the 
sense in which G-od may be said to be Infinite. It is not a 
logical necessity that we regard G-od as the All if we wish to 
avoid the belief that G-od is imperfect, in any vital significance 
of that term, or that He is struggling against evil in a battle 
the issue of which is uncertain both in reality and in His 
knowledge - in short, the rejection of Absolutism does not inevi- 
tably lead to the extravagances and shortcomings which character- 
ise those theories of a finite G-od which wound enlightened
religious susceptibilities and stultify some essential aspects
p of religious experience.
If this be true, the question arises, Are there any reasons 
for believing that G-od is, as we have seen He may be, finite in 
the above sense? Two main reasons have sometimes seemed to be
1. Ibid., p. 45.
2. cf. Mackintosh, Expositor, Nov. 1918.
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compelling. The first is that the identification of God with 
the Absolute accentuates the problem of evil, and particularly 
the problem of sin. Our experience of sin presents a problem 
for any philosophy; indeed, if the definition of it sometimes 
given as that which absolutely ought not to be is tenable, the 
problem is essentially insoluble, and the probability of its 
solution recedes as any less rigorous conception of sin ap- 
proaches that definition in rigour. Any philosophy which could 
solve this problem without denying what is fundamental in the 
conception of sin would receive from that fact a tremendous 
confirmation; but the failure to solve the problem of sin does 
not, at least for Christian thinkers, necessarily invalidate a 
system, since Christianity itself does not claim a theoretical 
explanation, but only a practical solution, of sin. The objection 
that is advanced against the identification of G-od with the 
Absolute, therefore, is not that it fails to solve, or even to 
help toward a solution of, the problem of sin. It is rather 
that this identification accentuates the problem by making sin 
somehow a constituent in the divine nature - a conception that 
is thoroughly abhorrent to religious sentiment - or else it 
explains sin away. The way in which the Absolutists in general 
meet this problem will seem to many religious thinkers to err 
in the latter direction. To them it will seem a positive 
failure to appreciate the awful sinfulness of sin to regard it 
as a necessary element in the good, although they will concede 
that sin's intrusion into history must somehow minister to the
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world-plan. The spirit of the attempt made by the Idealists to 
show that evil is less ultimate than good will be warmly wel- 
comed by them; but it will seem that such an attempt, as it 
works itself out, tends almost inevitably to an underestimation 
of the reality of evil, especially in the moral and spiritual 
aspects, and a spirit of caution will commend itself as more in 
keeping with our ignorance. From this point of view Lotze's 
attitude to the subject may be more satisfactory. He is no less 
convinced than the Idealists that the Good is primary, and that 
there is a solution of the problem of evil, but he frankly re- 
cognises that he cannot advance it. His "philosophic faith" 
is that there is "only the one real power appearing to us under 
a threefold image of an end to be realized - namely, first some 
definite and desired Good, then on account of the definitness of 
this, a formed and developing Reality, and finally in this 
activity an unvarying reign of Law." But he admits that there 
is in "the existence of evil and of sin in Nature and in History1," 
a 'decisive and altogether insurmountable difficulty" which 
stands in the way of a scientific elaboration of this faith. 1 He 
continues, "No one has here found the thought which would save 
us from our difficulty, and I too know it not." He therefore 
proposes to say "that where there appears to be an irreconcile- 
able contradiction between the omnipotence and the goodness of 
God, there our finite wisdom has come to the end of its tether, 
and that we do not understand the solution which yet we believe
1. Microcosmus II, p. 716.
in". 1 Lotze's answer to this objection, that is to say, is to 
admit its validity, but, in spite of it, to affirm his faith in 
the identity of G-od with the Absolute - and this, many will 
admit, is so far a tenable position.
The second main objection to the identification of G-od with 
the Absolute is that religion demands the personality of G-od, 
whereas the Absolute cannot be personal. Such an objection has 
been attacked from two points of vantage; it has been denied, 
that is, that the God of religion need be a Person, and an 
attempt has been made to prove the personality of the Absolute. 
It will be perfectly obvious that Lotze takes the second, but 
not the first, line of attack. We will not pause to consider 
the first, therefore, especially since we have already referred 
to it in the preceding chapter. Lotze's presentation of the 
second contention, however, must be carefully studied, for it is 
regarded as his most original contribution to philosophical 
theology. The objection is that the fundamental element in 
personality as we know it is self-consciousness, and that the 
dependence of self-consciousness on the contrast of self with 
not-self makes it impossible for us to regard the Absolute as 
personal. Amongst the Cartesians, who regarded the knowledge 
of the isolated self as the primary certainty, it would be per- 
fectly easy to believe in the personality of the Absolute; but 
Lotze recognises that the objection to this doctrine has arisen 
out of an insight which far surpasses the Cartesian position,
1. Ibid., p. 717.
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and he accordingly mentions it with respect. It was Kant who 
laid its foundation by his proof that a knowledge of the Ego 
apart from the non-Ego is wholly impossible. He taught that 
the unity of apperception cannot be rendered intelligible except 
in reference to an object, whose synthesis it is. The knowing 
self, though the first or supreme condition of experience, de- 
mands in turn, as the indispensable prerequisite of its existence
Q
a knowable world to which it is related." Kant's discovery in 
this respect changed the whole aspect of philosophy. It is 
fundamental to the Fichtean system, in which the self becomes 
conscious of itself only because its outgoing activity is re- 
flected back upon itself by the resistance of the not-self which 
it creates. For Fichte, that is to say, the opposition of a 
non-Ego to the Ego is a condition of the possibility of intelli- 
gence - on this as a foundation principle his whole system is 
built. In Schelling's opinion, to say that his absolute reason 
is beyond the opposition of subject and object is to say that it 
is entirely without attributes. Fichte had said that the Ego 
necessarily creates the non-Ego; Schelling contends that it is 
equally true to say that the non-Ego creates the Ego. Hegel, in 
opposition to the Identity Philosophy, insists that it is only 
in the opposition of subject and object that the Absolute exists. 
Thus the principle of the inseparability of subject and object, 
the dependence of reason, at least as conscious, upon this 
opposition, underlies the reasonings of all the German Idealists.
1. Ibid., p. 672 f.
2. cf. Kemp Smith, Commentary to Kant etc., p. 251 f.
It is regarded in our day, among the Idealists, as a philosophi- 
cal common-lace. Knowledge is regarded as the whole or unity 
in separation from which subject as well as object is a mere 
abstraction. But, if this be so, seeing that the Absolute 
cannot be regarded as having anything outside of itself to 
function as a not-self, the conclusion would seem to be una.void- 
able that self-consciousness, and so personality, is not possible 
for the Absolute. It is this conclusion that Lotze sets himself 
to break down, and the reasoning by which he attempts to do so 
is both negative and positive. Negatively, he examines the 
theories of a non-personal Absolute, and finds reasons for re- 
jecting them all; positively, in addition to advancing the 
reasons which we noticed in the preceding chapter for believing 
that the Absolute actually is a Person, he carries the war into 
the enemy's camp by his contentions, firstly, that a real non- 
Ego is not a sine qua non of self-consciousness, and secondly 
that, so far from the Absolute not being a Person, only the 
Absolute can be a Person in the fullest sense. These arguments 
we must now state and examine.
And, first, Lotze rejects the three views which were brought 
forward in the development of German Idealism, and which regarded 
the Absolute as spiritual but not personal. The first, that of 
J. a. Fichte, regards the Absolute as a Moral World-Order. In 
his later years Fichte, under the influence of the studies in 
philosophy of religion to which the difficulties in his earlier, 
moralistic thinking had driven him, spoke frequently and defin-
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itely of God as a Being whom he more and more tended to charac- 
terise as transcendent, and as a creative force preceding the 
material crea.ted. In the earlier writings he spoke more vaguely 
of the "idea of Deity," and regarded this as an impossible con- 
ception. "I abhor," he said, "all religious conceptions which 
personify God, and regard them as unworthy of a reasonable being 1.' 
Such an attitude is somewhat remarkable in one who taught both 
that, by creating the non-Ego, the Ego makes itself a person, and 
that the absolute Ego does thus create a non-Ego. However, it 
is a fact that, as Lotze says, he regarded "personality as an 
impossible conception of the Godhead," and substituted for it 
the conception of an ideal, Moral World-Order. Fichte says, 
"That living and active moral order is itself God; we need no 
other God, and can conceive no other." Lotze himself believed 
in, and endeavoured to establish, a moral world-order, but he 
was unable to regard this as the Supreme Principle. For, as he 
continually insists, there can be no order apart from the things 
ordered. Order is but relation, and when we seek to discover 
what it is in Reality which corresponds to relations, we are 
back again on the line of reasoning which, as we have seen, led 
Lotze to his Absolute. We can never regard the Absolute as a 
world-order, he argues, because we can never rest in such a con- 
ception. It inevitably leads us on to the idea of an ordering 
Being; and, if the world-order is further regarded as moral, we 
are driven to regard the ordering Being as also moral,consciously 
and purposively establishing the moral order. But here a^ain
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we are well on the way toward that personal conception of God 
for which Fichte wished to substitute the conception of a Ivloral 
World-Order. Thus far we have been following Lotze's discussion 
of the Fichtean doctrine in the Microcosmus. In the Philosophy 
of Religion 1 he attacks another of its aspects. "The non-ego, 
Fichte had said, is the unconscious product of the ego, or, what
o
amounts to the same thing, the product of the unconscious ego." 
Now Lotze denies that the spiritual element of the Absolute can 
be regarded as a reason that is 'per se unconscious.' He 
contends that, since we come to know reason always as conscious, 
or at least always in connection with conscious reason, we have 
no right to persuade ourselves that the elimination of the con- 
sciousness would not destroy the reason. To speak of a reason 
acting unconsciously in the world, he adds, can only mean that 
blind forces produce a result similar to that which a conscious 
reason would aim at; and such a claim, as his criticism of the 
teleological argument has endeavoured to make clear, is incapable 
of empirical justification. Finally, he urges that the Fichtean 
doctrine can never show how a self-conscious reason could issue 
from such blind forces, but we will elaborate this contention at 
a later point in the present chapter.
-z.
In his discussion of personality in the Microcosmus^ Lotze 
treats the Schellingian and the Hegelian views of the Absolute 
together. Schelling began as an enthusiastic Fichtean, but 
later revolted in favour of a more positive treatment of Nature.
1. sect. 24.
2. Weber, Hist, of Phil. (Ens. tr.), p. 488.
3. Vol. II, p. 676 f.
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He wished to show that Nature is visible intelligence, and in- 
telligence invisible Nature. It seemed to follow that Nature 
is, what Fichte had already shown the Ejo to be, subject-object. 
This, however, landed him in a dualism, and Schelling was led 
thereby into the working out of the Philosophy of Identity,which 
he later declared to be the only authentic exposition of his 
views. At this stage he came very powerfully under the influ- 
ence of Spinoza, and his Supreme Principle soon developed into 
what Lotze calls it, an Infinite Substance. Not that this is, 
for Lotze, a term of reproach, for he does not hesitate to 
characterise his own Absolute in the same way; but for all that, 
Lotze cannot accept the Schellingian conclusion. In the 
Philosophy of Religion2 he criticises Schelling's characterisa- 
tion of this Infinite Substance as impersonal reason. The words 
are easily uttered, he says, but to mean anything by them is a 
different matter. The impersonal states which we sometimes 
experience, and to which this view appeals for confirmation, are 
known only as occurring in personal spirits, and it cannot be 
shown, he urges, that they are possible in the absence of per- 
sonality. Those attempts which aim to show how the Absolute, 
from being impersonal, attains to personality, he continues, 
concede that it is now in some sense personal, and for the rest, 
whatever their metaphysical cogency, are entirely devoid of 
religious value.
Hegel was not satisfied with the way in which, by dropping
1. Ibid., I, p. 381. 2. sects. 25, 26.
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all differentiations, Schelling's Absolute was reached. It 
seemed to him that Schelling, had he taken seriously his own 
attempt to regard the Absolute as reason, would have preserved 
the differentiations within it, and would thus have afforded it, 
what is quite indispensable, a structure. His own attempt to 
take seriously the view that the Absolute is reason resulted in 
his substituting for Schelling's pure Identity the conception of 
a Self-developing Idea. Elsewhere Lotze has sharply criticised 
this Hegelian result. In his "History of the German Philosophy 
since Kant," he contends that Hegel's idea of the Absolute Spirit 
as merely a Self-developing Idea is not consistent with what his 
general idea of the dialectic would seem to demand. For the 
fact that, according to Hegel, Spirit falls into the triad of 
subjective, objective, and Absolute, would naturally lead us to 
expect "that absolute spirit .... would have returned, . . . 
only with greater depth of meaning and perfection, to the form 
that spirit possessed in the first stage of this development, 
the form, that is to say, of personal, individual Spirit." In 
the Microcosms, however, without entering on a separate and 
detailed criticism of the views of Schelling and Hegel, Lotze 
merely classes them together as pantheism, and brings two general 
objections against them. Philosophically he objects to their 
attitude to the physical, material world. For, he thinks - why, 
I do not know - they are willing to regard space as real and 
matter as primary to spirit, while he "could only agree with
1. cf. Ward, Realm of Ends, p. 171.
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Pantheism as a possible conception of the world if it renounced 
;ill inclination to apprehend the Infinite Real under any other 
than a spiritual form." But probably the objection that
weighed most heavily with, him, and which he here characterises
/ 
as religious, is their pantheistic suppression of the finite in
favour of the Infinite. This to Lotze, the ardent realist 
striving to do philosophic justice to the legitimate claims of 
science, was an unpardonable sin. His religious objection, 
however, is that, in the interests of the mere "formal properties 
of immensity, unity, eternity, and inexhaustible fulness," such 
views would sacrifice "all that is of value to the living soul!! 
The thought is not more explicitly developed in the present 
passage, but he probably has in mind those values which we have 
noticed in the preceding chapter, and which see-n to demand both 
the independence of spirits and the personality of God.
Underlying all these views of a non-personal Absolute is 
the belief that self-consciousness, which is fundamental to per- 
sonality, essentially involves the limitation of self by not- 
self, and is therefore repugnant to Infinity. This view, so 
widespread in his day and since, he now sets out to refute. The 
doctrine of the dependence of self on not-self, he finds, is 
held in two different senses. On the one hand it is declared 
to be a necessity of our understanding; on the other it is said 
to be necessary for the very existence of the self. Lotze deals
«
with each in turn. In the first place, then, it is held that 
1. Microcosmus II, p. 677.
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the Ego has significance only as contrasted with the non-Ego, and 
can be experienced only in the contrast, for the terms that 
express this contrast are strictly correlative. But to say, 
as is here done, that "neither of these conceptions has in 
general any significance apart from its opposition to the other," 
that each contains "barely the negation of the other," Lotze 
feels to be "perfectly absurd." If this were so, he contends, 
neither term could have, or ever acquire, any meaning whatever, 
and there could be no reason why the soul, which always, on 
becoming conscious of the distinction, classifies itself as Ego 
and not as non-Ego, should show this preference. For this to 
be possible one of the terms .nust be primary, and it is not 
difficult, he says, to determine which it is. The very form of 
the terms, he points out, shows that the Ego alone is positively 
apprehended, and, he adds, the form is here an accurate indi- 
cation of what the meaning clearly reveals. What the term non- 
Ego signifies is in general vague and obscure, and only in this 
one particular is it made definite, namely, that it is not the 
Ego. The meaning of the term Ego, on the contrary, is "directly 
obvious." It should be noticed, further, that, according to 
Lotze, the vagueness of the term non-Ego is highly significant 
of its psychological conditions. We have already seen, in 
discussing his treatment of Anselm's ontological argument, how 
the vagueness of its terms was interpreted by Lotze as an indi- 
cation that the conviction which Anselin was striving to express
1. Llicrocosmus II, p. 678 f; Phil, of Relig., p. 62 f.
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was based, not on reason, but on feeling. Here he makes the 
same suggestion. The indefiniteness of meaning of the term 
non-Ego indicates, he thinks, that the distinction between it 
and the Ego is based on feeling - a suggestion that will be 
worked out more fully in connection with the second view of the 
meaning of the contrast. Lotze's conclusion, therefore, is 
that the term Ego is primary, and that it is so because we Oet 
through feeling an immediate certainty of self, which may be 
made clearer by subsequent contrast with the not-self, but 
which is in itself a sufficient basis of personality.
But it will be urged in reply, Lotze anticipates, that the 
soul has not been shown to be in a different situation in respect 
of its apprehension of the self from its position in regard to 
the perception of colours. If the soul did not possess an 
original capacity for apprehending colours no apprehension of 
colour would ever occur, but the actual perception of colour is 
also dependent on external stimulation. Similarly, it may be 
urged, this feeling of the self can never arise except at the 
moment when the Ego is contrasted with the non-Ego. Lotze's 
reply is to fall back on the fallacious doctrine of representa- 
tive perception. "In all sensations and perceptions," he says, 
"what enters consciousness in consequence of such an influence, 
is invariably nothing but some inner state belonging to the 
spiritual being, - the sensation or mental representation itself; 
it is never the reality by means of which the state is brought 
about." The same is true, he says, of the contrast between the
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Ego and the non-Ego. "A reciprocal action with a real non-ego, 
of such a kind that this as such might enter into consciousness 
and the ego thus be posited in opposition to this perceived non- 
ego, never occurs at all." The opposition, in short, is not 
between the E^o and the non-Ego, but between the Ego and that 
representation of the non-Ego which is itself but a state of 
the Ego. All that is necessary, then, for self-consciousness 
is that the self should be able to distinguish itself from its 
own states. "A relation to an external reality is not necessary, 
and, consequently, 'personality' also is not bound to the con- 
dition of finiteness, - to wit, to that of being limited by 
another reality of the same kind." Lotze concedes that in 
finite persons these states receive their primary impulse from 
the stimulation of an external world, but this is only because, 
as finite, they are necessarily parts of this interrelated 
world. God, on the other hand, cannot be regarded as standing 
in need of any external stimulus, for it is as absurd to raise, 
in respect of the movement within G-od, a question as to its 
origin as it would be to raise a similar question in respect of 
the movement within the universe. Lotze has thus shown, he 
thinks, that, as far as the objection to the personality of the 
Absolute which arises from the correlative significance of the 
terms Ej;o and non-Ego is concerned, the Absolute may be a 
Person.
In the second place Lotze finds that the dependence of the 
Ejo upon the non-Ego is declared to be a presupposition of its
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existence; that is to say, it is maintained that the existence 
and active influence of a non-Ego is the condition without which 
the being upon which this influence works could not be an ^c;o . 
Such e. doctrine is quite modern, he declares, and is to be 
regarded as the result of an exaggerated reaction against the 
point of view which preceded it. The earlier viev v/.^s that, 
self-consciousness is "an essential end inborn characteristic, 
without which mind itself would be unthinkable, or by whose
presence it is at least distinguished froa the self-less soul of
p the lower animals.' The custom in -'-is o^n day, he points out,
was to regard self-consciousness as either the ^oal of a, mental 
development, or one of its secondary products, and so ii_ either 
case as the result of a long course of training. Lotze's view 
is that the truth lies somewhere between these extremes. Self- 
consciousness involves two thoughts of which the first is "an 
image of cognition or an image of representation, of that which 
this subject itself is, and by means of which it distinguishes 
itself from others." This element in self-consciousness, he 
concedes, is subject to growth, being gradually enriched by "an 
accumulation of external and internal experiences," whereby its
content becomes clearer and it acquires a. wider circumference.
A 
In the Microcosmus he indicates some of the stages through
which, largely under the influence of the non-Ego, the develop- 
ment of this cognitive element proceeds; but, he is convinced, 
and this is important for his subsequent argument, however far
1. : icrocosmus II, p. 678 . 2. Ibid ., I, p. 24?. 
3. Phil, of Relig., p. 56. 4. 3k. II, Gh. V., sect. 4.
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it may advance, the process is never complete, so that "self- 
consciousness is by no means identical with 'adequate self- 
cognition.'"
But this cognitive element, he continues, is not sufficient, 
for It alone could never Give to our Ego that uniqueness which 
is peculiar to it. For such uniqueness the fact of the identity 
of knowing subject with known object is not enough. This would 
do as a means of distinguishing Egos as a class from non-Egos as 
a class, but it would not explain that "fundamental and incom- 
parable opposition to all else" which distinguishes my E^o from 
all else, whether other Egos or non-personal objects. The 
uniqueness of the Ego is one of value, and, like all value, is 
apprehended only by means of feelings of pleasure and pain. 
"To this end simple feelings of sense are adequate no less than 
those more elaborate intellectual ones by which highly developed 
minds bring home to themselves the worth and peculiar merit of 
their personality." The "crushed worm", though its lack of the 
necessary cognitive element would debar it from ever attaining a 
consciousness of its Ego, could yet distinguish its own suffering 
as its own; "but the consummate intelligence of an angel, did 
it lack that feeling, would indeed be capable of keen insight 
into the hidden essence of the soul and of things, and in full 
light would observe the phenomena of its own self-reflection, 
but it would never learn why it should attach greater value to 
the distinction between itself and the rest of the world than to
1. Phil, of Relig., p. 56.
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the numerous differences between things in general that presented 
themselves to its notice." The contention is, in short, that, 
if the image of our Ego were not rendered unique to start with 
by its accompaniment of feeling, it cannot be shown how it could 
ever become unique; and Lotze proceeds to reinforce this view 
by an examination of certain theories which endeavour to show, 
without presupposing an original self-experience, how self-con- 
sciousness is generated by means of the non-Ego. And first, 
"the materialistic attempts to generate self-consciousness from 
all manner of motions in brain-atoms returning upon themselves, 
are deserving of no respect. As they are unable in general to 
deduce any 'consciousness 1 from motions, so is this return of 
the motions also unable to generate any self-consciousness." 
But those "frequent philosophic assertions" that in a being 
originally self-less, a purely out-going activity is turned back 
or reflected, by the resistance of a non-Ego, upon its point of 
issue, so generating self-consciousness - these assertions are 
really "not a whit better." Against such views Lotze brings two 
objections. In the first place, he objects to their employment 
of analogies which are drawn from the physical world, but which 
here can have no meaning. Secondly, he contends that, even if 
in some fashion such an outgoing activity could be turned back 
upon its point of issue, it has not been, and can never be, made 
clear how, in the absence of self-feeling, it could apprehend 
this point as its own self. To be of any value any such theory
1. I'icrocosmus I, p. 250. 2. Phil, of Relig., p. 58.
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would have to show "how the soul originally produces merely 
intuitive ideas, and then, in the course of the reciprocal actions 
of these its individual products, projects also conceptions of 
non-intuitive subjects to which the aforesaid ideas belong as 
predicates; that it finally succeeds also in assigning by 
thought one subject to the totality of all its inner states; and 
that it thus generates the consciousness of the 'ego 1 as of that 
one which is at the same time subject and object of the act of 
ideation." But all this, apart from self-feeling, could only 
serve to distinguish Egos as a class from other objects. In 
answer to the contention that self-consciousness is a product of 
training, Lotze has thus insisted that self-consciousness contains 
as a necessary element, self-feeling, and that this, though it 
is capable of indirect development as a result of the influence 
of the non-Ego, is a sufficient basis of personality before any 
such development has occurred. In other words, his contention 
is that what is fundamental to personality is not that self- 
knowledge which is perhaps dependent on the influence of a non- 
Ego, but self-feeling which is possible without any non-Ego.
We shall break the thread of the argument at this point and 
essay an estimate of some of its main features. In the first 
place, it should be freely acknowledged that Lotze's emphasis on 
the necessity of feeling for self-knowledge, in opposition to 
those theories which attempt to deduce self-knowledge, and even 
self-existence, from some kind of purely cognitive activity, is
1. Ibid., p. 59.
207.
of very high value. This, I think, would be very generally 
admitted today. Thus, in words that are strongly reminiscent 
of Lotze, Sorley says, "The feeling of pleasure or displeasure 
is, I believe, the experience which brings home to a man most 
convincingly this identity of the self as a continuous life. 
This experience compels him to a subjectivity of attitude which 
he cannot confuse with the experience of any one else"; and he 
refers to the judgment of Varisco that "a subject without feeling 
would care nothing for itself or anything else - such a subject 
would have no existence for self, would not strictly exist at 
all." Bosanquet goes so far as to suggest that a very slight
change in the feelings of two selves would sometimes produce
p their complete mergence, and, while Pringle-Pattison would not
concede this, he also acknowledges the importance of feeling in 
self-knowledge. We may agree with Lotze, in the second place, 
that, though our concept of our Ego is capable of becoming larger 
and more distinct in the course of experience, still there is 
something present from the first, even before real self-knowledge 
has arisen, which is the basis of self-knowledge and the necess- 
ary foundation of personality. But it does not seem so clear 
that this is in itself a sufficient basis of personality. In 
this primitive state we must acknowledge the presence, and ner- 
haps also the predominance, of feeling; but - thirdly - we 
must ask in what sense, if any, Lotze is justified in equating 
it with feeling. We have already had occasion to notice the
1. 'loral Values, p. 219.
2. Value & Destiny, Cn. II; of. Drrcl^, appearance, p. -O, 106,
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prominence of feeling in his thinking. we have seen that he 
finds the truth that underlies the traditional theistic proofs 
in an inner emotional urge; and we also pointed out that he 
regards the undifferentiated datum of religion as feeling, which, 
in order to become knowledge, must be worked up by the general 
for'.is of reason, but much of which never does become knov/ledge in 
this way. This is how he regards self-experience also. In 
what sense, then, can the primary datum of self-consciousness be 
said to be feeling? The ter:n is employed psychologically in 
several senses. It is use-i, firstly, as synonymous with in- 
tuition, as an impression produced by an object before it is 
worked up into knowledge - a usage that would seem at first 
glance to correspond with Lotze's; it is used, secondly, for a 
psychosis in which the affective aspect predominates; and, 
thirdly, it is used for the affective aspect of consciousness. 
There are probably other usages, but these are sufficient for 
our purpose. Of these three, the one sense in which we cannot 
admit that the primary basis of self-consciousness is feeling is 
the third, yet we fear that t?iis is precisely the one that Lotze 
often hankered after. For feeling in this sense obviously 
cannot stand alone; it is always an element in a mental state 
which involves also cognitive and volitional features; and when 
it predominates we have feeling in the second sense. In either 
the first or the second senses of the term, however, feeling may 
be admitted to be a primary basis of self-consciousness, and per- 
haps, in this case, the two senses -light coincide; but it is at
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least arguable that conative,and possibly intellectual, psy- 
choses may have an equal claim to be so regarded.
We must ask, fourthly, how much Lotze has gained by his 
contentions. He set out to prove, apparently, that the E^o is 
not necessarily dependent either for its self-knowledge or for 
its existence on a non-Ego. The first move was to deny that 
Ego and non-Ego are strictly correlative terms, his ground being 
that the terms must contain a basis for the contrast before it 
could ever arise, and that in this case the positive term is 
clearly primary. But this might be granted without admitting 
that either term could possess meaning before the contrast arose, 
unless we grant to feeling a cognitive function. It is in this 
ambiguity of the term feeling that the source of the difficulty 
is to be found. Either we must grant to feeling a cognitive 
function, in which case it alone is a sufficient basis of per- 
sonality, but then it is impossible to exclude the influence of 
a non-Ego; or we must endeavour to simplify feeling in order to 
do away with the necessity of a non-Ego, but then it is not a 
sufficient basis for personality. But I have argued above that 
even in the latter case, so far as our experience goes, feeling 
is indirectly dependent on a non-Ego. And this Lotze is con- 
strained to admit. The question arises, therefore, whether he 
has not given his whole case away. He admits that, in the case 
of finite beings, the simplest basis of personality is somehow 
dependent on the opposition of a non-Ego. Nor can we permit
1. McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, sect. 69.
2. cf. Bradley, Appearance, p. 104 f.
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him to escape this admission by substituting for a real non-Ego 
the states of the Ego itself; for, apart from the fact that, 
within our experience of persons, our states are most naturally 
explained by the operation of a real non-Ego, his is a doctrine 
of representative perception which, logically developed, dissi- 
pates all knowledge. He has also insisted that there can be 
for the Absolute no non-Ego. "The Absolute, then, has not a 
characteristic which is admitted to be essential to all finite 
personality, which is all the personality of which we have any
experience." 1 Now Lotze should have regarded this admission,
o 
McTaggart argues, as a reason for denying the personality of
the Absolute. For, as he points out, Lotze himself has contended 
that, since personality and spirit are never separated in our 
experience, they should never be separated in our theories, as is 
done by those who maintain that the Absolute is impersonal spirit, 
But if this be valid, McTaggart urges, it is equally valid to 
argue against Lotze that, since in our experience personality is 
never separated from the opposition of a non-Ego, it is illegi T 
timate to believe in a personality where this opposition is not 
possible. McTaggart has scored a good point against Lotze, but 
it may be questioned whether it does not bear more against his 
argument in refutation of the doctrine of an impersonal Absolute 
than against his views on personality. That this is so McTaggart 
very grudgingly concedes. "It is abstractly possible," he says, 
"that in some way utterly inexplicable to us the Absolute may be
1. McTaggart, Ibid., p. 69. 2. Ibid., sect. 72.
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personal. But," he adds, "this is the barest and most worthless 
abstraction of possibility." We may admit that this judgment 
is correct. Lotze, however, has advanced some weighty reasons 
for believing that this abstraction of possibility is actual 
reality. If he could have maintained the position, which he 
obviously hankered after, that self-feeling is a sufficient 
basis of personality and that, even in finite persons, the in- 
fluence of a non-Ego is unnecessary for the production of this 
feeling, then the way in which the Absolute is personal would 
no longer have been "inexplicable". But the admission to which 
he finally comes that this is not possible should have saved 
him from even the appearance of an attempt to do it.
Now, however, Lotze brings forward a contention that pro- 
mises to advance his argument considerably. It is not worked 
out to any great length by him, but he is extremely suggestive. 
His doctrine that the states of the Ego flow from its own nature, 
the objective world merely supplying the necessary initial 
stimulus, is one with which we would not wish unqualifiedly to 
identify ourselves; but his suggestion that our need of the non- 
Ego is not a producing cause of our personality but a limitation 
thereof due to our necessary relation, as finite, to the system 
of finite existences - this may prove to be a very valuable con- 
tribution to the discussion. A perfect personality, he argues, 
would be thoroughly transparent to itself, a complete unity in 
action, existing wholly for itself. Personality, in short, is 
"an ideal, which, like all ideals, belongs only to the Infinite
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as unconditioned, but to us, as every good, is only given as 
conditioned and therefore imperfect." It may be admitted that 
personality in us is only "a feeble reflection" of perfect per- 
sonality, and that the proper procedure in the study of personal- 
ity is to begin with the ideal; but when we come to the further 
conclusion that the Absolute is therefore a person, certain 
objections will have to be faced.
McTaggart, it should be noticed, admits neither of these 
points. "There is no reason to hold," he says, "that a finite 
person is necessarily an imperfect person," for there is no 
essential contradiction between determination from without and 
self-determiniation, and, indeed, the latter is realised through 
the former. This would seem to prove that finite personality 
can be perfect, and to disprove Lotze's contention that perfect 
personality is possible only for the Infinite. If, that is to 
say, personality in us is actually imperfect, that is not a 
necessary consequence of our finitude. If this point is con- 
ceded, and it seems to be both valid in itself and consonant with 1 
religious aspirations, then Lotze's claim will have to be nodi- 
fled to the extent that, in addition to the existence of a perfect 
Infinite Person, the possibility of perfect finite persons v/ill 
have to be admitted. If it is further conceded that, as a matter 
of fact, personality in finite persons is not perfect, then some 
explanation of its imperfection other than their finitude will 
have to be found; but it may still be claimed, \vith Lotze, that
1. Ibid., sect. 79 - 84.
finitude is not essential to personality. This brings us to 
rcTaggart's second point. "It may be freely admitted," he says, 
"that a perfect personality is a self-determined whole, not 
hampered and thwarted from the outside, and that the Absolute is 
such a whole"; but it does not follow from this, he urges, that 
the Absolute is a person. For, he continues, "not every self- 
determined whole is a person, and the Absolute may therefore be 
self-determined without being personal." It should, I think, be 
clear enough that this argument of Lotze's, in itself, does not 
prove the personality of the Absolute. I am not convinced, 
however, that Lotze intended it as such, even though I have 
included it among his proofs in the preceding chapter. Rather 
does his reasoning seem to run as follows. Y«Te have good reasons 
for believing that the Absolute is a person; we have also good 
reasons for believing that personality as we find it in finite 
centres is imperfect; therefore, since the Absolute alone is 
perfect as a person, the natural and reasonable procedure is to 
argue from the personality of the Absolute to that of the finite 
centres, and not, as is usually done, in the reverse direction. 
If this be his contention, McTaggart's argument, while true in 
its facts, is beside the point.
We have already referred to the contention of some modern 
Idealists that the Absolute is not personal, but super-personal, 
and we will not take up again the positive part of their teaching 
Certain aspects of their negative doctrine should, however, be 
referred to; and we will not endeavour to do more than that.
-Vr. Bradley charges most of those who insist on what they call 
"the personality of God" with, intellectual dishonesty. 1 For, 
he says, "the Deity, which they want, is of course finite, a 
person much like themselves, with thoughts and feelings limited 
and mutable in the process of time. They desire a person in the 
sense of a self, amongst and over against other selves;" but, 
he charges, they pretend to argue for a Deity who is neither 
finite nor mutable. The justice of this charge in general we 
are not prepared to debate, but it is obviously applicable to 
Lotze. For he both claims to be proving the personality of the 
Absolute, and yet really wants a God who is both mutable and a 
self which is, in some sense, "amongst and over a-gainst other 
selves." Whether it is possible to show that there is no 
essential chasm between the two views is also a question more 
general than we feel called upon to discuss; but we are ready 
to admit that Lotze has failed to bridge the chasm. This ad- 
mission is, in fact, but the recognition of that general weakness 
that we have previously laid bare, namely, his failure to achieve 
a satisfactory reconciliation between pluralism and monism, or 
to reject either.
Those who wish to regard the Absolute as a self will have to 
fs,&e also the argument whereby Bradley seeks to show that the
concept of the self is full of contradictions, and so is mere
o 
appearance. First he tries to attain a clear definition of
what we mean by the self, but every suggestion that occurs to
1. Appearance & Reality, p. 532.
2. Ibid., Chs. IX & X.
215.
him proves unsatisfactory from one point of view or another. This 
subtle enquiry, and its negative result, inevitably raise the 
question whether Lotze's handling of the subject is not too dog- 
matic. He has assumed that we know what we mean when we speak 
of the Ego and the 11011-250. Bradley would admit that the 
denotation of the term is in general clear; but his enquiries 
into its connotation, which of course must decide any particular 
question of its denotation, reveal a problem that Lotze betrays 
no suspicion of. Bradley then goes on to ask whether in the 
self may be found any special experience which will supply the 
key to the whole puzzle about reality, the puzzle as to the 
connection of diversity with unity. But he can find no sugges- 
tion that is not plainly inadequate and full of contradictions. 
His conclusion, therefore, is, "The self is no doubt the highest 
form of experience which we have, but, for all that, is not a 
true form. It does not give us the facts as they are in reality; 
and, as it gives them, they are appearance, appearance and error1.1 
In Wallace's opinion, personality is "only a position assumed to 
mark out and define individual existence." Its ideal involves 
a contradiction. On the one hand, "the complete penetration of 
all that comes within the compass of the person" involves the 
distinction between mine and thine; but, on the other hand,this 
distinction is eliminated by the essential universality of the 
mine. Whether there is in this any necessary contradiction may, 
I think, be seriously questioned. However, to continue with
1. Lectures & Essays, p. 278.
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Wallace, the only limitation of this universality can come from 
other personalities, and hence a person, he contends, is necess- 
arily f member of a world. The Absolute is therefore, he con- 
cludes, incapable of personality. For Bosanquet, the limitations 
of finite persons, though they doubtless have some value, are 
merely de facto; they are dependent on feeling, which again is 
dependent on our bodily constitution. Selves are adjectival, 
not substantial; they are elements in, not members of, the 
Absolute. He is able to hold this view because, for him, a self 
is merely a focus of content, the emphasis being laid on the 
"content 1 ' and the "focus", perhaps, hardly receiving serious 
consideration. These finite selves finally lose their individu- 
ality in the Absolute, in which they are maintained, if we may 
properly say this of them, only through the realisation and 
preservation of the values which they pursued in this life. He 
speaks of the universe as a conscious being; but it is not 
personal, because personality, he thinks, involves that finite- 
ness which is transcended in the Absolute.
Throughout our discussion of Lotze's theistic argument we 
have referred frequently to more modern thinkers, not that we 
wish to discuss their views, or feel competent to do so, but 
rather to indicate the broader aspects of the subject, the 
features of Lotze's work that are still received favourably, and 
the way in which the discussion has moved on since his day. Yfe 
may perhaps summarise our results as follows. Lotze has brought 
forward arguments, some of which are still regarded as weighty by
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thinkers of considerable authority, in favour of the personality 
of God, by which he means the Absolute. He has endeavoured to 
show that Infinity is not repugnant to Personality. This argu- 
ment resolves itself into the contention that arguments from 
personality in us to personality in G-od are moving in the wrong 
direction, and this, in addition to his insistance on the nec- 
essity of feeling for self-consciousness, is his re^ly to those 
who begin from finite persons and conclude that finiteness is s. 
condition of personality. Both of these points, in general, we 
were willing to accept. But we have seen that his discussion 
is weak in some of its details, that he takes more for granted 
than he was justified in doing, that the precise definition of 
some of his principle terms is lacking - a point which he him- 
self ur ;ed against the traditional cosmological argument - , and 
that an attempt nr.s since bee:; r.rcl^ <~y extremely inria^tiai 
thinkers to underline the very foundations on which rest triose 
of his arguments that appear to be most convincing.
We -must now leave the problem of personality, and glance 
briefly et a feature of Lotze's thinking that has been most 
frequently criticised, namely, his lack of a final system. We 
have already referred to it in the foregoing pages, and indicated 
what we regard as one of its most Important causes, namely, his 
preoccupation with the task of sifting and analysis. This is 
perhaps the natural consequence of his somewhat exaggerated 
reaction against system-building as it confronted lain in Hegel- 
ianisni. At present we are interested in only one of its aspects
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v.-hich we have called the problem of Lotze ' s sources. This in 
itself is a subject which v;ould demand, for its adequate dis- 
cussion, a thoroucli perusal of all his writings and much more 
space than we can devote to it; but we are bound to say some- 
thing, however inadequate, on the subject. V/e find Lotze con- 
tinually defending some doctrine, perhaps greatly purged from its 
accepted form, by describing it as a legitimate demand of science, 
of metaphysics, of living feeling; it is an aesthetic longing, 
or religion needs it, and so forth. Two questions arise at once
- first, how does he determine what is, and what is not, a 
legitimate demand in any of these fields?; and, second, what has 
he done to bring these potential contestants into an ultimate 
harmony? To answer the second question one would need to do for 
all the strands in Lotze's thinking what Sir Henry Jones has done 
mainly for his logic; and this task would be complicated by the 
fact, which we have noticed, that Lotze died before he was able 
to finish the exposition of his views. We have already noticed 
his tendency to make feeling the ultimate test, and have hinted 
that such a solution cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Nothing 
more can be done by us at present in this connection. The first 
question is also much wider than we can attempt at this late 
stage, but it is also, fortunately, much wider than our purposes 
involve. Our question rather is, How has he determined what is, 
and what is not, a legitimate demand of religion? Even in this 
restricted field we must be content to be suggestive, and not
1. cf. The Philosophy of Hermann Lotze.
219.
exhaustive.
We have seen how he regards religious knowledge as the 
result of the application of the forms of reason to data which 
he is willing to describe as due to the stimulation of our feel- 
ing by the Deity. This would lead us to expect that, for him, 
religion is an independent means for the attainment of knowledge, 
but his carefully guarded expressions in the opening section of 
the Philosophy of Religion suggest a doubt as to how definitely 
he is willing to stand by such a conclusion. When, in the 
fourth section of the same work, he turns to determine what 
kinds of feeling serve as the basis of religious knowledge, he 
leaves the way open for it, however, by recognising feelings of 
fear and dependence; but, though he concedes their effectiveness, 
he emphasises also their crudity in contrast with the nobler 
aesthetic and moral feelings which, along with them, exhaust the 
kinds of feeling in this connection. A religious doctrine, then, 
one gathers, must be based on a demand of feeling in one or more 
of these three forms, and, since all doctrines are the product 
of reflection, they must all, apparently, meet the test of meta- 
physical consistence. Lotze, however, as we have seen, is in- 
clined to reduce the latter to the former, and to make the test 
of intuition ultimate. Unfortunately, when he is concerned with 
the actual decision as to whether any particular doctrine, as it 
stands or in some modified form, is essential to religion, he is 
not always, indeed not often, careful to indicate which of the 
various tests determines his conclusion. What is more, he
220.
sometimes actually contrasts a religious need with one or other 
of the elements which, we were led to believe, constitute reli- 
gion. Thus his objection to the attempt to show how an imper- 
sonal Absolute became personal is that "an account of the way in 
which this result is reached is demanded by no religious need, 
but at the very most only by speculative curiosity." 1 Of course 
he is contrasting the practical interest of religion with the 
less directly practical interest of speculation, and in ordinary 
thinking such a contrast is legitimate enough; but in a study of 
the Philosophy of Religion it should be clearly recognised both 
that no interest is purely speculative, without practical bear- 
ings, and that, if reflection is indispensable to the formulation 
of a religious doctrine, it is highly improper to draw such an 
unqualified contrast between their respective claims. Again; he 
bases the doctrine of G-od's eternity on two foundations, - on 
the religious need for security, and on the aesthetic impressive- 
ness of the idea, - and he further emphasises the implied con- 
trast between these two bases by declaring that the latter is
p 
"apart from every religious need." But if aesthetic feeling is
one of the sources of religious knowledge, how can an aestheti- 
cally imposing idea be thus apart from every religious need? He 
offers certain interpretations of the doctrines of God's Unity, 
Omnipresence, and Omnipotence, which, he claims, are really what 
religion means to assert, but, in case we are not willing to 
accept his interpretations, we are not told how our false
1. Phil, of Reli.g., sect. 26. 2. Ibid., sect. 31.
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conceptions and his truer insight are to be recognised as such 
by us. We are told that religious faith in the personality of 
God, though it is involved in the metaphysical attributes, as he 
has shown'us, is actually arrived at by means of "familiar motives 
that lie nearer at hand." What he means by this we are left to 
infer for ourselves; but one fears that a son of India who 
sought in Lotze's writings for some enlightenment as to where 
his people have erred in thinking that religion does not demand 
a personal object at all would receive very little satisfaction. 
It should be noticed that we are not now criticising the deci- 
sions which Lotze makes as to what are the necessary doctrines 
of religion. It seems to us that he had a much keener insight 
in this respect than many of those who come to religion from 
philosophy with views already formed in the latter field. We 
have called in question only his indication of the grounds on 
which he bases these judgments, and it seems to us that he was 
probably influenced far more than he should have been by his 
religious environment. He seems to have largely overlooked the 
fact that his was a judgment educated in a particular religious 
tradition; but if he is gqin^, to decide for himself, on some 
principle of his own, what is essential for religion, then surely 
he should clearly indicate his principle, apply it consistently, 
and take into impartial consideration - unless he can justify 
some other course - the chief religious judgments of all mankind. 
But further; within the Christian environment on which he so 
largely, perhaps unconsciously, relies, there is a wide diversity
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of judgments. Surely we have a right to expect some indication 
of his method of solving these diversities. There is, for 
instance, the difference between trinitarianism and unitarianism. 
Lotze, as far as I can find, has no doctrine of the Holy Spirit 
at all, and he is willing to go with trinitarianism only as far 
as it intends to assert the unique value of Christ. He would 
obviously prefer that this subject be left in the real;- of 
feeling, since it cannot receive adequate expression. . The 
doctrine of the! satisfaction of Christ, precious to many 
Christians of general culture, is based, he thinks, on a crude 
conception of God, and on an "altogether impossible conception 
of a solidaric unity of the human race and of the possibility of 
a transfer of its guilt and obligation to a single representative 1 
The ideas of Reconciliation and Redemption do not specify the 
captivating power from which we are released. He thinks it must 
be the "order of natural law, which has connected sin with our 
finiteness and condemnation with our sin" - an idea that most 
Christians, we imagine, v/ould repudiate. Evidently he v.ill not 
creel it the doctrines of a Fall, a Personal Devil, or the prin- 
ciple of representation. Speculations as to the origin of sin 
and as to its consequences are, he thinks, "perfectly useless as 
regards the religious life"; nor does Eschatology permit of 
being speculatively cultivated. It is obvious, of course, that 
in every one of these opinions, there are many people who cannot 
agree with him; but whether we agree or not, in the absence of 
any sufficient principle of decision, his adherence to them
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ceases to have anything more than a 'biographical, importance.
In closing this re vie?/ of his theistic philosophy, we owe it 
to Lotze to indicate what we regard as his chief merits; and 
here we shall leave behind all question of the details of his 
argument. Philosophies must be judged, like persons, as much 
by their aims as by their deeds, and Lotze's has three which we 
wish especially to commend. In the first place, we think it one 
of his outstanding merits that he aimed to give due weight, not 
only to man's intellect, but also to the claims of feeling, of 
aesthetics, of morality, and of religion; and that he was willing 
to do this even if it must be done at the expense of a final 
system. Fie saw clearly that, in building a system, intellect 
has its materials supplied to it from various sources; that 
systems become coldly "rationalistic" when they unduly limit 
these sources; and, though he did show a tendency to confuse the 
intellect with the sources, he is to be commended for the fact 
that, in the collection of his data, he cast his net wide. A 
second merit is, perhaps, but an aspect of the first. He clearly: 
recognised that a. theistic argument, in particular, cannot shut 
itself up too closely. It must plant its feet on solid ground, 
he thought, and so its point of origin should be simple and in 
itself undoubted. In this, perhaps, he was influenced by the 
tendency which we have noticed in him towards what Bosanquet calls 
the "centrifugal type" of illusion, an attempt to take a "form 
of immediateness, understood as excluding mediation, for an 
absolute and reliable datum"; but he quickly recovers himself,
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if this be so, by offering a metaphysical proof of his starting- 
point. When, however, he has deduced from this all that he 
feels it will legitimately yield, he then proceeds, with a mag- 
nificent sweep, to press the whole world of experience into the 
service of his argument. In this, we are convinced, he mani- 
fests a true insight. And finally, we wish to indicate one 
decided merit in Lotze's attitude to the cosmological argument. 
.Vost of the forms of it which we examined in our opening chap- 
ter involve the idea of G-od as the final member of what would 
otherwise be an infinite causal regress. His remarks on the 
form which he takes as typical are not careful, as we saw in 
our second chapter, to differentiate between this idea and one 
that may be more satisfactory; in the elaboration of his own 
argument, however, he is arguing, not for a First Mover, an 
Initiator of the causal series of which the present universe 
is a stage, but for a present Cause who is, in theological 
terms, not a deistic Creator, but a sustaining Providence. 
Whatever one may think of the former idea,, it certainly is not 
sufficient without the latter, and if only one is to be adhered 
to the latter is clearly preferable. This idea is clearly 
recognised by Lotze in its distinction from the other, and is 
deliberately chosen by him. Many passages might be quoted to 
show this, but one will suffice. In the Iwicrocosmus 1 , he is 
discussing the problem as to whether and in what sense G-od may 
be said to have willed the world, and, with certain reservations,
1. Vol. II, p. 706 f.
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he finds the expression acceptable. Then he adds, "It is only 
for the finite being that will is principally an impulse towards 
change, towards the establishment of something which did not 
exist; but the real nature of will is only the approval by 
which the being that wills attributes to himself that which he 
wills, whether it is something that is to be realised in the 
future, or something that exists in eternal reality." He has, 
in other words, broken away from that idea of the exclusive 
transcendence of God which is implied in the eighteenth century 
cosmological arguments, and has endeavoured to work out one 
that will do more justice to G-od's immanence.
